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THE AUTHOR'S PREFACE
I would like to take this opportunity to inform both the people
who required me to write this thesis and who persuaded me to choose
this topic, that is, those people who have advised and taught me at
MIT, and its future readers, whomever they may be, that writing this
paper has been among the hardest things I have ever done in my life,
and my life has not exactly moved along a highway paved even with
asphalt, much less gold. I will spare you the more maudlin details,
and only give a few examples to point out the vehemence behind that
remark. I grew up in one of the more rural barrios of Coamo, a place
called Pasto. As a country kid, I, like all country people, rolled
up my pants-legs to prevent them from being soiled in the puddles
of unpaved lanes which had to be negotiated on the way to school,
and then upon arrival forgot to unroll them, a mark of moral and men-
tal depravity in the minds of the more citified students. I was
therefore not unaccustomed to patronizing remarks nor discrimination
nor the epithet of j Having committed a not illegal, but
nevertheless socially unacceptable indiscretion at the ripe age of
seventeen, I was shipped off to the new world of Cambridge, to be
supervised by a half-brother six years my elder. Thus I had had
much practice in learning to adapt to a system foreign to most of
what I had grown up knowing. My fortunes in Cambridge had gone up
and down; I thus was acquainted both with hob-nobbing with the rich
and powerful and with living and sleeping on the City Hall lawn.
All of this was, of course, very useful preparation for being a
graduate student at MIT.
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But nothing had ever assaulted my emotional supports as well
as my intellect in the same way that being the only Puerto Rican
immigrant in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning did. One
could have anticipated the usual attacks on the graduate student's
psyche and the sense of hurdle-jumping instilled by judges sitting
in a high tower watching the struggle below, clucking their tongues
at the figures so small in the distance. One could even anticipate
living with the omnipresent conviction that MIT was doing you a
favor, that as some poor Puerto Rican without the usual degrees
acquired in normal hurdle order, you would be, in the eyes of some,
a tolerated if paternally patted interloper. It came almost as a
revelation when I finally realized that I was doing MIT a few favors
too. Not only was I a statistic for their affirmative action
report, and a city document retrieval service for my fellow students,
but I was also a source of rare information about the city of Cam-
bridge, and indeed, the well was being pumped. One did get used to
the necessity of proving to one's professors, fellow students, and
eventually, so much doubt having been created, to oneself, that one
had earned every credit on that transcript as much as any other
student had. What one could not anticipate was the growing separa-
tion, imposed not merely by your own process of change, but much
more painfully, imposed by your own community, those people closest
to you, who insist that you are different, and though you try, you
cannot explain that you are not that different, and that you still
know whence you came. It is a cruel process, but having gone that
road, I know it to be irreversible.
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In addition to representing the embodiment of that whole
process, this thesis has presented additional dilemmas. When most
authors say that they were a participant-observer, they mean that
they simultaneously participated and observed. I did not. I was
a participant, not merely a participant, but an instigator, and
the observing has been a retrospective observing. Thus the writing
of this thesis has required a kind of self-analysis, and group analy-
sis by a member of.that group, that has not been pleasant or easy.
But the real problem in writing this thesis has been the necessity
of exposing both the strengths and particularly the weaknesses of
a community that does not deserve to have its dirty linen aired
before a puriently interested public. That that public will be much
more interested in our weaknesses than in our strengths, in our
infighting than in our needs and our goals is a suspicion that I can-
not dispel from my mind. I have, nevertheless, exposed them, and
my only consolation is the hope than within the Anglo community,
knowledge will bring concern, and within the Hispano community, that
the truth shall set us free of this plague. No doubt, some of my
friends at MIT will be offended by this preface, just as my Hispano
friends will be offended by the content. My only reply is that, to
the best of my ability, I have told the truth, and that this truth
must be faced before our problems can be solved.
It is also my pleasure to have this opportunity to thank the
various members of the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
who have helped me in numerous ways during the last four years,
and particularly my advisor and friend, Langley C. Keyes. That
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this thesis is now complete is due in large part to his patience,
his encouragement, and most importantly, his persistence in pursuing
me from one retreat to another. Each time that I had decided to
forget the whole thing, there was Langley, on the phone. It is
with a fine sense of relief that I am now able to repay, at least
in some small way, the faith that he has shown in me and in this
thesis.
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ABSTRACT
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the difficulties encoun-
tered in organizing and servicing Puerto Rican migrant communities
on the mainland are due to the fact that these communities are made
up of people from various municipalities in Puerto Rico, and that
these various municipalities do not share a common cultural heritage.
Inherent in this hypothesis is the argument that regionalism is still
a strong force on the island, and that the only reason that it has
not been more visible there is that, so long as these people remain
on the island in their home towns, relatively little contact occurs
between them. Once that contact is made within the mainland communi-
ties, however, these regional differences divide the community and
prevent the internal unity required for successful organization and
planning.
The case of the Puerto Rican community in Cambridge, Massachu-
setts (about 5,000 souls in a city of about 107,000) is used to
demonstrate the above hypothesis. This community's history is traced
from the late 1950's through 1975. The present thesis argues that
the conflicts between those people from the Municipality of Jayuya
and the Municipality of Coamo are due to the fundamentally different
cultural heritages that the two groups bring with them to Cambridge.
Secondly it is argued that these differences, not to mention the
city officials' ignorance of the community, were the fundamental
cause of various hostilities, particulary the October 1969 battle
between several hundred Puerto Ricans at Central Square, and that
these hostilities have thus far stood in the way of the organization
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of a unified Puerto Rican, and therefore a unified Hispano,
camunity.
Specifically this thesis argues that the jibaro cultural heri-
tage, a culture unique to Puerto Rico, has created the special prob-
lems in Cambridge. The Coameno comes from an area that has experi-
enced significant industrialization, and thus he has acquired urban
skills before his arrival in Cambridge. The Jayuyano's isolation
from this coastal change, on the other hand, has left him without
urban skills and with a political tradition of non-participation.
As a result, the Jayuyano has been unable to participate in what has
become a Coameno-dominated community.
The thesis further argues that this problem of regionalism can
only be overcome if special efforts are made both by the Hispano
leaders and by the city officials to develop local leadership among
the Jayuyanos and to create an atmosphere of trust.
viii
SECTION I. THE INTRODUCTION
PART ONE. THE HYPOTHESIS.
The hypothesis of this thesis is that the difficulties encoun-
tered in organizing and servicing Puerto Rican migrant communities
on the mainland are due to the fact that these communities are made
up of people from various municipalities in Puerto Rico, and that
these various municipalities do not share a common cultural heritage.
Inherant in this hypothesis is the argument that regionalism is still
a strong force on the island and that the only reason that it has
not been more visible there is that so long as these people remain
on the Island in their home towns relatively little contact occurs
between them. Once that contact is made within the mainland com-
munities, however, these regional differences divide the community
and prevent the internal unity required for successful organization
and planning.
The case of the Puerto Rican community (which numbers approxi-
mately 5,000) in Cambridge, Massachusetts (a city of about 107,000)
is used to demonstrate the above hypothesis. Specifically, this
thesis will argue that the conflicts between those people from
the Municipality of Jayuya and the Municipality of Coamo are due to
the fundamentally different cultural heritages that these two groups
bring with them to Cambridge. Secondly, it is argued that these
differences, not to mention the city officials' ignorance of the
community, were the fundamental cause of various hostilities, par-
ticularly the October 1969 battle between several hundred Puerto
Ricans at Central Square, and that these hostilities have thus far
1
2stood in the way of the organization of a unified Puerto Rican, and
therefore a unified Hispano, community.
PART TWO. METHODOLOGY.
It should be made clear from the outset that the author of this
thesis was a participant in many of the events decribed in this
thesis. As a member of the 1964 police delegation, he participated
in the event that marked the beginning of Puerto Rican activism in
Cambridge. And in June of 1975, the cut-off date for material ap-
pearing in this thesis, he was President of the Board of the Concilio
Hispano de Cambridge. This personal involvement in the events des-
cribed has in some ways been an advantage. The author has had access
to information that would otherwise not have been available, and he
has been in a position to evaluate how accurately the documents re-
flected the past they purport to describe.
That the author has been so intimately involved also has had
its disadvantages. One problem in writing a thesis about something
that one has been so thoroughly a part of is that one knows too
much, and is constantly having to make decisions about the propriety
of including or excluding various pieces of information. A second
problem of the participant is one of objectivity. The author came
to this country in 1961 from the Municipality of Coamo, and as a
Coameno he is a member of one of the two groups portrayed here, two
groups that have been in conflict with each other. The author has
tried to portray both groups as fairly and as critically as possi-
ble. le has tried to present accurately the feelings of both, and
3to be sympathetic to the reasons that they feel the way they dd.
Only the reader is in a position to judge whether or not he has
succeeded in this endeavor.
In addition to the two conflicting Puerto Rican groups, there
is another sometimes antagonistic pair in this thesis: the Hispano
leaders on one hand, and the various officials of this city on the
other. The author obviously was a member of one of these groups
too, and he does not claim to be an impartial observer in this res-
pect. He only claims that the facts presented here are accurate,
and that the interpretations are the result of careful analysis,
based not only upon his own opinions, but upon taped interviews with
those people directly involved and with others who were in a posi-
tion to shed some light on these events.
The information in this thesis is based in part on a selection
of the literature that has been published on Puerto Rican history
and migration, and on the files of the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge,
Inc., and of the Cambridge Alliance of Spanish-speaking Tenants, Inc.
What remains of the CEOC files for the years 1968 and 1969 and as-
sorted internal documents that he acquired as an employee of Model
Cities have also been used. He has also made extensive use of the
1970 Census of Puerto Rico and the publications of the City of Cam-
bridge Department of Planning and Development, including their pre-
sentations of the 1970 Census data, and a 1973 study entitled The
Hispano Population of Cambridge. The latter was carried out by Dr.
Susan E. Brown with the cooperation of the Concilio Hispano de Cam-
bridge.
4Extensive use of interviews has also been made. The author
interviewed 50 Jayuyanos and 50 Coamenos who lived in Cambridge
during this period. He began interviewing with a questionnaire in
hand, but he soon had to abandon that method. Because many of the
people interviewed were personally acquainted with the author and
knew that he already knew the answers to the questions that he was
asking, they could not really believe that the author intended them
to answer the questions. They would look at the author as if to
speculate on his sanity and then remark, "But you know about that."
Thus the author was forced to try some other methods.
After consultation with experts, the author changed his tactics.
With regard to the Coamenos, he asked a Spanish-speaking Anglo to
assist him, and with a concealed tape recorder they entered the
Hispanos' clubs. Sitting down next to a game of dominoes or cards
they would start a conversation which they would occasionally direct
onto the desired topic. And the Anglo could with some degree of
credibility ask questions in order to pursue some of their more re-
levant comments. These conversations would always attract a crowd,
and thus the Coamenu interviews were group interviews, which was
useful since the Coamenos were more talkative in a group.
The Jayuyanos were more difficult. They do not cluster in
groups in the bars. At most one finds one or two of them together,
and, on a given night, these pairs might be scattered throughout
the bars of Central Square. Furthermore the author found the Jayu-
yanos to be much more talkative in their homes around the dinner
table than in any other situation. He thus started visiting the
5various Jayuyano families which he had met over the years. (It was
absolutely fruitless to try to talk to those that did not know him.)
He would explain that as the President of the Concilio Board he was
trying to collect information that would help Concilio improve its
services. (The information was used for this purpose as well.) He
would add that the information would also be used for a project
that he was doing as a student at MIT. Those Jayuyanos who knew
him would talk under these conditions, and some of them were willing
to talk quite frankly. In the case of both Jayuyanos and Coamenos,
they were much more expansive when asked to describe their home
towns than when asked questions related to the problem of regional-
ism.
The author also interviewed 22 persons who were leaders, either
official or non-official, in Cambridge during the time that these
events occurred. The purposes of these interviews were to measure
the degree of their awareness of the Hispano community, their knowl-
edge of the community, and to discover what their perceptions were
of their own agency's response, and the responses of other agencies.
Like the Puerto Ricans, many of these respondents did not use
the interviews for the purpose that the author had intended them.
Actually, the interview process itself became a kind of political
pressure, since the officials had been given the questionnaire several
days prior to the actual interview. Many had taken this opportunity
to find out the answers to the questions. One actually had a copy
of the 1973 Brown Study (which contained answers to many of the ques-
tions) open during the interview, in spite of the fact that the author
6had asked him to put it away. He nonchalantly would turn to the ap-
propriate page and read off the correct answer. In addition, some
took advantage of this opportunity to express themselves on various
issues in a manner that was more appropriate for a public relations
campaign than a scientific survey. Nevertheless, the author did
manage to obtain some very useful information from these interviews.
If the Anglo population is not sensitive to differences among
Hispano nationalities, it is not surprising that they are almost
oblivious to Puerto Rican regionalism. Puerto Ricans, however, are
very much aware of regional stereotypes, even if they remain unaware
of their cost, the damage they have done to Puerto Rican political
unity. To offer just a few examples of these stereotypes, Ponce is
commonly regarded as being more socially conservative than San Juan,
whereas the people of Ponce consider themselves to be masters of
social finesse. In contrast to San Juan, Ponce's Spanish elite turned
up its nose at American businessmen in the early period of U.S. oc-
cupation. The people of Coamo call themselves "maratonistas" (mara-
thon runners), and those from Utuado boast that their town produces
the island's most beautiful women.
And when the people of these towns come to the mainland they
tend to form into "home town" settlements. For example, a study done
by the Cambridge CAP agency, CEOC, in 1969, comments that "In New
York, many people are from San Juan; in Boston, most Puerto Ricans
are from the...towns of Santurce and Ponce; in Cambridge, the majori-
ty of people are from...Coamo and Jayuya." It is this regionalism
7that has produced the raw material for the conflicts that plague
these communities.
PART THREE. USE OF TERMS.
Before we launch into this topic, there are a few items that
should be defined for the sake of precision. Words such as Hispano
and Spanish are often used carelessly, and the result is confusion.
A study done in 1973, for example, by the Alianza Hispana, Inc. of
Dorchester (a neighborhood of Boston) is called "Two-Hundred-Ten
Puerto Rican Families in Dorchester." But when one turns to its
introduction, one finds that it is not only about Puerto Ricans,
but about all Hispano mothers in that area.
Therefore, so as not to add to this already confused situation,
it should be made clear from the beginning that in this thesis the
term Hispano shall be used (as it is in Spanish) to refer to all
those people who have either themselves immigrated from the Spanish-
speaking nations of Latin America or from Spain itself, or who are
descendants of these people. Hispano is not actually a part of the
English language and normally should appear in print italicized to
indicate its foreign origin. However, since it is permissible not
to italicize those foreign words frequently used by English-speaking
persons, the author has taken the liberty of declaring Hispano a
frequently-used word, since in this thesis it certainly qualifies
as such.
In choosing to use the Spanish term Hispano, I have rejected
the English word Hispanic. If one looks Hispanic up in the dictionary,
8he will find that when used properly it refers not only to those
whom the author has defined as Hispano, but also to those persons
from Portugal or Portuguese-speaking areas.
This study deals exclusively with the Spanish-speaking. In
Cambridge the Portuguese community has its own organization and there-
fore is not related to the Concilio Hispano. Consequently, the
author has chosen to avoid this word.
The term Spanish-speaking also has been rejected on the grounds
of clarity. Some Anglos speak Spanish, and are thus Spanish-speaking,
but that does not make them Hispanos. In order to maintain this
distinction between the Hispano and those who speak Spanish but are
not from Spain or Latin America, I have confined the use of the
term Spanish-speaking (except in direct quotations or in the names
of organizations) to mean a person who is not necessarily a Hispano,
but who does speak Spanish. To further insure that this distinction
is maintained, the term Spanish-speaking, when used in this sense,
will usually be followed by a designation such as Anglo, as in a
Spanish-speaking Anglo. This distinction is important not only on
the grounds of orderliness, but important also because the term
Spanish-speaking is easily abused. It has happened that when a given
city agency was asked to provide a list of their Hispano employees
they produced a list that included many surnames that would not nor-
mally be associated with Hispanos. But since it is not that unusual
for Hispanos to have German, French, Italian or English names, a fur-
ther inquiry was made. It turned out that the agency had listed the
9names of all those persons that had indicated on their job applica-
tion that they had at some point in their life studied Spanish. The
institution did not even confine itself to those who had studied
Spanish successfully.
A third term that the author has rejected is one used by the
U.S. Government and many institutions, including MIT's financial
aid office. This is the easily-abused term, Spanish-surnamed. As
pointed out earlier, many Hispanos do not have Spanish surnames, and
the Anglo wife of an Hispano is not a Hispano.
Perhaps the use of the Anglo, too, should be clarified. Although
its etymology might suggest that it applies only to those persons
from the British Isles or possibly northern Europe, it is used in
this paper to refer to Irish-Americans, Italian-Americans, and other
assorted European-Americans. It is a word used by the Hispano popu-
lation to refer to the above-mentioned individuals, and it is more
polite than other words that Hispanos sometimes use, such as gringo.
Yet another clarification that needs to be made is one concern-
ing the two names that are applied to the planning department of
the Cambridge City Government. It should be pointed out that in
1975 the Community Development Program was superimposed upon the
Deaprtment of Planning and Development, and that after that date
the former title whould be used to refer to the deparment as a whole,
and the latter used to refer to one section of the Community Develop-
ment Program. However, to avoid switching terms and confusing the
reader, I have used the title Department of Planning and Development
throughout this thesis.
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PART FOUR. THE HISPANO CONTEXT.
Although this study focuses primarily on the regional differ-
ences within the Puerto Rican population, one should be aware that
these are not the only cultural difference among Hispano communities.
Every nationality carries with it the unique ethnic, social, geo-
graphical, historical and political traditions of its own nation,
and all of these traditions have been different in each particular
country of Latin America. The various Native Americans spread
throughout the area were not identical, nor were the various immi-
grant populations evenly distributed throughout the region. These
countries have fought different battles, and they have fought wars
among themselves, and they do not think they are any more alike
than Europeans think that Germans and Frenchmen are alike.
That the U.S. Government labels them all Spanish-surnamed ob-
scures these differences. This may be evidenced by the creation of
the Cabinet Committee on Opportunities for Spanish-speaking Peoples
in 1971. According to the chairman, Mr. Henry Ramiriz, this "...is
the only federal mechanism serving the nation's 12 million Spanish-
surnamed Americans." No consideration is given to the very real
differences among them, and thus govenment programs are often ill-
suited for the specific population of any given community. The
Government's failure to make these distinctions also leads to any
number of abuses, and most of these abuses are committed at the
expense of the Puerto Rican.
The Puerto Rican is the only Hispano whose entire homeland is
U.S. Territory, and thus he is the only Hispano assumed to be a U.S.
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citizen. Certain obvious differences are apparent between the Puer-
to Ricans and those not U.S. citizens, even without close in-depth
study. Because the Puerto Rican is an American citizen, he is en-
titled to all rights and privileges accorded a U.S. citizen under
the U.S. Constitution. The majority of Cubans who presently live
in Puerto Rico and the United States are there under Refugee Status
as accorded them under the 1965 International Agreement on Cuban
Refugees between the U.S. and Cuba. Predominantly, the Cubans are
not U.S. citizens, although they enjoy full benefit in all federal
programs. However, the following statement is indicative of the
Cuban situation before the 1965 Agreement, and in many ways reflec-
tive of the situation present today with other Hispanic nationali-
ties:
There is some conflict between other Spanish-speaking people
and Puerto Ricans, but it is mostly of a rather impersonal
sort. Generally, it is linked with the "discredit" which Puer-
to Ricans sometimes feel other Spanish-speaking throw upon
them, especially when in trouble, by claiming to be Puerto
Ricans, in order to enjoy the right of United States citizen-
ship. Apparently, this has come up in the past particularly
with Cubans, who attempt(ed) to enter and remain working in
the country by passing as Puerto Ricans. Some Puerto Ricans
tend to blame ither groups for the reputation they feel is
imputed wrongly to the Puerto Rican.
It is also interesting to review a situation existing in the
Public Welfare system. It was undoubtedly a surprise to the author,
upon asking the Director of the Department of Welfare how many Puer-
to Ricans are receiving Public Welfare, to learn that it was diffi-
cult for the worker to answer this question realistically as there
exists a phenomenon which she termed the "Instant Puerto Rican."
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She explained that "Instant Puerto Ricans are families that are not
Puerto Ricans, but declare themselves as such in order to collect
public welfare. On occasion, this situation has been encouraged by
sympathetic social workers upon seeing a family in distress, or more
commonly by not knowing the differences among Hispanos."
Looking at what has happened in welfare, one can readily under-
stand the benefits that a non-Puerto Rican Hispano can secure by
beating the system and taking advantage of the Anglo's ignorance, or
prejudice, or both. Yet how frequently is the Puerto Rican misrepre-
sented as a result?
The effects of this situation are obviously far-reaching and
merit further in-depth evaluation and research. This is not the
topic of the present study, however, but only background information
useful in understanding the tensions inherent in the mainland His-
pano community as a whole, and the more specific problem of region-
alism in the Puerto Rican community.
PART FOUR. A PREVIEW OF THE CONTENTS.
But it is not enough to tell this community that it has a prob-
lem, or even what that problem is. The Government of Puerto Rico
spends a great deal of money every year to have experts explain that
Puerto Rico has a problem. What is needed is not a diagnosis, but
a cure. And to discover the cure, one must trace the cause.
The body of this thesis begins in Section II with a short his-
tory of the island of Puerto Rico, and it does this for a purpose.
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To understand the origins of the town-centered regionalism of the
Puerto Rican migrant on the mainland, one must understand the his-
tory that created this regionalism. The Puerto Rican has been shaped
by forces that even no other Hispano nationality has encountered, at
least not in the same way or to the same extent. The result was
a culture unique to Puerto Rico, the culture of the jibaro, which
until this century characterized all of the island outside the city
limits of its coastal towns. These forces created an island made
up of isolated units, each different, with different customs, dif-
ferent vocabulary, and different ethnic mix. But the layer of cul-
tural difference that is most relevant to this thesis is that brought
about 'in the last 75 years by the impact of U.S. corporate invest-
ment. This economic development has brought about a major change
in the peoples of the coast. They are no longer a part of that ji-
baro culture, but a part of a culture that has evolved out of it and
away from it. It is this cultural legacy, this latest layer of
difference, that has provided the raw material for the problem in
Cambridge, and this diagnosis applies equally to the Jayuyanos who
arrive with that culture intact and to the Coameno who has only re-
cently abandoned it. The epithets that they throw at each other in
Cambridge refer not to sexual activities (although they do use these
in other contexts), but to the degree of urbanization and moderniza-
tion that their respective towns can claim. The Coaneno calls the
Jayuyano "Jibaro" or "Tomatero" (tomato head), while the Jayuyano
calls the Coameno "Orgulloso" or "Cara duro" (Hard-face). To under-
stand the seeds of truth behind such epithets one must go to the island.
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One must know this history to understand why two groups from
the same small island could be so different. Their history also
explains, in very general terms, why these people have come to Cam-
bridge. More importantly, it explains why they make the assumptions
that they do, and why they are exceedingly sensitive about some
things.
One must understand that the poor of Cambridge are not alike,
not even the Puerto Rican poor, and that the most important differ-
ences are not related to the pigmentation of the skin, but the ideas
in their heads. One can count the distribution of pigmentation (or
at least the census tries to) but the census cannot tell a planner
what is going on in the minds of a community. And even when one
talks to members of that community and finds out what they think,
one must know why they think that way to know how to change their
behavior, if that is necessary. And to know why they think the way
they do, one must know their history.
The second reason that one must know this history is a corol-
lary of the first. There has been a tendency in Cambridge to blame
either the Coamenos or the Jayuyanos, or both, for the hostilities
that have broken out between them. In one sense--that if they had
known better they could have done better in dealing with their dif-
ferences--one might be able to blame them. But placing all the
blame on them, the victims, is not only wrong, it precludes any
possibility of success in overcoming this problem. In reality,
that there is such an explosive mix can only be blamed on the forces
15
that have shaped the history of the island, the hurricane-like forces
that have blown across it.
Section II is a general outline of the history of the Hispano
community in Cambridge as a whole, from the late 1950's to 1975.
The emphasis here is on two things: the development of the hostili-
ties in Cambridge between the Coameno and the Jayuyano, and how
these hostilities have affected various institutions and programs
of the community. The second thing concerns the city's officials
and their lack of response. This section demonstrates that every
significant advance came only after the community had picketed,
demonstrated, sat-in, or threatened legal action. Thus the offi-
cials of Cambridge are not completely blameless, either. Their
own ignorance, which many do not admit or do not think relevant,
has tied the hands of the leaders of that community in specific
instances and in general.
In Section III there is much discussion of the Concilio Hispano
de Cambridge, Inc., and the members of its Board. For better or
worse, this institution and its leaders have been involved in every
major issue that has affected the community, and it is impossible
to discuss any specific problem, be it the undercount of the His-
pano population in the 1970 Census, unemployment, or housing, with-
out making reference to the activities of this institution and its
members. Nor is it possible to discuss regionalism as it manifested
itself in the Church, without making reference to the continuing
cooperation between Concilio and Father Sheehan, the priest at St.
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Mary's, and the similar problems that the two institutions faced as
a result of the regionalism manifested in the community.
In the last section, Section IV, the author has tried to assess
a number of things. First, which agencies in Cambridge responded
to the community, and why. Secondly, he offers an explanation of
why the agencies of the City of Cambridge have not offered the com-
munity decent services, and, third, he offers some possible solutions
to the problem. Specifically he offers one suggestion about how
the Hispano community and its leaders might try to overcome the vari-
ous problems that regionalism presents, and he offers a few sugges-
tions to the planners of the city with regard to what they might do
differently.
Mr. Fernando de Baca, special assistant to President Ford for
Hispanic and other minority language groups has recently declared
thatHispanos are well on their way to becoming this country's num-
ber one minority. Various attempts to count this population have
placed the total number in the United States at between 16 and 20
million. Since they are using their immigration quotas to the limit,
moreover, and their birthrate is twice as high as that of American
Blacks, he predicts the further rapid expansion of this population.
[New York Times,
At the same time, Mr. de Baca went on to lament the lack of
attention that this group has received from various public agencies.
"We've gone unnoticed, ignored, and neglected, but we're destined
to become a very important political force in the next two decades."
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But how can he be so optimistic when "the voter registration rate
for Spanish-speaking Americans is only about 35 percent of those eli-
gible--some twenty percent of the national average" [Ibid.]? As this
thesis demonstrates, the community has many problems to solve within
itself before it is going to be able to mobilize those numbers.
SECTION II. THE ISLAND
PART ONE. THE ORIGINS OF CULTURAL PLURALISM.
A. Borinquen, Spaniards, Africans, and the World Economy.
The origins of the hostilities in Cambridge, Massachusetts lie
in almost 400 years of Island history. Thus it is not an easy mat-
ter to explain without a review of that history. The planner must
know the community for which he plans, and to know the Puerto Rican
one must understand his origins. To understand where the Jayuyano
and the Coameno are coming from, one must understand first what they
have in common, and secondly, why they are different. It is for
this reason that the following synopsis of the major story lines of
that history is absolutely essential to the main arguments of this
thesis.
The island of Puerto Rico is one peak of a partially submerged
mountain chain that runs from Key West, Florida, almost to Venezuela.
Of the four large mountain-top islands--Cuba, Jamaica, Hispaniola
(Haiti and the Dominican Republic), and Puerto Rico, which.collec-
tively are the Greater Antilles--Puerto Rico lies the farthest to
the east, 1,050 miles from Florida. About 100 miles beyond Puerto
Rico the chain makes an abrupt turn toward the south, and the tips
above water become much smaller. The latter group is known as the
Lesser Antilles. During the age of European sea power that began in
the 15th century and lasted until the development of the airplane
in our own century, Puerto Rico stood as the outer gate to the entire
Caribbean region. The Atlantic Ocean washes its northern shore;
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the Caribbean Sea laps against the beaches of its southern coast.
About 100 miles long and 35 miles wide (that is, about half the
size of Massachusetts), Puerto Rico is 3,435 square miles of tropi-
cal paradise. With a remarkable stable temperature that hovers
around seventy-five degrees Fahrenheit in the winter and eighty de-
grees Fahrenheit in the summer, its sumptuous coastal plains and
white sand beaches would attract any passerby. The northeastern
trade winds that regulate her temperature also bring much rain,
especially to the northern two-thirds of the island, creating more
than a thousand streams, over 50 of which merit the designation
"rio" [Williams, p. 2]. Strewn-horizontally across the island, es-
pecially through its most middle strip, are mountains, whose jagged
peaks and steep valleys, along with the uneven plains that they
define, trace the body of a reclining woman, if one stares at the
contours long enough. The head and the torso (which make up about
the western three-quarters of the area) are called the Cordillera
Central; the northeastern leg is the Sierra de Luquillo; the south-
eastern leg, the Sierra de Cayey. Somewhat west of the island's
most central point, these mountains climb precipitously to their
highest and most forbidding. The highest peak of all, Cerro de Pun-
ta, towers 4,398 feet above the valley of Jayuya [Robert V. Masters,
pp. 17-19. This peak is often referred to as La Puntita en Jayuya].
In the 15th century, A.D., on this island of flowers, fruits,
and gurgling streams, lived a gentle people, the Borinqguen. Although
they were closely related to the Carib, their warlike neighbors on
the nearby islands, and although they spoke approximately the same
C &ET-SITE OF lhA
OF§~ CAUFN
20
language, Arawak, culturally they were a very different people. On
BorinquIn the women ruled, and women warriors defended this island
against their expansive, aggressive patriarchal neighbors. No one
knows how many there were before the invasions of the patriarchal
and even more war-like white man; many authors estimate around 30,000
[Stan Steiner, The Islands: The Worlds of the Puerto Ricans (New
York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1974), pp. 23-33].
The Borinquin were a settled agricultural people. Each of the
island's seventeen sub-groups had a territorial base, within which
it cultivated fields of corn, tobacco, sweet potatoes, peanuts, pep-
pers, yames (a white vegetable similar to a potato), yuca (from
which they made a bread called casabe'), and a host of other rare
and exotic products [Hauberg, p. 6 and Williams, Chapter One]. They
also gathered the island's fruits, herbs, and natural fibres, both
cotton and maguey, neither of which were cultivated, but were avail-
able for the picking.
Although the Borinuen did not possess sophisticated agricultu-
ral tools (they merely planted with a sharp stick), they were highly
skilled at carving stone; making multi-colored pottery; and spinning,
weaving, and dyeing wild fibres. From stone they made hatchets,
knives, and religious objects; from clay, various kitchen utensils,
storage vats, and, again, religious objects; and from fibre they made
fishing nets and lines, hammocks, and cloth. (Only married women,
however, wore any of the latter item, and that only below the waist.
[Williams, Chapter One.])
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Blessed by an abundance of mountain streams, the islanders lo-
cated their villages near water, so that they could bathe every
morning. After the bath, they would then paint themselves with a
red dye made from the juice of tree seeds. The dye, which was an
effective insecticide, was also used to color their food. It was
this dye that intensified the red of the bronze-colored Borinquen,
and inspired the European discoverers to dub them"la gente colorada,"
the red people [Steiner, p. 8].
The people lived in circular bamboo houses, called bohfos, which
were rather loosely and randomly clumped into villages. Inside the
ordinary home, which was usually just one room, would be a stove
made from three large stones. Its fire was kept constantly burning.
Hanging from the rafters of the roof were hammocks, in which the
people slept. High-backed, but short-legged chairs, made either
of stone or wood, lined the walls, and above them hung the masks of
the ancestors, from which perch they could oversee all affairs of
the household. These masks might be made either of clay or of stone,
and their presence in the home made it the only center of religious
activity, apart from the village plaza, or batey.
The layout of the villages makes it very clear that their
society was not completely classless. Every village had one main,
swept-bare dirt road that led directly into a large, swept-bare
batey. Facing the village batey was the house of the cacique, or
chief. Unlike the other houses of the village, the chief's house
was rectangular, possessed windows, and a plank floor made of palm
trunks. The rest of the village made do with just a door for
22
ventilation, and a pounded earth floor. Although the local cacique
might be either male or female, the island's supreme cacique, the
elected leader of all others, was male.
Borinquen society of the 15th century was not a pure matriarchy,
but it was matrilineal--the male positions of leadership were in-
herited through mothers or sisters. This fascinated the Europeans.
It was the woman who chose the man she wished to love. It was
the woman who ended a love, at will. And the men seemed to
have few rights [to] love, or even to their own children....
Village and family life was ruled by the women; the family
name, the ownership of the land, and the tribal leadership were
inherited through the women [Early travelogues, cited by Steiner,
pp. 26, 33].
Second in power only to the political cacique was the religious
bohique, a position that combined the functions of interpreter of
the gods and spirits, healer, and historian, and a position which
could be filled in the late fifteenth-century village either by male
or female. The overwhelmingly primary diety was the Earth Mother,
creator of life. She brought the warm rain and the crops. Next in
the pantheon was a male, Iluracan (from which English got its word
hurricane), whose winds brought death and destruction. The female-
male duality of the earthly power structure and human procreation
thus projected itself into the non-human realm. There were also
lesser spirits (cemies), historical personages and ancestors, and
the bohique attended their stone effigies which surrounded the
village batey.
That the bohique was also a curer was related to the belief that
disease was caused by possession. Spirits (the ephemeral forms of
the dead) took over an individual, and to get rid of the offending
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spirit, it was necessary to call in an expert-the one who knew
spirits and who could use this knowledge to control them, sometimes.
After inhaling snuff, the healer invoked rituals and trances, which
often involved medicinal herbs and nutritious foods. And since a
people must understand their origins and their past, in order to
learn from it, the bohiques memorized and passed on one to the other
the lessons of history, the stories of its heroes and heroines, as
well as its herbs [Williams, p. 7].
Also amazing to the Spaniards who arrived in the late 15th
century were the scenes that they witnessed at the open-air arenas,
especially large bateys, where religious ceremonies were held. As
on Mount Olympus, singing, dancing, and games made up the service,
as well as human phallic blood offering. (Phallic worship is as
common among matriarchal societies as breast fetish is in the modern
world. The dominant sex seems always to become fixated upon its
opposite's most protruding part. Columbus, incidentally, when
pressed for a description of Borinquen, resorted to the simile, "like
a woman's nipple on a round ball.") [Steiner, p. 20.] The largest
of the bateys were lined with large stones, carved and painted with
female deities. And before the eyes of their gods, women and men
divided into teams, not always by sex, and sought to keep a latex
ball in the air with their hands, heads and elbows. It was, essen-
tially, a netless game of volleyball, by which it was determined
just whose side God was on (Ibid., p. 10.]
Columbus first found this island, on November 19, 1493, only
because of female Borinquen guides, whom he had acquired quite by
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accident. On his second voyage to the "new world" (the inhabitants
of which he insisted on calling "Indians," since he had set out for
the East Indies), the Admiral and his crew happened upon one of the-
Lesser Antilles. Having gone ashore to find food, they instead found
women, Borinqud'n prisoners of war, held by the local Carib. Seizing
upon this gift from the oceans (and a sudden disappearance of the
Carib as a result), the women persuaded Columbus that there was a
much better place to forage for food-their home, the island of
Borinqudn. (The conversation took place through Carib interpreters,
men whom Columbus had taken on his previous voyage.) After Colum-
bus and his crew had "enjoyed" them for eight days, he did agree
to give the women a ride home, but as soon as their own beaches were
sighted one night, he lost them. They jumped overboard and swam
ashore. The next morning, when the men of the old world embarked,
the Borinquen, following the Carib precedent, had disappeared.
The Spanish conquistadors were of the opinion that they had
found a new Garden of Eden. Nightingales sang in November and the
maidens were shamelessly naked. Only the married women wore a cloth
wrapped around them like a skirt. The "gentle and friendly" Indians
were "almost Biblical in their innocence, giving 'all they have' to
strangers, offering 'great love towards all in preference to them-
selves" [Christopher Columbus in a letter to the King and Queen of
Spain, cited by Steiner, p. 21. For the story of the female POW's,
see p. 26). The English poet John Donne (1573-1631), always associ-
ated in U.S. published history books with staid religious preoccupa-
tions, nevertheless thought that Columbus had found a good thing:
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Licence my roving hands, and let them go,
Before, behind, between, above, below.
o my America! my new-found land...
My mine of precious stones, Hy Empery,
How blest am I in discovering thee! [Cited by
Steiner, p. 27]
If the Borinquen women loved well, they also fought well, with
"a strange fury." The Garden of Eden, it seemed, harbored Amazons.
During the Easter season of 1496 Columbus and crew, while in search
of food, happened upon another group of Borinqu~n women. But this
time they were not prisoners of war, but women in war-paint. With
feathers in their hair, necklaces of animal teeth and bone around
their necks, and bows and arrows in their hands, they set upon the
Spanish foragers. They were, of course, no match for guns from Lom-
bardy, and they lost. And yet when one man of the Canary Islands
attempted to rape a Borinquen cacique, instead of escaping while
she could, she attempted to kill the man. And she would have, if
his fellow men had not intervened.[Steiner, p. 23].
In 1499 the captain and crew of another Spanish ship, while
foraging for food on Borinque'n, found gold [Williams, p. 15), the
lure of the New World, and its curse. Then, in 1504, the first
slaves arrived. There were five of them, and they arrived in chains,
by order of the King. They were women; they were white, Christian,
European women, "aging widows," who had been rescued from Moslem
captors in the general Islamic retreat out of Europe. Too sullied
for Spanish society at home, the King shipped them off to the New
World to be "sexual servants" of the poor, struggling, but ever
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hopeful conquistadors left behind on Borinquin. And in the absence
of old world amenities, they took up the life-style of the Borifiquen
women, as they had lived the life of Moslem women before. Now to
be blessed with Spanish men, they constituted the main part of the
slave trade for ten years, and their children were the first criollos,
second-class Spaniards, born of this New World [Federico Ribes Tovar,
The Puerto Rican Woman (New York: Plus Ultra Publishers, 1972),
pp. 33-34. Also see Steiner, p. 58].
In 1508 came Juan Ponce de Leon, a plebian soldier. As a reward
for his services as Indian subduer on Hispaniola, its Spanish
governor had permitted him to take charge of an expedition to
colonize Borinquin. Ponce arrived with fifty men on August 12, 1508.
With him was the first African to ever set foot on the island, a
free man, an ex-slave, Juan Garrido. Born in what is now Angola,
he had been taken as slave to Spain and baptized Christian. After
purchasing his freedom, of his own accord, he sailed to Hispaniola
where he had fought the Carib alongside Ponce. He then accompanied
Ponce to Borinquen, as he was later to accompany him to the "island"
of Florida, where he was also the first African to set foot in what
is now the U.S.A., more than a century before the Puritans debarked
onto the rocks. Still later, he accompanied Cortez on his expedition
against the peoples of Mexico, where he became the first man, of any
color, to plant wheat on the American mainland [Williams, p. 16].
Ponce told the Boriquen that the white men were gods, and immortal.
And the supreme cacique, Agueybana the Elder, received them, and
helped them find the golden nuggets, which they craved. He led them
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to a beautiful natural harbor on the northern side of the island,
which Ponce called Puerto Rico, and to a nearby river called Toa,
which Ponce renamed Rio Grande de Lofza.
Lofza was the female cacique who reigned over the territory
surrounding the fertile lower reaches of this river. She told him
that the most powerful gods of the island lived in this place, and
that she had the powers to invoke them. She also told him that
Borinquen was ruled by women. And Columbus wrote home, the women
[do] seem to work more hard than men."[Steiner, p. 24] Nearby was
the Cave of Maria, the site where the oldest skeletons of the
ancient peoples of the island have been found. But more important
to Columbus, there was gold in the bed of the river.
Agueybana the Elder, supreme cacigue, also brought people to
help Ponce find the nuggets, and they stayed to show the Spaniards
how to cultivate the local crops, and how to live on this island.
In 1509 another Spanish ship arrived, bringing more settlers, and
it is probable that the first African slaves on Borinquan came with
them [Williams, pp. 16-17].
The next thiraq that Ponce did, in order to teach the Borinquen
the true religion and a better way of life, he said, was to give
a group of them to each Spanish settler, a group that would be under
each conquistador's personal care. The Spanish word for this new
institution was repartimentos, or the distribution. It went hand
in hand with Catholic conversion and forced labor in the mines and
in the fields.
But the Borinquen ran away, to hide in the mountains. The
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Spaniards hunted them down, for how could they live as noble lords,
as patrones without serfs? The Borinquen first tested the Spanish
claim to immortality, by drowning a Spaniard in a high mountain
stream, and having proved to themselves that these men were not gods,
but liars, they revolted.
Agueybana had died, and his brother Guaybana was now supreme
cacique. As leader of the revolt he was joined by a Carib refugee
from Ponce's conquest of Hispaniola, Guarionex. Guaybana was killed,
but Guarionex established a guerrilla base in the territory of
Otoao, the cacique of the highest mountains. Otoao (for the territory
is named for its cacique) stretches from what is today Lares on the
west to Jayuya on the east.
Although the rebellion in 1511 killed half the Spaniards on
the island, it failed. And the Indians died; some people say they
died out. They died in the gold mines, or due to harsh treatment
by their new masters, or due to new diseases from the Old World, or
by suicide. But many of them did flee to the mountains, to the
"entrails and subterrain paths of the earth," the caves of the
highlands.
The bohiques of Otoao have kept their history alive for four
hundred and fifty years. When an American writer visited the old
land of Otoao, as recently as the early 1970's, the local holder of
the history and the herbs showed him the ceremonial grounds and the
painted stone carvings of the Earth Goddess. And he repeated the
story of the refugee leader of the 1511 revolt. "That is why the
fields are here. That is why they built the batey so big. That is
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why there are so many Ceremonial Grounds here." [Steiner, pp. 17, 111.
The Borinquen who fled to the mountains were the first Puerto
Rican j{baros. In Arawak the word meant wild; by 1511, it had come
to mean free, escaped into the mountains, into Otoao.
B. Isolation under Spain.
Although Puerto Rican history is in some ways a part of general
Caribbean history, the history of gold-seekers and sugar slavery,
Borinque'n remained unique. There were two overwhelming facts of
nature that made this particular island different: its strategic
military position as the outer gate to the whole Caribbean area, and
the rapid and early depletion of what turned out to be meager de-
posits of gold. When the gold ran out, no Spaniard wanted to go
there; the ones who had already arrived wanted to leave, to go to
Peru or Mexico.
But the Council of the Indies, set up in Madrid in 1511, with
complete authority over Spain's New World conquests, insisted that
Spaniards stay, for strategic, military reasons. Puerto Rico was
"unique because the Council of the Indies treated the island not so
much as territory to be colonized as a strategic outpost of empire
--the cockpit...of the Hispanic Caribbean defense system" [Lewis,
p. 47]. The result was that all things civilian on the island, in-
cluding its economic development, were subordinate to military fiat
and the defense of Spain's already old-fashioned and therefore
threatened Catholic and mercantile world. It was only a Spanish-
imposed isolation that would preserve this world into the 19th cen-
tury.
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For our purposes, its overwhelming importance as a strategic
holdout of the obsolete had two consequences. Compared to the other
big three of the Greater Antilles--Cuba, Hispaniola, and Jamaica--
Puerto Rico received fewer African slaves. Slaves were related to
profit-making enterprises, and since there were fewer prospects for
profit, fewer slaves were brought. And since the slaves were
brought by money-lending mercantile houses of the coast, those who
owned the sugar mills, they and their descendents tended to live on
the coast. There is little evidence of their presence on the island
in the Cordillera Central; those that live in the mountains live in
the ranges of the east, Luquillo and Cayey. The earliest African
slaves, by some quirk of fate, were Wolofs (sometimes, Jelofe) from
what is today Senegal. They were members of the Nation of Islam,
arch-enemy of Catholic Spain. They, like the Borinqueni, did not
make very good slaves. They, too, fled to the mountains where they
joined the Borinqudrn in the caves. And since the Wolof men outnum-
bered their own women four to one, they often lived together with
Borinquin women. These unions, and the children that they produced,
created very strong bonds between the African and the Borinqudn.
Just fifteen miles from what is today San Juan, and about that
far from the gold mines, there is a village, Lofza Aldea. Aldea is
an Arabic word for village; thus, at least one word of the Islamic
tradition dots the map of Puerto Rico. That they named their aldea
Lo'za, after the femak cacique of the area to which they had ori-
ginally been brought, was a tribute to the Borinqultn women who had
received them. The spiritualism of western Africa thus joined itself
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with that of the Borinqudn, and the village of Aldea Loiza, to this
day, maintains a reputation for the supernatural. The Wolof, too,
became jbaro, and blended in with and identified with the Borinquen.
After 1532, the sugar mill owners had persuaded Madrid to pro-
hibit the sale of heretical Wolof to anyone on the island. The
slaveships now delivered up Yorubas and Ibo from the Slave Coast (now
Nigeria), Ashantis from the interior and Fantes from the coastal
areas of the Gold Coast (now Ghana), and Bakongos (from what is now
Congo, Brazziville, Zaire, and northern Angold). They also brought
more members of the Nation of Islam, whether they realized it or not,
the Mandinke (from the coastal areas of Gambia and Sierra Leone)
[Steiner, pp. 53-66. Steiner's misspellings of African names have
been corrected].
While slavery under the Spaniards was never benign, it was dif-
ferent from that in the southern United States. Most importantly,
slaves were allowed to marry whomever they wanted, and it was pos-
sible to purchase one's own freedom or that of one's family at the
lowest market price. And, since the Puerto Rican sugar business
rarely boomed, the prices were not impossibly high. These two as-
pects of Puerto Rican slavery meant that there were many mixed
marriages, and that many of the slaves in Puerto Rico went free.
That Garrido, the first African, arrived on the island a free
man is symbolic of the African experience generally. Not only did
Puerto Rico have fewer slaves, but also it became a haven for those
escaped from other islands, particularly those of the Protestant
Dutch and English. The only requirement exacted of these new
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immigrants, fugitives who were declared "free" upon arrival, was a
declaration of loyalty to Spain and to the Catholic Church. So many
African slaves had taken advantage of this opportunity by 1714 that
they had established their own town, San Mateo de Cangrejos, which
is today the Santurce section of San Juan [Williams, p. 65].
In 1787 it was estimated that of a total population of approxi-
mately 100,000 people, 79 percent were free (either Spanish, or
mostly Spanish), 11 percent were slaves (African or mulatto), 8 per-
cent were free Africans, and the census takers managed to count 2
percent who were Boringuen. (This, no doubt, is an undercount of
Borinquen, and probably represents the urban, visible Borinquen only,
many of whom were servants in Spanish households.) Due to the con-
tinued arrival of these new ifbaros, by 1827 the free Africans and
mulattos outnumbered the slaves four to one (127,287 to 34,240)
[Steiner, pp. 60-61].
The second consequence of the overriding importance of military
and strategic concerns was a large Spanish "drop-out" population,
men who had deserted the amenities of the Spanish urban enclaves to
take up life in the countryside. There Old Spain blended with the
Borinquin and African jfbaro civilization to create the second 1jf-
baro: the romanticized, impoverished man of the soil. These jibaros
were not confined to the mountains; they reached to the very limits
of the Spanish city. They and their lives were unique to the island
of Puerto Rico, and thus when the urban criollos began their psycho-
logical search for Puerto Rican identity, they settled on this man,
the man who wore the para, the jbaro's big straw hat.
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It was this b population the Dr. Ricardo Alegria, Director
of the Institute of Puerto Rican Culture, referred to when he called
Puerto Rico "the country of the small former." "Our island has al-
ways been the country of the small farmer, the individual landowner.
It is a mistake to say that Puerto Rico was part of the slave 'plan-
tation system"' [Steiner, p. 60]. But they were not the small farm-
ers portrayed in U.S. history and mythology. The myth and the reali-
ty of the Puerto Rican jfbaro was altogether different, and more
resembled Appalachia than any other segment of U.S. life. "Scattered
throughout the mountains, living usually in isolated and remote
places, people who were so poor that they had to accept self-suffi-
ciency or so independent that they would accept poverty developed
a simple subsistence way of life that resembled that of the Tafno
[Borinque'n] more than the Spanish. Their houses were thatched like
the Tafno Bohf'os; they cultivated Tafno crops, slept in hammocks,
learned the medicinal and magical. uses of herbs....Isolated almost
completely from the culture, ideas, and technologies developing in
Spain, the jfbaros developed ways of their own--and at the same time
preserved some things, such as certain pronunciations of the Spanish
language, that time and progress eliminated from the mainstream of
Spanish culture" [Williams, p. 56].
The rather pathetic plebian Spanish soldiers left on Borinqun,
the raw material for this second jibaro, were men of many pretensions,
but few means. To finance their search for gold the colonists had
borrowed extensively from the local branches of Spanish mercantile
houses, who monopolized all flour, oil, wine, clothing, and manufac-
tured goods, and who controlled a committee of the Council of the
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Indies, the Casa de Contratacio'n. Its main purpose was to insure
that all profits went into the King's coffers; toward this end they
had complete control over who traded what, with whom, and for how
much. [Williams, pp. 32-33, 28] The soldiers frequently defaulted,
even when they tried to diversify into the new gold, sugar cane. Due
to raids from Carib Indians, French and English pirates, smallpox
epidemics, and the fierce winds of Huracan, not to mention the strangle-
hold of the moneylenders, they more often than not ended up losing
all they had, and sought to escape this unhappy, spirit-jinxed island.
But they could not; Madrid had declared the death penalty for those
caught in the act of deserting Borinquen. Many of these Spaniards
joined the first jibaros in the foothills and the mountains, and
learned to live, as they did, off the fruits of the Earth Goddess.
Spanish rule in Puerto Rico not only tolerated mixed marriages
between slaves and Borinqun, it tolerated much more open cohabita-
tion between Spaniards and African or mulatto women. In addition,
because they could not afford a real Spanish wife, many of those
poor conquistadors took meztizo or Borinque'n concubines, whom they
lived with but did niot support. By 1569, the majority of the whites
lived with African, Borinquen or meztizo women [Ribes Tovar, p. 44].
Although the Council of the Indies in Madrid tried every tactic
that its collective mind could think of, they could not stop such
practices. Thus, it was reasonable for an old man of San Juan to ex-
plain, "My second grandfather told me the Spaniard like very much
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the black race....And they mix the race. That's the reason there
is no pure black. Nobody here is pure black. There is many mixes,
Spanish race, Indian race, and black race. Nobody can say, 'I am
pure....' Everywhere there is mixture" [Steiner, p. 65). One com-
mon Puerto Rican saying is "El que no tiene Tinga, tiene Mandinga."
Or, in English, "If you don't have the blood of the Tinga, you have
the blood of the Mandinga."
The society that grew up under Spanish rule was mixed, both in
terms of color and culture, but not mixed evenly. The criollo elite,
in the 17th century, lived in the four "big cities:" the coastal
(or foothills) towns of San Juan, San German, Arecibo, and Coamo
[Williams, p. 56]. In these towns the rule of Spain, the King and
the Church and the mercantile monopolies, was dominant. Along the
coasts, where in the beginning the sugar was produced largely by
slaves, and where free Africans established their fishing villages,
the African gene-pool prevailed. And in the countryside, in the
hills and in the mountains, there was the , the escaped sub-
sistance farmer, who could be criollo, meztizo, or pure Borinqudn.
A large part of this ifbaro mix was Spanish, especially with regard
to the men.
...The Puerto Rican proletarian, and especially the campesino
of the mountain and country districts, developed into a unique
pre-industrial character type..., the beginnings of the peasant
class so typical of Puerto Rican society even today....le in-
herited, to begin with, the anti-social individualism of the
early Spanish settlers....The habits of indolence were encouraged
by a sweet climate that required very little clothing by way
of protection, so that one could be content with an ordinary
striped shirt and a pair of loose trousers, and since everybody
lived thus, there were no reasons for competing one against the
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other; and the sentiment was reinforced by the fertility of
the land and the luxuriance of its wild fruits....This indivi-
dual mounted on his emaciated horse, dressed in a broad-brimmed
straw hat, cotton jacket, clean shirt and checkered pantaloons,
sallies forth from his cabin to mass, to a cockfight or to a
dance, thinking himself the most independent and happy being
in existence. [Lewis, p. 57.]
That was the idealization, the romantic image believed not only
by the outside observer, but also by this . The reality was a
"poverty of terrible dimensions" [Lewis, p. 57]. The second iftaro
was either a propertyless farm laborer or a subsistence farmer en-
gulfed by the world of the socially distant Spanish hacendado, who,
in both cases, assumed the role of protector and provider with regard
to the community that provided him his living.
But the image was as important as the reality. "The portrait
helps to explain the massive psychological power of insularismo in
the island tradition and the comparative absence of any sense of
unity and identity between the various groups of a community
so much physically separated from each other. [Lewis, pp. 57-58.]
The women, the descendants of the Borinquen caciques who had
ruled, took over, and, essentially, took care of these conquistadores
and their children. The sphere of the woman has most vigorously
continued the Borinqun traditions: in their food and the way it is
prepared, the construction of the home, in the crops and fruits, in
the furniture, and in their belief in spirits and the Earth Mother.
The instruments of jibaro music are a blend of Borinque'n, African,
and Spanish; while the tunes, especially the parrandas (Christmas
carolings) are clearly inspired by traditions of southern Spain, as
are their dances [Seda, p. 44].
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They also took care of their men's quixotic psyches by bending,
accommodating to the requirements of the male's sense of dignity
and, at least in public, by giving him the respect that he thought
was his due. But one should not be misled. The descendents of
former Muslim captives and Borinqudin caciques are not like the women
of Spain; they have never developed any inhibitions against physical
combat, and they still, sometimes behind the scene and sometimes
openly, run their villages, control the local spirits, and nurse the
sick in the Borinquen way. That Felisa Rincon Marrero was mayor of
San Juan (and in Puerto Rico the mayor of San Juan is as powerful
as the governor) from 1946 to 1968 was no abberation, but a common
pattern, writ large. [Ribes-Tovar, p. 237].
Spain managed to keep Puerto Rico more or less sealed off from
the rest of the world until the 19th century. But throughout its
last century of rule it was fighting a losing battle against the
forces of criollo nationalism in the new world as well as the growing
economic power of the United States. Between 1811 and 1830, Spain's
territories in the New World had been reduced to what was essentially
Cuba and Puerto Rico. Seriously weakened by a series of wars, de-
clared and undeclared, civil and international, Spain was an easy
target for the exploding independence movements throughout Latin
America. And to what refuge would the Spanish, reactionary, anti-
republican, anti-protestant refugees go? They went to Puerto Rico,
where the Spanish were determined to make a last-ditch stand. So
many of them came that the population balance shifted again, and Puer-
to Rico had a white, Spanish majority by 1830. [Lewis, p. 58.]
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What was already one of the most mixed cultures of this world
was now the recipient of new ingredients, as new hurricane-like for-
ces blew over Puerto Rican beaches, adding new ingredients to the
"genetic bouillabaise."
In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
Frenchmen came from Louisiana when it was bought by the United
States, and from Haiti when the slaves revolted. The Latin
American wars for independence brought loyalist Spaniards and
Venezuelans. As the slave-sugar economy flourished, Scotch
and Irish farmers came from the province of Galicia and the
Canary Islands. In the 1840's, a labor shortage brought
Chinese coolies to Cuba and Puerto Rico where, in the latter,
they helped [re-]build the Central Highway. Italians, Corsi-
cans, and Lebanese also spiced the melting pot. [Wagenheim,
pp. 92-931.
"...And from Philadelphia, strangely enough, came a large group of
Irish Catholics," who have added a red-haired, blue-eyed gene-pool
into the mix around Castaner and Utuado. [Masters, p. 27.]
By the end of Spanish rule in 1898 Puerto Rico had become an
island of cultural islands.
It is revealing that in 1898 the capital city had a population
of less than thirty-five thousand and there were only eighteen
towns with populations in excess of twenty-five hundred. The
separation between town and countryside was exacerbated by an
almost medieval communication system....Even journeying from
hamlet to hamlet was a hazardous enterprise, and this, combined
with the difficult mountainous terrain of the interior high-
lands, added its own contribution to the endemic parochialism
and cultural philistinism of rural life. [Lewis, p. 560]
Each hamlet was left to mix its own ingredients in its own man-
ner, creating not one culture, but many. Anthropologists who have
tackled the problem of defining a Puerto Rican culture have had an
exceedingly difficult time.
Apart from consensual unions, which are not registered, another
distinction among marriages in Puerto Rico which is quite sig-
nificant is difference in type of ceremony, whether civil,
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Protestant, or Catholic....When one realizes that Aguada is
the municipio contiguous to Aguadilla, the difference in type
of marriage ceremony is striking. It is difficult to explain
the absence of any Protestant marriages in Barranquitas and
the high rate of civil marriage in Santa Isabel. What is clear
is that type of marriage ceremony differs sharply from one area
of the Island to another. There is no consistent pattern which
can be called "Puerto Rican." [Fitzpatrick, pp. 88-89, empha-
sis added.]
C. The Modern World Breaks In.
It was during the 19th century that the isolation of Puerto
Rico began to break down. The refugees from nationalism and Protes-
tantism, the urban loyalist elites from all of Spain's former colo-
nies concentrated in Puerto Rico, and among them were many with en-
trepreneurial talents and experience, men who were not molded by the
Spanish mercantile monopoly that had characterized Puerto Rico. They
produced a more modern economic boom in the coastal areas. American
capital, too, began to find its way to Puerto Rico, as the U.S. role
in Latin America grew. And ideas penetrated. The urban criollo be-
gan to catch the new world fever, to dream of autonomy, if not inde-
pendence. They lobbied in Spain, they wrote books and poems, and
they also inspired the ifbaro.
In January of 1868 Dr. Ramon Emeterio Betances issued the "Ten
Commandments of Liberty," the first of which was the abolition of
slavery. In February, when he learned of a U.S. offer to buy Cuba
and Puerto Rico from Spain, he issued the "Provisional Constitution
of the Puerto Rican Revolution," a document that called for the in-
dependence of Puerto Rico.
It was the jfbaros of Otoao who responded, rising up in the
first major mass act of violent protest against Spain since the
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Borinque'n had risen from Otoao in 1511. The tobacco farmers of the
mountains, caught between the Spanist mercantilists on the coasts,
the hacendados of the large estates, and the increased pressures and
competition coming from the new coastal entrepreneurs, arose in the
classic peasant fashion. It was a short, swift uprising, aimed more
at expressing grievances, shaming the conscience of the rulers, and
communicating over their heads to the ultimate powers at the center*,
powers assumed to be benevolent. The ifbaro made no pronouncements;
he had no program for ruling. El Grito de Lares of September, 1868,
was an outburst of fury and frustration, a cry from the inarticulate
of Otoao. [Silen, pp. 28-31].
The Outcry from Lares, from Otoao, in turn inspired the indepen-
dence forces of the criollo coast.
The Grito de Lares marked the birth of our Puerto Rican
nationality. It was the voice of a Puerto Rico that had its
own interests and its own consciousness. Those interests had
collided with the interests of Spain, with the Spanish govern-
ment....The jibaro, as the man who produced the coffee on the
hacienda, was cast in the leading revolutionary role of the
anonymous hero fighting for the demands of his class. In join-
ing the revolution he put his protest on the line against the
privileges and luxury of a tiny minority. From that day on,
the ifbaro was the people. [Silen, p. 31.)
After 1868, in the coastal cities of the criollo, "civic asso-
ciations, clubs, casinos, and circles of a recreational type mush-
roomed," and politics became the preoccupation of the day. Indepen-
dence or autonomy, negotiation or revolution were the issues of the
day, and generally negotiations for autonomy won out. In 1897 Spain
granted autonomy to Puerto Rico, under extreme pressures from out-
side forces, but before the Puerto Ricans could discover whether
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that autonomy would be real or not, the army of the United States
invaded in the autumn of 1898, and Puerto Rico was declared a ter-
ritory of the United States. The only serious resistance to the
U.S. takeover came from the machete bearers of Otoao, the horse-
back riding guerrillas who resisted Spain's replacement. Again,
the struggle was quick and violent, and they lost.
The Puerto Rico that the North Americans seized in 1898 (along
with Guam and the Philippines) was already a segmented society. The
North American presence, and its impact on transportation, communi-
cation, and education, however, did not serve to unify those dispa-
rate parts. Rather, it reinforced them. Private investment as well
as government spending has a strong tendency to clump in those
areas where the return on profit will be reasonably rapid or the
results rapidly apparent, and thus urban areas tended to become-more
urban, and the rural areas fall, relatively, further and further
behind.
Not only did the North American presence not overcome the cul-
tural segmentation, it has added new layers to the veneer. This
former bastion of Catholicism has been somewhat penetrated by various
Protestant denominations. In order to prevent undue competition for
souls, the new missionaries divided up the island. The Baptists
occupy a broad diagonal strip that runs along the old Carretera
Militar, between Ponce and San Juan. The western end of the island
was reserved for Presbyterians, the north for Methodists, and the
east for Congregationalists. The United Brethren are found mainly
on the southern coast, and most Episcopalians are in the larger
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cities and their suburbs. [Masters, p. 28.1
There have been new immigrants. Mainlanders have come, and
more importantly, the North American mass consumer culture has struck
the new wage-earners of the coast. And since the Puerto Rican govern-
ment still has no control over its own immigration laws, it has been
unable to stop the massive, highly disruptive, and very conservative
Cuban immigration. The nineteenth-century refugees from republican-
ism and Protestantism have now been joined by the refugees from Cas-
tro's socialism.
But the most significant change that the American presence has
wrought has been to exacerbate the cultural differences between the
coast and the mountains. When the U.S. took over the Island in 1898,
the i1baro zone reached all the way to the city limits of the coast.
But during the course of the 20th century, the coastal ilaro under-
went fundamental changes, while the jrbaro of Otoao did not. "What
took place...after 1898 was the replacement of a rudimentary rural
capitalism by an industrial high finance capitalism" [Lewis, p. 93].
That Spanish culture which had been created by a system of landed
estates, and subsequently adopted by the Jbaro, suffered from the
slow erosion of its supports. The hacendados of the sugar lands
could not compete with the corporations, and they lost their land
and sank into the newly forming middle class of the city. As the
lord of the manor disappeared, so did his "serf," the ifbaro, who
now became a wage-laborer in the impersonal corporation.
By 1935, the end result of the new North American world of the
coast was apparent, even to Washington. The follow'ing assessment
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came from Secretary Harold Iches.
Puerto Rico has been the victim of the laissez faire economy
which has developed the rapid growth of great absentee owned
sugar corporations, which have absorbed much land formerly
belonging to small independent growers who in consequence have
been reduced to virtual economic sefdom. While the inclusion
of Puerto Rico within our tariff walls has been highly bene-
ficial to the stockholders of those corporations, the benefits
have not been passed down to the mass of Puerto Ricans. Those
on the contrary have seen the lands on which they formerly
raised subsistence crops given over to sugar production while
they have been gradually driven to import all their food staples,
paying for them the high prices brought about by the tariff.
There is today more widespread misery and destitution and far
more unemployment in Puerto Rico than at any previous time in
its history. [Cited by Lewis, p. 92.]
The impact that such developments had on the jfbaros of the
mountains was less direct, but just as real. The price of food and
other necessities rose, since the rice and beans that had formerly
come from the small farmers of the coast now came from corporations.
And unlike most other items, coffee (the only hold-out against Ameri-
can capital, the crop of the mountains) was not protected by tariffs,
and that fact, plus several disastrous hurricanes, severely damaged
the Jfbaros' only cash crop. With the continuing decline of coffee
production, the jrbaro often had no choice but to leave his home in
the mountains, where at least his culture was more or less intact,
and migrate to the coast, in search of a job.
This process of differentiation between the coast and the
mountains was accellerrated after World War II by a new surge of
coastal industrial development.
Operation Bootstrap was launched when Luis Munoz Marin became
Puerto Rico's first elected governor (1949-1964). Munoz launched
the Operation in an effort to transform the island from a depressed
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agricultural area into a diversified industrial economy. "U.S.In--
dustry was lured by low wages, freedom from federal taxes and long-
term forgiveness of local taxes. While the commonwealth's develop-
ment agency, Fomento, catered to capitalists, successive administra-
tions adopted a host of New Deal-style programs that made Puerto Rico
the closest thing to a government-managed society in the U.S. system."
[Time Magazine, Feb. 16, 1976, p. 15, "Trying to Make it without
Miracles."]
The side effects of this development upon those isolated in
the mountains also intensified. Prices for necessities continued to
rise as more and more items became the products of agro-business.
The last remnants of the small farmer of the mountains were fast dis-
appearing; although some still lived on the land, they did not farm.
It was too expensive. Instead they lived on the roots that would
grow without investments and on the food stamps with which they pur-
chased the packaged imports of corporations and agro-business.
As in 1935, the mainlanders have reported the consequences.
"While processing products for export, Puerto Rico became highly
dependent on imports of all kinds (the trade deficit was $1.8 billion
in fiscal 1975," no-ed Time Magazine [Feb. 16, 1976, p. 15]. And,
as a result, "The island has lost its predominantly agricultural
character" [Fitzpatrick, p. 48]. Such plain statements do not begin
to describe the human costs of such development. Not only for the ex-
ifbaro of the coast who has been forced to change, to adopt to these
impersonal forces, but also to the jbaro of the mountain, who has
not yet lost the cultural expectations of an almost completely des-
troyed system, only because he lives in the isolated valleys of Otoao.
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In the coastal areas Operation Bootstrap has intensified this
new layer of cultural pluralism. It has minimized the influence of
the old Spanish ways, has made many of them old-fashioned, and em-
phasized la lucha, the rat race. In these areas is emerging a new
social group with a new mass-American culture, created and maintained
by television, radio, the newspapers, and the 20th-century develop-
ment of the public school system that comes complete with suburbs
and buying on credit.
This sudden shift has important cultural and personal
consequences. It introduces a series of uncertainties and
anxieties which are the common experiences of new middle-class
people in areas of rapid social transition. The advance to
middle-class status involves serious economic pressures....
they are in an economically precarious position. Furthermore,
they have come from a cultural background in which social
status was fixed. In such a traditional two-class system, a
person in the lower class has no anxieties about social posi-
tion; he knows exactly what is expected of him...But the person
newly arrived in the middle class has none of these certain-
ties. [Fitzpatrick, p. 49].
The ex-j4baro of the coastal areas has not lost his concern
for respect and dignity. He has transformed that concern into an
anxiety about his own identity and image, and the identity and
image of Puerto Ricans. His measuring stick is no longer that
of the b but that of the mainland middle class, at least in
some respects. He is embarrassed by his compatriot, the man of
Otoao, who is not a la moda, in style.
The condescending tone in the following description of today's
ifbaro is indicative. The man who symbolized what .Puerto Rico was
has now become a liability, a reminder of Puerto Rico's "backward-
ness," poverty, and politically subordinate status.
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The jfbaro, mountain bred, avoids the town whenever pos-
sible, avoids the genteel life of a civilization higher than
his own. He instinctively tucks his little hut away in the
most inaccessible spots; he shrinks from the stranger and lap-
ses into stolid silence when brought face to face with things
that are foreign to his life. He does all this because he has
been made to feel that he must do all that he is told by estab-
lished authority, and he knows that this authority never takes
the trouble to look for him unless it expects to get something
out of him; because he is suspicious of outsiders, having been
too often led astray by false prophets and disappointed by
false promises; because he realises that he is not a free agent
anywhere save in the mountain fastnesses....This lack of men-
tal contact, of a common ground of interest between the jIbaro
and the better class of Puerto Ricans drives the former to
charlatans for his medical advice, to the wild fruits and
vegetables of the interior for his food, and to weird creeds
for his religious comfort. [Cited in Lewis, p. 96.]
The jibaro's response to this attack on his dignity-the towns-
man's looks of disapproval when he does come to town with his para
on his head, his shirt-tails tied at the waist, his trousers tight
at the ankles, and a machete hanging from his belt-has been his
traditional response. Most of the time he merely seeks to be left
along in his mountain isolation, but, occasionally, when frustrated
to the point of violence, the jfbaros, men and women, take up their
weapons and strike out at the source of this frustration.
Once again, inspired in part by the independence forces of the
urban coastal region, the people of Otoao erupted on October 30,
1950, burning everything in their path. The nationalists of the
cities were whispering about an island-wide revolution on November
3, the eve of registration day for a vote on a new constitution for
Puerto Rico. But Jayuya did not wait. On October 30 the men and
women of the ifbaros rose up with rifles and machetes. The next
morning at dawn the National Guard,
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Armed with maching guns, bazookas and tanks recaptured Jayuya
...Fighter planes strafed the rebels. They had seized control
...last night after bombing police stations, killing some
policement and detting many fires. By afternoon...with the last
pockets of reistance apparently wiped out, Jayuya looked as
if an earthquake had struck it, with several blocks destroyed
and most of the other buildings in the town of 1,500 charred
by fire. [New York Times, November 1, 1950, p. 1.]
On November 2,
rebels came out of the hills in droves today and surrendered
meekly in the aftermath of the Puerto Rican uprising....The
number taken into custody passed 400. [New York Times, Novem-
ber 2, 1950, p. 1.]
They came out "meekly," having uttered their cry, and, once more,
fell silent.
SECTION II. THE ISLAND
PART TWO: COAMO AND JAYUYA
Amidst this patchwork of layered cultural patterns, the two
towns that concern us are Coamo and Jayuya, the towns that by 1972
had produced approximately 62 percent of the Cambridge Puerto Rican
population. And since it is the differences between the peoples of
these two towns that have produced the major internal problem of
the Cambridge Hispano community, a closer look at these particular
towns is warrented.
As the crow flies, Coamo and Jayuya lie no more than some
20 miles apart, and both have become a part of a new center of
development, a development that has been consciously designed to
reach out from the port of Ponce. Ponce has always been the island's
second largest city, and the southern terminus of the one Spanish
road that ran from San Juan on the northern coast to Ponce on the
southern. In 1950, when Operation Bootstrap began its work, Ponce
had a population of 126,810; by 1970 the municipality included
158,981 persons, 82.2 percent of whom lived in the urban area. It
is around Ponce that "the large oil refineries, and other commercial
and industrial development, with resulting higher economic levels"
have developed. [Bourne and Bourne, p. 15.]
In spite of the fact that Coamo and Jayuya lie so close together,
one does not go from one to the other. The roads do not run from
Coamo to Jayuya, or vice versa. Jayuya lies on the northern side
of the island's watershed, high in the mountains. Coamo lies south
of the watershed, in a valley of the foothills as they begin to
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flatten out onto the sourhern coast. If one insists on following
the mountain roads from one to the other, taking what on the map
might appear to be the shortest route, one could easily spend two
hours negotiating hair-raising trails clinging (it seems rather pre-
cariously) to the sides of the mountains in order to traverse those
20 air miles. The sensible person who wishes to go from Coamo to
Jayuya would first go southwest to Ponce, and then northeast to
Jayuya. Thus the cultural differences, produced by the island's
history of isolation, that have caused the explosion in Cambridge,
have created no problems oU the island, for there is almost no con-
tact between the two towns.
Indeed, Jayuya has very little contact with the outside world
at all under normal conditions. The town sits on the northern bank
of a mountain stream at an altitude of 1,430 feet above sea level.
On the northern side of this stream the mountains soar to 3,116 feet;
on the southern side, only one and one-half mile from the town, the
island's highest mountain peaks at 4,398 feet. [Masters, p. 1740
The roads all go around the valley of Jayuya, even the projected
scenic route that promises a panorama of views from one end of the
gordillera Central to the other will not go. through Jayuya.
So remote an area was not even declared a municipality until 1911,
and its population center, the barrio of Jayuya, was not declared
urban until 1960. By 1970 the municipality's 39 square miles con-
tained 13,588 people.
Coamo, on the other hand, is an old town founded by Spanish
clerics in 1597. Its 77 square miles contain 26,468 people, and
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unlike Jayuya, they were not spread all over the mountainsides before
1950, but clumped into small settlements, or concentrated in and
around the urban barrio. [Geological Survey Map, 1943.] Also, very
much unlike Jayuya, Coamo lies along the military road, the one
road the Spanish built to connect San Juan and Ponce. Indeed, Coamo
was one of the first four towns on the island, and had always been
an important center of Spanish settlement. [Williams, p. 56.]
Nor has Coamo's importance as an urban center diminished over
the years. Not too far from the central urban barrio are the Bafos
de Coamo, which have attracted the rich for centuries, and in the
20th century a gambling casino has added to their attraction. [Silen,
pp. 34-35.] Also in the 20th century, one of its many civic clubs
started a marathon, the Maraton San Blas, and runners now come from
all over the world to this town. And, most recently, Coamo's own
runner have won the Boston Marathon team prize two years in a row,
in 1975 and 1976. [Boston Globe, April 20, pt. 6, p. 28.] One
should also point out that their shirts very clearly declare their
origin to be Coamo, not Puerto Rico.
Due to the public works program and improved highway system in
the vicinity of Coamo, one can now go from Coamo to Ponce's indus-
trial area in 15 minutes. Thus Coamo has become a commuter's town,
with 27 percent of its work force traveling the 15 minutes to Ponce,
or the 45 minutes to Guayama, or even the two and one-half hours to
San Juan to find good jobs. Coamo, although not the center of this
Bootstrap phenomenon, was drawn into it, and did develop some indus-
try of its own, mainly the garment industry, particularly gloves and
other sewing piecework.
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These changes are most clearly reflected in the occupations of
Coamo's residents. Those with clearly urban employment (profession-
als, technicians, non-farm managers, non-farm administrators, sales
workers, clerical workers, craftsmen, operatives (including trans-
portation operatives), and service workers) made up 78 percent of
the municipality's work force (3,484 people out of 4,459). The
largest single group were the operatives, 1,189 persons or 27 per-
cent of the work force. Craftsmen were the second largest group,
with 583 persons (13 percent) service workers third (11 percent),
and professionals and technicians were fourth with 446 people or
10 percent of the population. [1970 Census.]
Because Jayuya's main street, its one road, does not really
go anywhere, except to other roads, Operation Bootstrap did not do
unto Jayuya as it did unto Coamo. It did not create a new struggling-
to-be middle class. It brought a grand total of two U.S. (medicine)
factories, which added to the two canneries operated by Goya consti-
tute its entire industrial sector. It, too, is part of Ponce's
hinterland, but it is "the other sector of the Ponce region [which]
reaches into the mojt remote mountains with scattered agricultural
population...Here agricultural workers represent 46 percent of the
population and the standard of living is among the lowest on the
island" [Bourne and Bourne, p. 15].
Because the road to and through Jayuya has not been much im-
proved, and no new highways have been built in its vicinity, it did
not produce the blue-collar commuting force that Coamo did. Only
7 percent of the municipality's work force is employed outside its
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own boundaries, compared to 27 percent in Coamo.
The contrast is most clear when one looks at the occupations
of Jayuya's work force. If one adds up the "urban" jobs (profession-
als, technicians, non-farm managers, non-farm administrators, sales
workers, clerical workers, craftsmen, operatives and service-workers)
one finds that 65 percent work at non-farm occupations (1260 out of
1951), compared to Coamo's 78 percent.
Almost exactly the same percentage of persons held jobs classi-
fied as "professional, technical and kindred," (10 percent) and "ser-
vice workers, except household," which was 11 percent in both towns.
The contrasts showed up in operatives (transport and non-transport),
craftsmen, foremen, and kindred workers," among the urban force, and
among household service workers, non-farm laborers (which could be
either "urban" or not) and among farm labor, both managers and workers.
The largest single group of non-farm workers in Jayuya were
still the operatives, but these 297 individuals constituted only 15
percent of the work force, compared to 27 percent in Coamo. And,
in Jayuya these people were mostly young women. If one separates
the transport workers from. operatives in general, they constitu-
ted 12 percent of Jayuya's work force, but 22 percent of Coamo's.
And in Jayuya these transport workers are 24 percent of all opera-
tives, but in Coamo they are only 16 percent, which suggests that
due to Jayuya's isolation, one had to do more hauling to service a
non-transport operative population that was only 54 percent as large
as Coamo's. In Coamo the craftsmen were the second largest group,(13
percent), but in Jayuya they came fourth with 10 percent.
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Big differences also show up in terms of farming population,
household servants (private household workers), and in on-farm (but
also non-industrial) laborers. Farm workers and managers in Jayuya
constitute 23 percent of the work force, whereas they are only 13
percent of Coamo's work force. Non-farm laborers in Jayuya were 12
percent of the work force, whereas in Coamo they were only 7 per-
cent. And Jayuya had well over twice as many household servants
per person in the work force than did Coamo (2.3 percent in the for-
mer, and only .8 percent in the latter).
The urban-rural contrasts between Coamo and Jayuya also show
up in average family size. The agriculturally oriented Jayuyanos
had an average family size of 5.19 persons, compared to Coamo's
somewhat more modest 4.69, a difference of one-half person per fami-
ly. Probably due to the larger number of children, at least in part,
the median age in Jayuya is some 20 months less than that in Coamo
(17.6 compared to 19.2).
In education, too, Coamo excels. The average Coameno over the age
of 25 has completed 5.6 years of school, whereas the same figure
for Jayuya is only 3.9 years. Some 16.9 percent of Coamo's population
possess a high school diploma, whereas only 13.9 percent have one
in Jayuya. Even in Coamo only 2.5 percent of the population are
college graduates, and in Jayuya that number falls to an even 2 per-
cent. However, probably due to the lack of agricultural work and
the high degree of urbanization that is now occurring in Jayuya, 55
percent of the age group 3 to 34 years old was attending school in
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1970, a figure that was 6 percent higher than the same figure for
Coamo. That in 1970 there was still some farmwork to be done
might make parents less than enthusiastic about sending a son to
school is indicated by the fact that a slightly higher percentage
of females were attending school in Jayuya than males (14.6 com-
pared to 13.2 percent). That this is a relatively new phenomenon
in Jayuya is indicated by the fact that in the age group over 25,
females had completed fewer grades than males (3.7 compared to 4.1).
Unemployment is worse in Jayuya than in Coamo, especially for
males. For the total population the figure in 1970 (before a mini-
mum wage law for agricultural workers was implemented) unemployment
in Jayuya was calculated at 8 percent, whereas Coamo's rate was
5.9 percent, some 26 percent less. That the factories which Jayu-
ya does have employ mostly women is clear if one breaks down the
male and female unemployment rates. One then finds that 9.3 per-
cent of the males in Jayuya were unemployed and 6.7 percent of the
women. And these employment figures do not count those persons,
unemployed, who have given up looking for a job, and essentially
retired to live off nature's offerings and food stamps in so far
as possible.
As a result of all these factors it is not surprising to learn
that the mean family income (for a family one-half person smaller)
in Coamo was $4,503, almost twice that figure for Jayuya, $2,339.
One should not, however, get the impression that the residents of
Coamo are generally affluent. Indeed, 77.2 percent have incomes that
place them below the poverty level (and prices in the stores of
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Puerto Rico are not lower than in the United States); in Jayuya in
1970, 83.8 percent were below the poverty level. Still, compared
to the "poverty" figures, the percentages for those receiving pub-
lic assistance are low. In Coamo only 17.6 percent receive such
assistance, but in Jayuya, 24.1 percent receive such assistance.
Desertion from the more rural barrios and movement toward the
urban center in search of employment is characteristic of both Coamo
and Jayuya. Twenty-five years ago, the rural barrios of Coamo were
truly rural, and people used the land to feed themselves and some-
times to produce for the market. This is no longer true. Many do
still live on the land, but they have jobs in town, and that is how
they feed and clothe their families. Many people, particularly from
the barrios most distant from the center have left the land alto-
gether and moved into the urban area. Since Coamo has been more
urban longer, this trend does not show itself for the overall ag-
gregate municipality population figures. In 1950 43.8 percent lived
in areas defined as urban; in 1960, 46.6 percent did, and in 1970
the overall figure dropped to 45.6 percent. However, this apparent
drop can be explain. The urban barrio, Coamo, had expanded to the
bursting point, and was spilling over into the adjacent "rural"
barrios, which are really quite urban along the outskirts of the
town of Coamo, even if those parts of the barrio further away are
still "rural." The following map, indicating change in population,
makes this very clear.
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Many of Coamo's farms have been bought by real estate brokers,
and the island's planners have moved to regulate this development.
A special program for planning suburban development has
been started. In these plans it is recognized that closer
cooperation is needed between agricultural and urban planning;
in this CRUV (Urban Renewal and Housing) must be more concerned
as suburban communities grow and the separation between urban
and rural becomes less distinct. The Planning Board envisages
a "green belt" as part of this new suburban development and
sees also the changing distinctions among urban, semirural, and
suburban. It has the hope that communities may develop, or
be developed, in which there will be a mixture of classes in
which public housing may be included and where there will be
increased opportunity for upward mobility. From an economic
standpoint, municipal services-electricity, water, sewage, etc.
--can be better provided where population density is greater
and adjustments to this need can be made. Those communities
or areas which remain truly rural do not at present come within
this category. [Bourne and Bourne, pp. 20-21.]
No such suburbs have developed in Jayuya. Population move-
ment is still toward the town itself. All other barrios have suffered
population loss, and thus Jayuya's case is much more straighforward.
In 1950 there was no barrio in Jayuya that had a population dense
enough to qualify as urban, including the central barrio of Jayuya.
By 1960 16.0 percent of Jayuya's population lived in areas that
qualified as urban, and in 1970 that percentage had grown to 28.2
percent. (That the central barrio's population increased by 63.2
percent indicates that part of that barrio must still be rural.)
This is a dramatic increase, and since Jayuya did not offer much in
the way of urban jobs, especially when compared to Coamo, one might
suggest that the push factor of the deterioration of the farm econo-
my under the pressure of the international agrobusinesses was much
stronger than any pull factor. The following map shows population
shifts between barrios in the municipality of Jayuya, by percentages.
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But there are not enough jobs in either town to provide employ-
ment for all those who must leave the land. Obviously both towns
are producing migrants, at least some of whom end up in Cambridge.
Again, in the case of Coamo, the effect of this migration is not im-
mediately apparent from the municipality's aggregate figures. Coamo's
total population from 1960 to 1970 grew from 26,082 persons to 26,468,
for an increase of 1.5 percent. Yet the overall growth rate of the
Puerto Rican population during this decade was 2.6 percent, and thus
Coamo's rate of increase was only 58 percent of the island average.
One cannot say precisely how much of this slower growth rate was
due to a growing propensity for smaller families and how much was
due to migration, but one suspects that both contributed to it.
Jayuya's population actually declined during this decade from 14,622
persons to only 13,588.
Not only did Jayuya's population decline between 1960 and 1970,
thus indicating some degree of distress in the area, but the year 1970
brought further disaster to this town, a disaster which has not yet
been recorded by census-takers. Before 1970 Jayuya's agricultural
economy (coffee and vegetables) was still functioning, more or less,
mostly due to its isolation. But in that year the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico passed a minimum wage law guaranteeing farm workers
$8.00 per day. The owners of Jayuya's tomato patches and coffee
bushes refused to pay this amount, and closed down their farms, al-
lowing the land to lie fallow. This little town made the October
15, 1975 edition of the New York Times--almost exactly the 25th anni-
versary of its previous appearance under the headline of rebellion.
58
This time the subject was its remarkable unemployment rate. "In the
central town of Jayuya, population 14,000, the Puerto Rican Labor
Department reports, the unemployment rate is a staggering 96 per-
cent" [Article begins on p. 1]. A study carried out in Cambridge
in 1972 estimated the number of Jayuyanos among its population to
be about 630. [Brown, pp. 18, 21.] And Father Sheehan in 1975 ob-
served that many were still arriving.
To put all these statistics succinctly, one must only
say that the Jayuyano comes to Cambridge from Otoao, the high moun-
tainous site of the jfbaros, the men and the women who have so far
escaped the changes of the mind that economic change has forced upon
the people of the coastal towns, including the people of Coamo. Sepa-
rated by the island's highest mountains at home, in Cambridge they
would be driven together by necessity, by prejudice, and by Anglo
ignorance. They, like all the others from the old colonies of Spain,
regardless of their differences, would be lumped together as the
Spanish-speaking. And among all those differences, the most explo-
sive mixture would be that between two groups of Puerto Ricans, two
groups whose homes are only some 20 miles apart, as the crow flies.
SECTION III: THE CAMBRIDGE SCENE
PART ONE. EARLY CMBRIDGE, 1964-1969.
A. The Migrant and Cambridge.
Due at least in part to the entry of the mainland's highly
capitalized corporations and the transformations that their presence
had wrought in Puerto Ricos economy, an imbalance between the num-
ber seeking jobs and the number of jobs being offered was an old
problem on the island. This imbalance, even before the advent of
Operation Bootstrap in the late 1940's, had already created a long-
standing Puerto Rican community in New York and other mainland cities.
This first imbalance was in part related to a second, the imbalance
between the number of rural peoples whose agricultural livelihood
had been wiped out by competition with agro-business, the highly
capitalized food producers of the mainland, and the number of jobs
created by the investments of these and other mainland corporations.
The push off the land was much stronger than the pull of the urban
job market. [Lewis, 1974, pp. 49-51.]
The peoples of the coast had given up farming and begun their
transformation into middle-class wage-earners, only to find them-
selves in the late 60's losing out in the international labor mar-
ket. Many of the corporations which their government had lured to
Puerto Rico now were being lured away by even cheaper offers of
Asian labor. Furthermore, the stream of farmers out of the mountains
had not diminished. If anything, it had accelerated. Every year
brought another crop of youth out of school and onto the job market.
Something had to give, and migration to the mainland became the answer.
59
60
This new stream of migrants sought new cities, cities that were
not already jammed with their fellow countrymen and their fellow un-
employed. It was only in the late 50's that a handful of Puerto
Ricans discovered Cambridge, Massachusetts, and chose it to be their
new home. At the beginning there was only a small trickle of such
migrants, but by 1965, this trickle had become a steady stream.1
And what was this new world like? Cambridge, Massachusetts,
today a city of some 107,000 people, is one of 76 separately incor-
porated cities that make up the Boston Standard Metropolitan Statis-
tical Area. Of these 76 urban entities, Cambridge is the one most
closely tied, both geographically and otherwise, to the central
city of Boston. The hub of Boston's transportation center, the Park
Street station, is approximately a ten-minute subway ride from Har-
vard Square, Cambridge's mass transit center, and a mere seven min-
utes from Central Square, the area around which this study centers.
Boston and CAmbridge are separated by the winding Charles river, a
natural boundary that is crossed by thirteen bridges along the
twenty some miles of banks that lie between the cities. One part
of Boston, Charlestown, actually lies on the Cambridge side of the
Charles, at the point where the river enters Boston Harbor.
Cambridge, like Boston, is an old city that dates from the
17th century, and like Boston it still has its core of Brahmins,
Unless otherwise noted, this section is based on discussions
with migrants, including the very early ones, over the last fifteen
years, on interviews with migrants carried out in 1974 and 1975,
and on the author's own observations after his arrival in Cam-
bridge in 1961. To his knowledge there is no other record of
the early formative years of this community.
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descendents of its first immigrants, the Pilgrims. Today, however,
they are very much outnumbered by layer upon layer of peoples from
the various parts of Europe, American Blacks, and most recently
French Canadians, Portuguese, and Latin Americans.
Thus there really are two Cambridges, the comfortable and es-
tablished Cambridge around Harvard University and to its west, and
the newly arrived and poor Cambridge, which is generally located
in the eastern half of the city, where the buildings of the other
major university, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, line
the banks of the Charles, the city's easternmost edge. It was into
this eastern half of Cambridge that the Puerto Ricans came.
Why these early arrivals chose Cambridge was probably due, at
least in part, to their preference for its closely knit network of
urban amenities, in a town that was not as forbidding as New York
or Boston's South End. One author has noted the tendency of some
migrants to choose cities very much like Cambridge.
These represent concentrations of Puerto Ricans in high-
ly industrialized smaller cities, where Puerto Ricans are like-
ly to be employed in heavier industrial work, such as factories,
machine shops, and steel mills. They live in one or two family
dwellings, and are often in the process of buying the home in
which they live. Life in these smaller cities is much quieter
and better organized, and the Puerto Rican community gives the
impression of managing its life more effectively. [Fitzpatrick,
p. 75.]
This observation parallels closely some of the reasons given
by Hispanos in Cambridge explaining why they had come to this par-
ticular city. They often referred to quiter neighborhoods, jobs
provided by the factories and businesses in its eastern half, and
to their search for better and cheaper housing. And after this
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early group had established itself, the most common reason for coming
to Cambridge was that the new arrivals already knew somebody there
from home. [Brown, p. 51.) No doubt it is this search for familiar
people and familiar things that has created the Boston Puerto Rican
scene in which each city of the area has been settled mainly by
people who come from one or two towns on the Island.
Coamenos and Jayuyanos, the two groups that settled in Cambridge,
were basically strangers to each other when they first arrived. Since
there had been little or no contact on the Island, they had no strong
feelings about each other, and there was thus no problem. And yet
in Cambridge they were to form into two separate communities, almost
as removed from each other as Coamo and Jayuya. One can deduce
that the reason for this was that their cultural differences, dif-
ferences that had been several centuries in the making, produced
this separation. They did not dress the same; they called various
objects by different names; they listened to different music; they
danced differently; they married differently. In short, they were
strangers in many ways.
These differences were especially significant due to the early
boarding house arrangements that the two groups developed in the
late 1950's and early 1960's. Some of them rented large apartments
and subdivided them so that they closely resembled an ordinary
rooming house. They then offered room and board to family members,
distant relatives, or friends for approximately $20,00 per week.
This was a most attractive arrangement for the immigrants, most of
whom were single men or men who had left their spouses behind, and
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it provided human contact, a common language, informational exchange,
and, very importantly, home-cooked Puerto Rican food. It was, in
short, a home away from home. To quote a sociologist on the subject
of such non-familial social units,
... All human beings belong to social groups other than their
nuclear family as a necessary condition to their survival....
Those who get together in circles of friends (or cliques) share,
in addition to some common interest, a sense of belonging, or
solidarity, and feelings of trust cemented by interpersonal
adjustments or emotional ties....The most important small groups
or cliques in which...Hispanos can participate are those people
who came originally from the same home town in Puerto Rico.
[Padilla, pp. 212, 215.]
Indeed, for the newly arrived immigrant, who often came straight from
the barrio, the rooming house was a home town womb to which he could
retreat from an oblivious if not hostile world. That they lived in
such close quarters and ate from the same table meant that the dif-
ferences in cultural background between the Jayuyano and Coameno
directed them into two different concentrations, into what was to
become two separate communities.
During the very early years of immigration, the Puerto Ricans
were more or less randomly distributed throughout the eastern half
of the city, but as time went on small concentrations built up.
These concentrations, however, were not "Puerto Rican" concentrations;
they were either Coameno or Jayuyano concentrations. There were two
clumps of Coamenos, one about one-half mile south of Central Square
in Cambridgeport (Neighborhood 5), and another about the same distance
southwest of Central Square in Riverside (Neighborhood 7). The Jayu-
yanos were also in two clumps. One was directly east of the Harvard
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campus in Mid-Cambridge (Neighborhood 6), and the other was straight
south of the first, directly on Massachusetts Avenue, about one-half
mile west of the center of Central Square. The latter clump's
southern edge was just inside the northern boundary of Riverside
(Neighborhood 7).
While the Jayuyano population from 1960 to 1969 was relatively
stable, both in terms of numbers and in terms of its location, the
Coamenos were not. Starting in about 1964 or 1965 there was a visi-
ble northward movement toward Central Square among the Coameno popu-
lation in the Cambridgeport-Riverside area. This movement was in
part an expression of the Coameno desire for urban amenities: the
subway to Boston, the stores, and the movie theaters and the other
entertainment possibilities of the Square, but it reflected a growth
in the number of Coamenos as well.
With regard to employment, Coamenos and Jayuyanos did not ar-
rive in Cambridge equally endowed with the skills required for earn-
ing a living. The former were better educated and had come from an
area characterized by skilled trades and light industry, whereas
the latter had been farmers of the mountainside and had few non-agri-
cultural skills. Yet the Coamenos, in the beginning, had no better
luck that the Jayuyanos when it came to finding a good job. There
was one great equalizer: neither group could speak English. The
two groups found it equally difficult to find any work other than
poorly paid unskilled labor. Nevertheless, during the late fifties
and the early sixties, such jobs were plentiful, and the immigrants,
Coamenos or Jayuyanos, took whatever they could find. Several
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companies (all of which hired many unskilled workers) could be iden-
tified as employers of significant numbers of Puert Ricans: Corru-
gated Box Company, Allston Arrow Company, Banda of Massachusetts,
American Electroplating, and B.F. Goodrich, among others. Car
uashes and laundries also employed many.
This equality of opportunity was fleeting, however. As the
years passed and the immigrants learned English, the better skilled,
better educated Coamenos were able to find better paid jobs, usually
based upon experience or skills acquired on the island. The Jayu-
yanos were left behind in the poorly paid jobs. By 1966 the shift
became quite evident as the number of companies hiring skilled
labor and also having significant numbers of Coameno employees grew.
These included KLH (electronics piecework), Stop and Shop, Fenton
Shoe, MMM Meat Company and Barker Steel.
Very late in this period, perhaps in 1968 or 1969, the first
Puerto-Rican-owned businesses began to appear in the Central Square
area. These included several bodegas, or grocery stores that also
carried many Puerto Rican non-food specialties. Most of these
stores were owned by Coamenos, and there were no Jayuyano owners.
Time also made clear a second difference between the two groups,
a difference of cultural style, a difference related to their differ-
ent island origins. Coamenos tended to use family and friendship
ties in such a manner that several companies soon found themselves
with a whole group of Coamenos (uncles, brothers, cousins, school
friends, and so forth) all working in the same plant. This phenome-
non was less apparent among Jayuyanos, although there were several
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of them (at American Electroplating, Nabisco, Nexco, and Deran's Con-
factionary Company). These Jayuyano concentrations, however, were
related more to the market for unskilled labor than to any initiative
on the part of Jayuyano employees. His independence of spirit, and
his ilbaro penchant for the widely dispersed boh(os of the mountains,
took a strange turn when transplanted along the concrete walks and
walls of Cambridge. Accustomed to working alone, restrained only
by the forces of nature, in Cambridge he wanted to avoid other
Puerto Ricans (particularly as bosses) even if he could not avoid
other people or bosses altogether.
COAMENO: I work at the steel company in Watertown [Barker
Steel]; I have twenty Puerto Ricans working with me and all of
them are from Coamo. When the big boss asks me if I know some-
one that wants to work, I go looking for a Coameno. If I can't
find bne in Cambridge, I send for one in Coamo. But I would
not recommend a Jayuyanol [Emphasis added.] However, don't
misunderstand me, I am not saying that I dislike them personal-
ly. It is just that I cannot trust them. You recommend one,
he works for one month or two, and he quits. Then the big boss
starts complaining. I am the one responsible to the boss, not
the worker. If he is a good worker, he makes more money, and
I go up [get promoted] and make more money too. Do you under-
stand? As I was saying, no one does anything for nothing.
[Coameno interview.]
JAYUYANO: I prefer to work for an American boss, than to
take orders from any Puerto Rican. [Jayuyano interview.]
It was around 1964 or 1965 that the boarding house phenomenon
began to disappear among the Coamenos. As their economic conditions
improved many began to send for their wives and families, and upon
their arrival they sought separate "family-style" apartments. Many
of the young men had married local Anglo women, and they, too, moved
into apartments. These "family-style" apartments tended to be lo-
cated in areas close to the original Coameno boarding-house concen-
trations.
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The arrival of Coameno families meant increased numbers in Cam-
bridge, and it meant increased communication between Cambridge and
the island as the daughters-in-law wrote to their mothers and the
grandchildren's activities were reported. The increased communica-
tion and information about Cambridge prompted the further migration
of single men and women who were seeking employment. Many of the
females were quite young and came as baby-sitters for Coameno wives
who wanted to work. Both the Coameno men and women arriving during
these years tended to live with these families rather than in board-
ing houses.
The Jayuyanos continued, to a much larger degree, to live in
boarding houses. And, when they did marry, or send for their fami-
lies, they tended to move away from the Jayuyano boarding house
concentrations, away from the Puerto Rican concentrations; sometimes
they moved out of the city altogether. Again, the parallel with
their behavior on the island is quite clear. Just as the fbaro
sought out his own isolated hollow, the Jayuyano separated himself.
Although given the density of population in the Boston area, he
could not separate himself from people, he could separate himself
from Spanish-speaking people, which in some ways served the purpose.
Just as in employment, an Anglo boss was somehow better than a Puer-
to Rican boss, so too was an Anglo neighbor preferable to another
Hispano. At least he would not try to converse, and he would not
presume to interfere.
The condition of the housing in these areas of Hispano concen-
tration was poor, to say the least. A housing stock survey, Housing
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Needs in Cambridge, published by the Department of Planning and De-
velopment in December 1972 and based on information gathered from
the 1970 census, began its discussion of housing by area with the
following generalization:
It is evident that the greatest number of dwelling units in
need of improvement are located in the eastern end of the city
-- in East Cambridge, Model Cities, Cambridgeport and Riverside
[all of them areas of Hispano concentration]. A house in any
of these neighborhoods is more likely to lack central heating
and basic plumbing facilities than a house in any other part
of the city....The large volume of absentee-owned property with
antiquated heating and plumbing facilities strongly points up
the need for more systematic code enforcement.
And Puerto Ricans were unaware of state and local housing codes, or
that they could protest violations of such codes.
B. Anglo Institutions: The Bar, The Church.
In these early years the Puerto Rican immigrant faced a great
wall of non-recognition, both with regard to the Anglo public and
secular Anglo institutions. They were seen not as Puerto Ricans,
much less Jayuyanos and Coamenos, but as "Spanish-speaking." Few
Anglos even knew that they were U.S. citizens. That the public
was oblivious to their individuality was bad enough, but that the
agencies of the city also ignored them, and rarely, if ever, acknow-
ledged their existence or their need for services was worse. The
Puerto Ricans were expected to assimilate into the general Anglo
urban society, as so many other ethnic groups in the city had done
before them. They were treated as just one more ingredient of the
immigrant Cambridge melting pot, a stew pot of Italians, Portuguese,
French Canadians, Greeks, and Irish, and so forth, who had arrived
before them.
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The most directly felt need on the part of the new immigrants,
most of them young and male, was recreation and social activities.
In the beginning there was nothing for them to do and no place to
go. Because they did not speak English and because they did not
know their way around the city, life was basic. Just getting to and
from work was considered an accomplishment. Eventually, however,
as their English skills improved, a few brave souls ventured out
into the local restaurants and bars, and some even went so far as
to cross the Charles River in order to attend the various athletic
and social activities (and sometimes, mass) at the Cardinal Cushing
Center for the Spanish-speaking, in Boston's South End.
Once they did begin to venture out in numbers, trouble ensued.
In the bars, particularly, difficulties and misunderstandings arose,
partly due to cultural and linguistic differences and partly due to
the ignorance and prejudice of the Anglo community. Sometimes it
was simply a question of turf. Because of such incidents the Puer-
to Rican population attracted the attention of the police, and soon
there was friction not only between the Puerto Ricans and the rest
of the barroom clientele, but also between the Puerto Ricans and the
police.
It seemed to the Puerto Ricans that the police assumed that any
trouble was their fault, and that the solution was to tell the Puer-
to Ricans to leave, to go home. When the Puerto Ricans protested
what they considered to be an arbitrary order, the police sometimes
arrested them for disorderly conduct or public drunkenness. The
70
drunk charge was most convenient for the police, since they could
just lock the offender up for the night and let him out in the
morning, without pressing charges. Since the Puerto Rican's English
often was insufficient for him to defend himself and since he was
unaware of his legal rights, misunderstandings and injustices were
common occurrences. The Puerto Rican community became afraid to go
out at night, lest they end up in jail, for reasons that they did
not understand. This, unfortunately, was the Puerto Rican's first
introduction to the public agencies of the City of Cambridge.
It was in 1964 that this problem finally became so critical
that a few Puerto Ricans decided to do something about it. The
incident that set off the reaction occurred when these young men
heard that "The Margaret," that is, the Pearl Street Cafe (located
on the corner of Green and Pearl Streets in Central Square) would
no longer serve Hispanos. This was the last straw, for this par-
ticular bar was the favorite watering-hole of the Puerto Ricans.
Margaret was the name of the owner and manager, an older woman who
had been more friendly than most proprieters to a Puerto Rican
presence in her place of business. The police, however, had finally
pressured her into excluding these "trouble-makers."
Faced with such injustice and discrimination, about eight or
nine of its Puerto Rican patrons decided to do something about an
increasingly intolerable situation. Essentially they were being
denied the right to enter a public place. They went to the Direc-
tor of the Cardinal Cushing Center, Father Serrino, whom they had
met while participating in the various activities there. They asked
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him to go with them to talk to the police.
It is somewhat ironic that the institution in Cambridge most
responsible for the creation of an indigenous leadership among the
Puerto Rican population was the Police Department, for it was this
group of young men, who had themselves been arrested for crimes of
which they felt themselves innocent, who were to become the nucleus
of what is today the Hispano community's leadership. It was the
Police Department who helped to instill in them an appreciation for
the value of learning English and of acquainting themselves with
the operation of their adopted city's government.
These young men, patrons of ''the Margaret" and the future lead-
ers of the Hispano community, were blue-collar workers, and most of
them were from the rural barrios of Coamo. Indeed, four of them were
brothers or cousins. As a rule, they had been in Cambridge longer
than most Puerto Ricans; they spoke functional, if not correct Eng-
lish; and they had retained some vestiges of their parents' rural
sense of dignity and respect. Furthermore, because they were from
the rural barrios, they were not unaccustomed to defending them-
selves in town.
Father Serrino arranged the meeting between the offended patrons
and the Chief of Police of Cambridge. Other participants in the
meeting included Margaret, the owner of the bar, two lawyers provi-
ded by the Cardinal Cushing Center, and a priest from the Center.
As a result of this now famous meeting, Puerto Ricans were no longer
hassled about their right to be served at the local bars, and prob-
lems with arrests decreased somewhat. This 1964 meeting was and
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still is viewed by the Puerto Ricans as their first victory as a
community, and the members of the "police delegation" came to be
viewed with "respeto." Because they had succeeded in solving one
problem, others began to bring them other problems, and eventually
they had become that community's spokesmen, whether they liked it
or not.
The police problem, however, did not wither away completely.
Some five years later, these same people would still be negotiating
with the police. In his summary of the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge's
first year, the Board President described the same phenomenon.
The police were terrible, as well as the courts. When a
Spanish person was taken to police headquarters, he was treated
very poorly, and the bail was set so high that even a "criminal"
would not have had the money to pay it. That is, it was truly
discrimination and abuse. Spanish people would go into a bar
or restaurant to have a drink and someone would call the police
for no other reason than they they were speaking Spanish [which
for some reason annoyed many patrons of these establishments]
and the police would come get them. Many times they were put
in jail simply because they kept asking what their rights were.
[Robert Santiago, Cambridge Spanish council.]
After the 1964 meeting with the Chief of Police, the Cardinal
Cushing Center for the Spanish-speaking continued to be the communi-
ty's main resource center. Only a short time after this meeting a
group of Puerto Ricans (all Coamenos) went to Father Serrino and
asked that a Spanish-speaking priest hold mass in their neighborhood.
The Center agreed, and sent Padre Jose to the Blessed Sacrament
Church in the Riverside section of the city. Two years later, in
1966, quite by accident, a second Spanish-speaking priest was assigned
to St. Mary's of the Annunciation, a church located north of Central
Square, in Area 4.
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At the time of Father Daniel Sheehan's arrival there the great
wave of Puerto Rican movement into that area had just begun. The
Hispanos who attended the masses in Cambridge during this period
were overwhelmingly Puerto Rican, and included both Coamenos and
Jayuyanos. There were no arguments or fights at the Church, and
thus few people realized that a problem was brewing. Even so, if
one had looked closely, one could have noted that the membership of
the committees of parishoners, committees that supervised various
social, religious and charity functions, was almost exclusively
Coameno. The Jayuyanos did not participate on these committees.
It was in the bars that the problem was very evident. In fact,
the problem between the Coamenos and Jayuyanos soon came to dominate
the Hispano barroom scene. As the Anglos had become more accustomed
to their presence and the police problem had diminished somewhat,
"the Margaret" had become an "Hispano" bar. And there it was that
the Coameno and the Jayuyano, almost strangers on the island, became
acquainted. As the two groups confronted each other across a smoke-
filled and alcohol-fumed barroom, arguments and fist fights started
over the most minor things. Here is where the local cleavage in
the Puerto Rican community began. Here is where "the Cambridge
Scene" really commences.
C. The First Puerto Rican Institution: The Club.
The first Puerto Rican institution in Cambridge was the "club,"
a private organization designed to provide recreation for Hispanos.
In 1967 a group of Coamenos, many of whom were the same young men
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who had composed the 1964 police delegation, and some of whom had
belonged to similar institutions at home in the barrios, decided to
form the Latin American Sports Club. Its founders hoped to provide
a place for the community to go, in part to keep them out of the
local bars and the various troubles that had brewed therein. The
Club would offer its members a place to talk, drink, and entertain
themselves with dominoes, billiards, and dances.
The idea had been conceived by two young Coamenos who had then
set about to enlist their friends and acquaintances. Potential mem-
bers were-asked to contribute $25.00 per person to finance the pro-
ject. Once the money was collected, they formed a Board of Direc-
tors, elected officers, and rented the whole fifth floor of 525
Massachusetts Avenue, at the corner of Massachusetts Avenue and
Essex Street, the western end of Central Square.
After the Club was under way, admission was charged to special
events such as dances, and that plus the revenue from liquor sales
was deposited in a Club bank account. This money could be withdrawn
to pay the rent and other expenses, and to make interest-free loans
to the membership. At first, the Club was run completely with
volunteer labor.
In 1968 similar clubs had opened in the same general area, two
important ones being the Latin Club on Green Street and the Fraterni-
dad Hispana on Brookline Street. (The latter had taken its name
from an abortive CEOC program of the same year, which will be dis-
cussed in the same section.) Both of these clubs also were founded
and managed by Coamenos.
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In part because their organizers had been members of the police
delegation, and also simply because they were a place for the commu-
nity to gather and exchange notes, these clubs became something more
than recreational and social institutions. Unofficially, they were
the service centers of a Hispano community that was being ignored
by the City's agencies, and people with problems came there for ad-
vice and information. Aside from the Catholic Church, the Police,
and one friendly City Councilor who would later become Mayor, very
few of the City's officials or leaders were even aware of their
presence. This particular City Councilor, of Italian extraction,
felt some sense of cultural compatibility with the Hispanos, and
was quite willing to listen to the complaints of the community.
When the clubs first formed, both Coamenos and Jayuyanos came,
and both came for the same reasons. It was more comfortable there,
away from the possibilities of barroom slurs from inhospitable Anglos
and possible misunderstandings with the police. Although both on
the job and in his home, the Jayuyano, if given a choice, preferred
to avoid the Coameno, his fears of intoxicated Anglos and the pos-
sibility of arrest persuaded him to seek the security of the all-
Spanish-speaking club. Furthermore, the clubs did buy jfbaro music
for the jukebox, as well as music preferred by Coamenos, a luxury
the Anglo bars did not afford.
The Jayuyanos, however, did not join the clubs, even though
they were invited to do so. None of them ever paid the entrance
fees or dues. That the Jayuyanos used the club's facilities, but
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would not support them financially, irritated the Coamenos. Nor
could the Coameno take the Jayuyano's "old-fashioned" sense of dig-
nity too seriously, whereas the Coamenos' verbal jousting over vari-
ous games, or just the weather, irritated the reticent Jayuyano.
And there was a problem over what records to play on the jukebox.
After 1967 clubs opened and closed, and the latter events usu-
ally had been precipitated by the damages done to the premises by
such fights. Although the majority of these fights were not between
Jayuyanos and Coamenos, but between Hispanos from Cambridge and out-
siders, it nevertheless did not take long for the not terribly verbal
jibaros and their sense of personal dignity to wear out their wel-
come, and for the Coamenos, who were worried about the club's "good
name," to actively discourage them from coming into the clubs at
all. The following comments are representative of their respective
sentiments.
The Coamenos: The way I look at it, they didn't have any infan-
cia back in Jayuya. [The connotation here is that Jayuyas have
never really grown up and that they do not really understand
the ways in which the real world operates.] They don't know
how to act. At the beginning, we used to invite them to our
home to a party. We used to let them in the clubs. We used
to help them find jobs, but we have to stop it. In the club,
the problem was that they don't know how to-'play pool. Then
they get drunk and want to play for money. Well, as you know,
some of those guys [Coamenos] are good players, so the Jayuya-
nos end up losing and then they start fighting. Well, the club
was organized for everybody, but not to have a group of Jayuyas
give it a bad name. The other problems at the club was the
music box [the jukebox]. We have some jfbaro music, and, well,
that was all they wanted to hear....[But] the Coamenos wanted
to hear salsa. So trouble start all over again. So we could
not afford to have them around. If they were members of the
club, then it was different; they have a voice. But they didn't
want to pay the dues, and then they want us to let them in and
do whatever they please. Impossible. [Interview with club owner.]
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The Jayuyanos: "...For years we have been having problems in
Cambridge with the Coamenos. But this is basically because we
are two different groups. We don't believe on what the Coameno
does and the Coameno does not understand why we don't like to
be with them. Supposedly, they are better than us, more educa-
ted. They have better jobs; they own businesses, homes; [they]
control the recreational activities, the clubs, and so on...
With the clubs is the same. You know [Club X] doesn't let
Jayuyas in, as well as the other clubs. [Collated interviews.]
D. The Origin of Concilio.
In 1968 the Cambridge Economic Opportunity Committee (CEOC),
the local office of a federal anti-poverty program, decided to or-
ganize a small community relations program which they called "Fra-
ternidad Hispana." The organizers of the Hispano community's clubs
were insulted by this program. In their opinion it was poorly de-
signed and poorly administered, and when they tried to make sugges-
tions to CEOC with regard to the "Fraternidad Hispana," they were
ignored. At the same time that they were struggling to serve a
community through their own clubs purely with voluntary labor, this
agency of professional organizers had set about to plan programs
for the community without even consulting one Hispano about what that
community might want. The Board of Directors of CEOC which ran the
program did not include one Hispano, and neither had CEOC's Director
hired any Hispano employees to help administer the program. The com-
munity, not surprisingly, made little or no use of the program and
it died an early death in 1969, before it was even one year old.
The clubs remained the service centers of the community. (According
to the 1975 staff of CEOC, the agency's files from this period were
lost in a move. The author has had to rely on his own and others'
memories in describing those early events.)
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Aside from inspiring the name of a new club, the Fraternidad
Hispana on Brookline Street, and of attracting the club leadership's
attention to CEOC, this program of 1968 produced no lasting results.
While "Fraternidad Hispana" had still been functioning and the
club leadership had been complaining to CEOC, the Hispanos had made
the acquaintance of a Black CEOC Board member, and in the spring of
1969 he informed them that CEOC had written a proposal to Washing-
ton in which they had based their requests partly on the presence
of an Hispano community, even though they had made no special pro-
vision for Hispanos in any of their programs.
Once again, the club's leadership felt that they were being
used, and because the unpaid club leadership was suffering from ex-
haustion in an effort to hold down regular jobs, service the communi-
ty, and still maintain some sort of family life, the Board of Direc-
tors of the Latin American Sports Club called a meeting of the His-
pano community to discuss the CEOC situation. They decided to form
a delegation that would approach the Board of CEOC and request that
two Hispanos be hired by that agency to deliver services to Hispanos.
More or less, this delegation was made up of the same people who had
formed the police delegation of 1964 and the club leadership of the
late 1960's--the Coamenos.
The delegation presented itself at a meeting of the CEOC Board,
and asked to speak. They were told that since they were not on the
meeting's agenda that they would have to wait. They waited, and they
waited, and after several hours they walked into the meeting uninvi-
ted and informed the Board that if they had to wait any longer, they.
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would leave and return the next day with a picket line. The Board
still could not see them, and they left to organize their picket line.
As they sat around that night at the Latin American Sports club
discussing the arrangements for the picket line, they decided that
they were going to too much trouble to merely ask for two Hispano
employees. They would ask, instead, for their own agency, with
their own Board of Directors. Then they would not be at the mercy
of a CEOC Board that included no Hispanos, and they -would be free
to design and administer their own programs, based on their experi-
ence with the community. Thus was the Concilio Hispano de Cambridge,
or the Spanish Council, conceived.
That picket line (which was mostly Coameno, but did include a
few Jayuyanos) was two weeks old when the Director of CEOC agreed
to the demand for a Hispano program with a separate Board of Direc-
tors. It is today the opinion of the organizers of that picket
line that the reason it succeeded was due entirely to the fact that
CEOC was embarrassed and worried about the possible consequences of
such bad publicity. That an agency supposed to serve the poor
should be so publicly assailed by the poor left it open to attack
from its enemies.
[The CEOC Director] ran his operation in such a way that he
could not fail to respond to pressure put on by the Spanish
community. If [he] started to lose any jiece of the very deli-
cate coalition that he had put together, he would have gone
right down the tube. There were too many people in Cambridge
who wanted his scalp, because he had been a rebel. He had not
been a member of the club, so to speak. In political circles
he had not shared the CEOC program with the city power struc-
ture...In order to avoid the inevitable sword falling on his
neck, he had to form a very loose but delicate coalition of
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poor folks, Blacks, Spanish, public housing tenants, and Portu-
guese, and not only did he have to form it, but he had to keep
it together. If there was ever a signal from the community that
a part of that structure was starting to fall apart, that meant
that [his] head was ready to roll. So, he had to make every
effort to be responsive to that situation. That's how he kept
his position.That's how he was able to do things in Cambridge,
the only way. So when the Spanish Council started to make
some noise and showed dissatisfaction with their priorities
within the CEOC framework, [he] had to respond. And it cer-
tainly did have a positive effect in that regard. [Interview
with former Director of Model Cities.]
And since the CEOC Director insisted that he had no money for
any Hispano Board, a delegation of Puerto Ricans and CEOC staff went
to New York, to the regional office of OEO. There, much to the His-
panos' surprise, they discovered that the Director of the region
was a Puerto Rican, and they came home with instructions to CEOC
that it should provide them with $8,000 from its own budget. Fur-
thermore, another $10,000 would be given to CEOC by OEO, and $18,000
was to be spent by CEOC in the manner suggested by the soon-to-be-
elected Board of Directors of Concilio.
Having secured the Concilio's funding, the leaders set about
to establish this Board of Directors. There would be nine Board
members, just as there are nine City Councilors in Cambridge, and
these nine would then elect their officers, including the President
of the Board, just as the City Councilors of Cambridge elects its
Mayor. The meeting to elect the Board was held at the Latin Club
(for Concilio had no facilities of its own), and the entire Hispano
community was invited by leaflets distributed in all the areas of
Cambridge where they lived. Perhaps a hundred people attended that
meeting, and only a handful of Jayuyanos were among them. The
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elections were supervised by the Election Commission of Cambridge,
and the community confirmed that leadership, now five years old, by
electing them the Board of Directors of the new Concilio Hispano de
Cambridge. And since they were no Jayuyano candidates, there were
no Jayuyanos on the Board.
E. Preliminary Observations.
The leadership that emerged from the Puerto Rican community
during the 1960's was very much indigenous to that community and
very much a part of one particular subgroup, the Coamenos, the
largest single group of Hispanos in Cambridge. Under considerable
prompting from the Cambridge police force, the first of the City's
agencies to respond to their presence, these young men, the children
of the rural barrios surrounding the old city of Coamo, emerged as
the leaders of the immigrant blue-collar workers of Cambridge.
Seasoned veterans of the Cambridge scene, they had by using the
one resource they knew, the Catholic Church, tackled the problems
with the police force, and then in 1967 they had organized the
clubs to keep themselves and their compatriots out of the bars.
After the clubs had been functioning as social service centers for
two years they had organized the community to picket CEOC, and per-
suade them to fund an Hispano agency. Thus, when it came time for
the community to elect its leaders, the Board of Directors of Con-
cilio, that community elected this same group, on the premises of
one of these clubs.
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To perceive the history of Concilio's origins, and particular-
ly the origin of its leaders, is essential to an understanding of
its entire history. Concilio's Board, at the time of its formation
in June 1969, was mostly Coameno; and there were no Jayuyanos on it.
But the reason for this was not simply that Coamenos and Jayuyanos
had come to blows in the bars of Cambridge. That this leadership
emerged from one particular group, and only one group, was due to
the cultural styles that the two had brought with them from the
island, not to any power struggle between them. That several of the
Board members were relatives also was a product of that process, and
was not due to nepotism or any other devious desire on their part.
Almost half of that original police delegation were relatives; that
a family should band together in the face of the arbitrary arrest
of one of its members is natural. The problems that Concilio would
later face in terms of Board composition were due not to the fact
that anyone had manipulated the situation, but rather to the very
natural, almost unconscious, way in which this leadership had emerged.
Although Coamo had been a center of the elite, indeed the Bai*os
de Coamo had been that elite's playground, these immigrants had never
been a part of this upper crust. But the traditions of that elite,
particularly its political and community traditions, had had an
impact on them. The elite of Coamo was part of the coastal tradi-
tion; they had been playing politics in Madrid and in San Juan
throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, and ever since 1868 they
had been the organizers of every variety of club and civic associa-
tion of the town. The talk was always of politics; as soon as one
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election had decided who was right and who was wrong about the
chances of the various contending parties, speculation began about
the next contest. Along with the lottery, cock-fighting, and soft-
ball, politics was a municipal sport. Time Magazine, no doubt
talking about the coastal areas, was amazed. "The islanders are
passionate in their politics, and voting turnouts of more than 80
percent are common" [Feb. 16, 1976, p. 16].
And the barrios had played a smaller game by roughly the same
rules. None of this group had ever belonged to Coamo's elite frater-
nities, such as the one that organized and still operates the Maraton
San Blas, but they had seen it done, and they called their first
club a sports club. They identified with the traditions of Coamo
even if their own families had not been the carriers of those tradi-
tions. That, plus their relatively better education and skills,
and their rapid adaption to the mainland city, prompted them to
respond to the slights and injustices of Cambridge in a political,
not a personal, manner. That the leaders were almost all Coamos was
not because the Coamenos desired to exclude the Jayuyanos from the
community's leadership. It was the Jayuyano's own political and
social traditions that had persuaded him to ignore the delegation
and the committees, to at most stand by the side of the arena and
merely watch the game. The Coamenos and the Jayuyanos, even hefore
the first fight had occurred, had been two separate groups, and only
one of these groups was really prepared, psychologically or other-
wise, to play the pressure politics of Cambridge immigrants.
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The Jayuyano, isolated in the mountain fastnesses of Otoao,
arrived in Cambridge with his jVbaro cultural apparatus almost com-
pletely intact. His barrios had not copied the political traditions
of the coastal elite; they had been engulfed and still were to a
large extent by the paternalistic system of the hacendado. From the
very beginning of Spanish rule when Ponce had divided up the Borin-
gu 4in and assigned them to a lord, the irbaro had learned to depend
on the highly personalized favors of his patron. The ifar had no
tradition of pressure politics. When abused he retreated into iso-
lation and quietude, until that abuse became intolerable. His tra-
dition of political activism is the tradition of the peasant uprising,
a violent protest provoked by fury, and carried out more for the good
of the soul than out of any hope of gaining control over one's own
life. His is the wrath of the Borinque'n Earth Goddess, of an erup-
ting volcano whose lava flows down the hills burning all in its path,
only to cool and harden until the next such explosion. From the
uprising against the Spaniards in 1511, to El Grito de Lares in 1868,
to the resistance against the U.S. takeover in 1898, to the most
recent 1950 uprising in which the Jbaros of Jayuya burned a large
part of their town to the ground and then walked out of the moun-
tains to surrender, the people of Otoao have maintained just one
tradition of protest.
The very reason their ancestors chose those mountain hollows
centuries ago was precisely because they were isolated, and the so-
ciety of the coast did not often penetrate in ways that could not
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be ignored. Most significantly, in terms of the issues that divided
the Jayuyanos and the Coamenos, the peoples from the mountains had
been isolated from the cultural and psychological changes wrought
by industrialization upon the minds of the peoples from the coast.
Thus, unchanged, the jfbaro has been pushed from his mountainside.
But unlike the invasion forces of the 16th century or the late 19th
century, the force that pushed him was amorphous. In 1511 the jf-
baros seized a Spaniard and drowned him, to see if he were god or
man, and revolted against those men, but the changes in Puerto Rico
since 1940 have not come embodied in any recognizable force, except
perhaps the U.S. label on his can of beans or the cardboard box of
rice. Having been taught his place, he has no anxiety about who he
should become; he does not seek to adapt, but to survive, intact,
in the hostile environment of Cambridge. As long as his ifbaro
dignity is not assaulted, he merely wishes to be left alone.
The ex-ilbaro of the coast, on the other hand, has changed.
Operation Bootstrap was the final stage in a process that has added
a new layer of cultural pluralism to the island. In the coastal
areas like Coamo, economic and social change have minimized the in-
fluence of the old Spanish ways, made many of them old-fashioned,
and emphasized la lucha, the rat race. In these areas emerged a new
social group, a blue-collar work force that aspires to be modern
and respectable. With the mainland mass media's definition of the
ideal life being broadcast into their homes, they have replaced the
old sense of personal dignity with a new concern for their whole
group's image before the public. Joseph P. Fitzpatrick has aptly
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described this new group, from which many of the Coameno migrants
come.
This sudden shift has important cultural and personal
consequences. It introduces a series of uncertainties and
anxieties which are the common experiences of new middle
class people in areas of rapid social transition. The advance
to middle class status involves serious economic pressures....
They are in an economically precarious position. Furthermore,
they have come from a cultural background in which social
status was fixed. In such a traditional two class system, a
person in the lower class has no anxieties about social posi-
tion; he knows exactly what is expected of him...But the person
newly arrived in the middle class has none of these certainties.
[Fitzpatrick, p. 49.]
Fitzpatrick goes on to say that these anxieties about who others
think they are, and an old conviction that has never really been aban-
doned--that people do come in classes-has made them anxious to live
up to their new image of respectability, a respectability defined
by the mainland. They are thus very suggestible, and very adaptive.
In the same way that they have arrived in Cambridge with industrial
and craft skills, they have also arrived with some of the values of
the mainland's anxiety-ridden lower middle class, especially when it
concerns their "good name."
This anxiety and an awareness that they could easily slip
back into the disoriented, urban slum culture makes them adopt and
cling to the dominant group's values even more vigorously than those
people to whom such values are instinctive. That they have essen-
tially been demoted several rungs on the relative social ladder by
removing themselves from their homes and joining the poor of Cam-
bridge exacerbates this anxiety. They thus have no patience for the
baro who might ruin the group's reputation, or for the poor that
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call themselves Puerto Rican, in order to claim U.S. citizenship,
welfare, or other benefits. Nor do they appreciate the Anglo's in-
ability to distinguish them from less image-conscious groups.
Nevertheless, it has been this same anxiety that has propelled them
to adapt to this society, to learn English, and to seize every op-
portunity that might lead down the path of upward mobility. That
the Jayuyano's clothes are not cut and styled according to the latest
dictates of fashion; that they still lope along the sidewalk as if
traversing their own hills and hollows; that they still talk like
peasants; that they hang religious pictures on their walls, like
the stone and clay cemies of the Boringue'n, or hang plastic baubles
from their rear-view mirrors, that they still insist on defending
their dignity with their fists or a knife, that they stick out
like sore thumbs, and that they are poor, irritates the Coamenos.
The Coamenos' snide remarks about "jitaros" assault the Jayu-
yano's dignity. The Coamenos cannot take his "dignity" seriously;
they smile, with tongue in cheek, and talk about people who never
seem to grow up. Nor can the Jayuyano take the Coameno's "good name"
seriously. He would prefer to stay away-but it is too difficult.
He too is subject to Anglo prejudice. He, too, wanted to take refuge
in the Coameno's private clubs. And it was in these clubs that the
origins of the Battle of Central Square can be found. Indeed, it
was with the founding of the Latin American Sports Club that the
problems became serious, and in front of its door that it exploded.
SECTION III. THE CAMBRIDGE SCENE
PART TWO. CONCILIO AND THE BATTLE OF CENTRAL SQUARE.
Concilio began in June, 1969, with a separate Board of Direc-
tors, but with no office of its own. The organization used the CEOC
office as an address, and carried on all business from there. Any
large meetings were held in the clubs. Furthermore CEOC had complete
control over the funding and the budget, and Concilio could not even
see its own books; they were controlled by CEOC. Thus for its first
two years Concilio was often unsure of how much money it had or
would have, which made planning exceedingly difficult, and it could
not raise its own funds, since its bank account was CEOC's bank
account. And since CEOC wrote the checks, in practice, CEOC had to
agree to all disbursements. On the other hand, CEOC did include
two Hispanos on the CEOC Board of Directors. In return for that
$18,000, the clubs' unofficial social service planners had given
up a great deal.
On July 9 the Concilio Board hired the Executive Director, an
associate of theirs who was already a Concilio Board member. This
man, a Coameno, was also a Board. member of the first Hispano club;
he had helped to organize the CEOC picket, and had been a part of
the delegation sent to the regional offices of CEOC in New York. He
then hired a part-time secretary, and by August Concilio was estab-
lished in its own office, at 678 Massachusetts Avenue, in the same
building as the City's Housing Authority. (Minutes of Board Meet-
ings, July 9, 1969.)
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One of the first items of business taken up by the Board was a
study of the city government. A chart was brought to one meeting,
and the nine members sat and discussed who was who and did what.
The Board then determined to write a letter to the City Manager re-
questing that he call a meeting of all relevant agencies and depart-
ments, as well as all the major private and public employers in Cam-
bridge. The purpose of the meeting would be to get commitments from
them all to deliver services to the community and to hire Hispanos,
so that these individuals could help their own community from such
posts. [Minutes of Board Meeting, August 8, 1969.]
Much to the surprise of the Board, the City Manager agreed to
call such a meeting. In a 1976 interview with the man who was City
Manager in 1969 (and City Manager again at the time of the inter-
view), the author asked him why he had acted favorably on this re-
quest.
The City Manager insisted that he had not been reacting to any
kind of pressure that Concilio had exerted on CEOC or upon the City.
Rather, he had been persuaded solely by the merits of the arguments
put forward by the 3oard. Even though Concilio might have been
exerting some pressure just by pointing out to the City and its of-
ficials that there was a large Hispano community and that no effort
was being made to serve it. "As I told you at the time, I thought
you were exaggerating your numbers, and I think that you would agree
with me today that you were, but yet at the same time you really had
a problem." (The author does not agree today. Later in the interview,
the City Manager accurately estimated the population as about 5,000.
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But that was not what the City was saying in 1969. In 1969 Con-
cilio (shaking in its boots) estimated the population at 5,000,
whereas the city was claiming less than 2,000. The City Manager
remembered Concilio's 1969 claim as 20,000!) Thus the City Manager
responded simply because the request was legitimate, and he felt
compelled to respond to a legitimate request. It was definitely
"reason, not pressure."
There was, however, more to it than simply "reason." Although
they were completely unaware of it at the time the decision was
made, the club leadership in the spring of 1969 had stumbled onto
the one sure way to convince the City Manager that they "really had
a problem." They could not have made a more astute decision than
the one they did make, to picket CEOC. The following remarks are
those of the City Manager.
I have never been a fan of CEOC. I have never felt that
the Cambridge Economic Opportunity Committee conducted itself
very well with respect to the very constituencies that it
should have. I think that as far as I was concerned, they had
a built-in bias. They considered their role to be one of con-
frontation with the City Government or with the powers that
be, rather than one of asking and trying to verge [?], and ca-
jole a response that would be favorable. For a large part my
feeling about CEOC has been rather consistant. I never felt
that CEOC did a very effective job for the community that it
ought to have represented.
CEOC never gave the City Government, or the people, or
the attitudes credit. The purpose was to confront the city.
And they...felt that nobody had any honest motives about try-
ing to do something to improve somebody's lives. And I thought
that the request that was made by the Spanish community was
one that was very reasonable.
And, no doubt, to demonstrate to CEOC the way an agency should
respond to the Hispano community, the City Manager responded to
this reasonable request and called this meeting. If Concilio had
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done him the favor of picketing CEOC, it was the least he could do
for them.
The agencies of Cambridge, and its private employers, did res-
pond to the City Manager and come to the meeting. There were so many
there that the City Hall Chambers were jammed, wall to wall, and
all the agencies and private institutions and employers were reason-
able and full of good intentions. But after they left that meeting
only five agencies actually delivered. Two of them were state agen-
cies, two of them were agencies specially created to help the poor
anyway (that is, CEOC and Model Cities), and the last was the Housing
Authority, which was supposed to provide housing for low-income
people. The latter three receive extensive funding through state
and federal programs. None of those agencies directly under the
City Manager, who had called the meeting, responded.
The Cambridge office of the state's Department of Employment
Security (DES) agreed to hire one Hispano employment aide, and the
Cambridge office of the state's Department of Welfare hired two
workers who could speak Spanish (but who were not Hispano). CEOC
hired one Coamenc, who worked for them directly for two months and
then was transferred to the OEO Training and Technical Assistance
Unit (which CEOC administered) as a housing specialist. Model
Cities said that they would give money to CEOC for a Foreign Lan-
guage Referral Service (which was not what the Council had asked
for, and which remained unpopular until the day it was abolished in
1973, and the Housing Authority decided that they might be able to
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admit a few Hispanos into public housing. [Model Cities' programs,
purposes and programs will be explained in the subsequent chapter
on housing.] The rest of that roomful of people, and the agencies,
companies, and institutions that they represented, delivered nothing.
Back at the Concilio office, there were only two people to ser-
vice a problem-ridden community of thousands, the Executive Director
and a part-time secretary. The job was impossible. No matter how
hard they tried, they could not deliver services in a manner that
the community had every right to expect. The unpaid Board members,
themselves, often got involved in the ordinary work at the office,
which was not surprising since they had been handling such problems
for years at the clubs. Thus a valiant, if frantic, effort was
made to act as a referral service for Hispanos with problems.
The client would come into the office, frequently unaware of
which agency he or she needed, and ask to talk to the Executive
Director, who was most often out on an errand with the previous
client, trying to deliver that person to the appropriate place, and
to plead his or her case with the appropriate person. Meanwhile
the part-time secretary could either ask the second client to wait
for the Executive Director to return, or she could go with that cli-
ent to the appropriate agency, leaving the office locked up, or
leaving it with a Board member or a friend that had just happened
in. If she left with the second client, the third client would
then be faced with a person who was not even an employee of Concilio,
and who could do nothing but keep the office open until either the
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Director or secretary returned. When forced to make long waits,
that might or might not result in a successful resolution of their
problem, many prospective clients became disgruntled in the extreme,
and blamed the deficiencies or complete absences of service on
favoritism, or on discrimination against their group (and such per-
sons, coincidentally, could have been Jayuyanos). Such scarcity of
resources lent itself to the development of conflicts between Con-
cilio and the community and among the Concilio Board itself.
Obviously they needed more people, and that meant money, and
whenever they asked CEOC for anything, they were told that they should
go to Model Cities, and when they went to Model Cities, they found
that they really should address themselves to CEOC or some other
agency. On the other hand, whenever a Hispano wandered into any
city office, including those of CEOC and Model Cities, asking for
help, he was sent to Concilio, which was supposed to be able to solve
all problems for the Hispano. These agencies were perfectly willing,
and in fact anxious, to relay all problems to Concilio; they were
just unwilling to give it funds to hire people to do anything about
all the problems that were being referred to them. And since they
were completely dependent on CEOC for funds and could not raise
their own money, their hands were tied. At one point, therefore,
the Board tried to incorporate separately from CEOC, to gain their
independence, but this proved impossible due to the attitude of the
Executive Director, the man they themselves had hired back in July.
The first Executive Director was a short man with a large spirit
and a voracious appetite. He was in many respects an excellent
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organizer-he had the energy and the flair to inspire the population
and get them behind him and his causes. He had excelled on the two-
week-long picket line in front of the CEOC offices, and that was why
the Board had chosen him as Director. But he also possessed a fatal
flaw. He could not conceive of himself as a part of a larger unit;
he could not conceive of himself as an employee of the Board. He
was very much a man who intended to use his personal charisma and
his new-found connections to maintain a monopoly position in which
only he, and he personally, could deliver to "his" people.
But the style of the first Executive Director was not the only
matter that provoked problems between him and the Board. One of the
first disagreements occurred at the August meeting at which the Board
decided to ask the City Manager to call a meeting of all city agen-
cies and major employers in Cambridge. The new Executive Director
objected to the Council putting pressure on the City Manager, and
through him upon these other agencies and employers, to hire Hlispa-
nos. Indeed, the Executive Director already had hired his own
secretary, an Anglo, against the express wishes of the Board. The
Executive Director had so vehemently objected to the letter being
written that, in the end, it was written by a Board member, and
signed by a Board member, not by the Executive Director of Concilio.
The Executive Director offered no substantive reasons for not
exerting this pressure; in fact he did not offer any reasons. The
other Board members were left to conclude that the only explanation
for his behavior was that he wanted to monopolize the position of
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representative of the Hispanos before the Anglo powers that be, and
thus ensure that all communications and benefits that were transferred
from one to the other went through his person. The employment of
other Hispanos would complicate his plans. From the perspective of
the other Board members, he was operating in such a manner that he
took the pressure off the City Manager, and aligned himself against
the Board and their policies.
The problems between the Board and the Executive Director
multiplied so rapidly that in a matter of weeks they had lost con-
fidence in the man, and were convinced that he had aligned himself
with an unresponsive power structure against them. Thus it was
particularly frustrating when the Board attempted to incorporate
Concilio, so that it could control its own finances and have com-
plete access to its own books, only to find that the Executive Di-
rector saw incorporation and the independence of Concilio from CEOC
as a threat to his own power, which was based on his rapidly culti-
vated relationship with the Director of CEOC, the source of Concilio's
money.
. The Board had made the first mistake in hiring this man, but
the Director of CEOC and the City Manager compounded this mistake
by dealing almost exclusively with this man and ignoring the Board
of Directors. The Board wanted very much to fire the man, but they
did not. They were afraid to try since his paycheck came from CEOC,
and the Director of CEOC paid more attention to him than to the
Concilio Board. Whenever they tried to raise the issue with the
CEOC Director, whenever they tried to explain to him the damage that
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this man was doing, the CEOC Director defended the Concilio Direc-
tor. The Concilio Board worried and fretted but they did not try
to fire their Director. And the City's officials never seemed to
realize that this blunder-buss was not representative of the Board
or the community; and the community too, for a few short months,
assumed that the Board was responsible for him.
In a very real sense this first Executive Director was the
flame that lit the powder keg of Coameno-Jayuyano tensions, the
flame that set off the October 1969 Battle of Central Square. In
a style more becoming to a village tough than an Executive Director,
he made no attempt to overcome the Jayuyano distrust of the Coameno-
controlled Concilio. He made no effort to invite them to meetings
or special events, and whenever the Jayuyanos complained about the
service the Director took it as an attack on his own person, a chal-
lenge to his own capacities, and his own ability to deliver. And
so he fought with them. The Board members were very much aware of
this situation, but were paralyzed by indecision. The Jayuyanos
did not come to them to complain, and so they had no opportunity to
discuss the problems with them. Nor did the Jayuyanos complain to
the CEOC Director. That was not their style. They talked to each
other on the sidewalks and in the bars, and merely intended to be
overheard. And the Board was afraid to call a meeting about the
problem because they could not predict how the CEOC Director would
respond. They were afraid he could use such a meeting against them.
The crisis came to a head one autumn night in 1969 when the
Concilio was only a few months old. The first Executive Director
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had somehow ended up at a party held in the home of Jayuyanos and
had gotten into an argument about whether or not the Concilio was
delivering services equally to Jayuyanos and Coamenos. When the
argument got heated, the Director displayed his new powers, his con-
nections with the city government, by calling in the police to
arrest three Jayuyanos right there in their own home. They spent
the night in jail, and the Executive Director, bloated with his new-
found power, walked out of that apartment with his head up and his
chest out, a posture he also maintained on the sidewalks of Central
Square. Puerto Ricans describe it as "frog" posture.
Not quite so confident as he appeared, the Executive Director
then proceeded to the Director of CEOC., The Executive Director
convinced the other that his life was in danger, that the Jayuyanos
were determined to kill him, and that he therefore needed a gun.
The officials of the City of Cambridge used their influence to per-
suade the Police Deaprtment to give him a permit to carry a pistol.
Why these men succumbed to such folly, why they asked that a gun
permit be given to the Executive Director of Concilio without so
much as consulting the Concilio's Board of Directors about their
opinion on this matter, why, when even the Mayor does not go around
with a gun slung on his hip and the City Council would never tolerate
such a farce--why they decided to give this man a gun is a matter
of no small perplexity to this author. These officials must have
believed that a Puerto Rican who was just trying to deliver the
ordinary services that a community should expect should somehow
need a gun to defend himself from that ungrateful community. They
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believed what this man told them, that the dangerous 11baros were
lurking in every dark corner of Cambridge, laying for this man, the
city's man at Concilio. These officials were no doubt totally
oblivious to the fact that by allowing the director to play his
games and ignore Board policy, they were seriously damaging the
Board's credibility within the community. For the community assumed
that the Board of Directors was in charge, and that the Board ap-
proved of this man and his gun-toting.
The Jayuyanos, especially those incarcerated, were incensed by
the jailing of these three men. And yet initially they took no
revenge. But when that "frog" (as he was called) started walking
the sidewalks of Central Square with a gun slung on his hip, like
some sheriff in a cheap (Anglo) western, and when they heard that
this gun was to protect him from the Jayuyanos, they became not only
outraged, but scared. They were afraid that he was going to use
that gun on one of them. Not only were the Jayuyanos scared, but
so were the members of the Concilio Board, and so was the Anglo
secretary that the Director himself had hired. The whole Concilio
office would freeze in terror, backs against the wall, whenever the
Director appeared. The Jayuyanos, however, did not cower against
the wall, but sought a remedy, revenge. They went to two members
of the Concilio Board-indeed they went to one of their homes to
meet with them--and demanded that the Executive Director be fired.
It was then that they discovered that the Board had been wanting to
fire this man for weeks, and not just because of his problem with
the Jayuyanos.
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Presented with the irate Jayuyanos, the Board members decided
that the time had arrived for a showdown, and they chose an upcoming
meeting scheduled for October 19 as the occasion. That meeting was
in many ways a demonstration of the success that the Concilio was
having with regard to the amount of attention that it could command
from city officials. The Board had gotten the officials of CEOC,
Model Cities (which had just begun to implement its programs), and
the Cambridge Redevelopment Authority (an urban renewal office),
among others, to give up their Sunday afternoon to come explain to
the Hispano community what their programs offered in the present,
and what might be done in the future.
The Board knew that the first Director was making an effort
to bring out his supporters to that meeting, in order to attack and
discredit the Board members in front of the officials. So the Board
members invited the Jayuyanos to come to that meeting, en masse, to
express their grievances in front of the officials, in order to
discredit the Director. They had been wanting to raise the issue
of regionalism anyway, and they saw this as an opportunity to do it.
They also wanted to prove to the officials that the Executive Direc-
tor did not represent the community, and that he could not deliver
that community to them.
The supporters of the first Executive Director were for the
most part Coamenos, but that was beside the point. Most of them
were people that he had assisted in getting onto the roles of the
Welfare Department, or some other charity, and in the process he had
convinced these people that it was only due to his personal intervention
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that they had received such benefits. At least that was the story
that was going around (indeed, it was one of the more legal versions
of that story going around), and people believed it, including the
people on the Board of Directors of Concilio. And when mobilizing
the people for this meeting the Director had neglected to tell them
that they were about to be used to discredit the Board; he had con-
fined himself to the benefits that he was about to deliver to them,
due to his connections with these officials.
That this characterization of the first Executive Director is
not just the opinion of a frustrated former Board Member is apparent
from an examination of an editorial that the Director wrote encour-
aging the Hispano population to come to this meeting. It appeared
in the third issue of a Concilio-sponsored weekly, the Noticiero
Hispano, which is dated October 17 to 23, 1969. (The use of the
Concilio's name by this weekly had been offered by the Director,
without consultation with the Board.) One might add at this point
that the Spanish wording of this editorial is just as awkward as
the following English translation, which has attempted to duplicate
both the style and spirit of the communique.
I want to inform you that here in Cambridge there exists
an agency and the purpose of this agency is to improve an area
that makes up a section of Cambridge. This agency is the Con-
cilio Hispano. We want to inform you that this is the area
where the majority of the Hispano community lives in this city.
Aside from using the first person singular pronoun "I," with
reference to Concilio, revealing his own opinion that he was the
Concilio in the same way that Louis XIV was France, the Director
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erroneously describes the Model Cities' program as a program of Con-
cilio. One would think that the Anglo city officials, including
the Director of Model Cities, would have been offended by such an
error.
Furthermore, I want it that no Hispanos who live in other
areas fail to respond with their support for all those people
in this community that have the right to be offered this kind
of program. The area that I have referred to is that of Colum-
bia Street, Broadway, the whole area of Mass Ave, Hampshire
St. and East Cambridge. This area is better known as Model
Cities. [For a complete text, see the Appendix.]
Not only does the tone turn dictatorial or demogogic ("Further-
more I want it that no Hispanos who live in other areas fail to res-
pond..."), but the description of the Model Neighborhood Area is in-
accurate. It did not include all of Broadway, "the whole area of
Mass Ave," all of Hampshire Street, or any of East Cambridge. He
does finally get around to mentioning the name of Model Cities, the
real sponsor of the said program, but he uses it only to designate
a geographical area, and does not correct his earlier inaccurate
description of the program's sponsor as Concilio.
The city officials and the Hispano community of Cambridge did
come out on that fateful Sunday in October 1969. One of the Board
members who knew that the Jayuyanos were also coming, and that the
session would prove stormy, had gone up to the meeting place, the
Latin American Sports Club, early, but he had decided not to unlock
the doors and let the people in before 1:00, in an effort to prevent
any pre-meeting fights. He was watching the crowd gather down below
when he saw a vanguard of Borinquen troops approaching from the west,
along Massachusetts Avenue. They were obviously ready for a fight,
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both the men and the women. lie flew down the stairs to try to talk
to the leaders of the approaching vanguard, but by the time that he
got down, the fight had started on the sidewalk in front of the Club,
and already the brawl included hundreds of angry Puerto Ricans. At
this point he ran in good Coameno maratonista fashion for the nearest
police station, where he managed to deliver the message that there
was a big fight a C:entral Square, and that the police were needed
inmediately. Racing the riot squad back to the square, he got there
in time to see the crowd surround the car of the Coameno Executive
Director, from which the Director had never had a chance to emerge.
Fortunately the Director's gun was not in his hand, but in the
glove compartment, and fortunately the message delivered by the
Jayuyanos did not exceed the bounds of "Get out of this town and
don't ever come back." The police assisted in the exit of the Direc-
tor's car and broke up the main body of the fight moments before
the main army of Jayuyanos arrived, even though they were coming at
a run, having heard that a fight had already started. In spite of
the fact that an estimated 400 Puerto Ricans had brawled all the way
across Massachusetts Avenue, completely tying up traffic along the
main street of Cambridge, and that many more had been converging on
the scene, not one person was arrested.
But the damage was done. The two sides, the Board and the Exe-
cutive Director, had summoned their forces for a showdown in front
of the city officials. Both had intended to prove to the City's of-
ficials that their side, and only their side, could deliver this
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community, but instead what they had demonstrated was not the power
to bring people out, but rather how well they could do battle with
each other. The Concilio, and its Board of Directors, had been dis-
credited right before the eyes of the city officials, officials who
had all arrived in time to have a ring-side seat at the hostilities.
It would take years to recover from the damage done that day. And
the Board and the Concilio were discredited in the eyes of the com-
munity, for that community had not seen what had transpired behind
the scenes, could see nothing of what was happening. They only saw
that the board had not delivered much except the batey battle of
Central Square.
Furthermore, any hope that the Concilio would be able to organ-
ize the Jayuyanos of Cambridge died on that Sunday afternoon. The
Jayuyanos, having wreaked their vengeance on the Executive Director,
who has never returned to Cambridge and who submitted his letter of
resignation to CEOC via the U.S. mail, retreated to their mountain
fasthold of non-participation. Having lost the one Executive Direc-
tor who was a community organizer, who had had the charismatic ap-
peal to bring the crowds out (regardless of his other shortcomings),
Concilio never again has been able to find an Executive Director
who can organize. Any mobilization that occurred after October 19,
1969, was carried out by the Board of Directors.
It was an unqualified disaster, but it could have been worse.
The Jayuyanos had come armed, just in case, and they did not use
those arms. Nor did they murder the Director, even though he was
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penned in his car. Fortunately, the Director did not use his gun,
either. Fortunately the police got there before the main body of
Jayuyano troops did, and fortunately they did not arrest anyone,
for arrests might have been provocation for another round of revenge.
After the dramatic exit of the first Director the Board took
over, and succeeded in following their own advice to the community,
to move into the Model Cities' neighborhood. They left the building
that also housed the Housing Authority and moved east down Massachu-
setts Avenue to the middle of Central Square. In February of 1970
they hired their second Executive Director, a woman from Jayuya,
by way of Boston (Dorchester). She had not been a member of the
Cambridge community, and, amazingly enough, was unaware of the Coa-
meno-Jayuyano hostilities of the previous autumn. One of the Coameno
Board members who knew her had solicited her application for the job,
and the Board had hired her with the hope that a Jayuyana Executive
Director would be able to patch up the deep division within the
community and overcome the Jayuyanos' refusal to get involved in any
attempt to mobilize the community.
In spite of their good intentions, it did not work. There
was at iost a lowering of the volume of Jayuyano remarks about the
Coameno-controlled Concilio. Enthusiastic participation, enthusias-
tic anything, was totally absent from that part of the community.
Nor had this second Director been at her post more than a few months
when she married a man who had been living with a Jayuyana woman for
years. This was unacceptable behavior and the Jayuyanos used it as
an excuse for not cooperating with this woman. The Board was also
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disappointed because the second Director was either unable or not
inclined to mobilize and organize the community, nor was she a plan-
ner of programs. She contented herself with the ferrying of clients
to their proper destinations. When one of the Board members who
was organizing the Cambridge Spanish-speaking Tenants' Union asked
her to sponsor this union and the housing project that grew out of
it as a program of Concilio, she refused. He was forced to go to
CEOC, and though she did eventually sit in on the negotiations for
the incorporation of the project (a process described in full in a
subsequent chapter), she was essentially there for the ride.
And she did, of course, find out about the Jayuyano-Coameno war
at Central Square, and this did not inspire her toward further co-
operation with the Board. She became almost secretive about what
she was doing as Executive Director, and even if her intentions had
been completely honest, she would have aroused suspicion in the
minds of the Board members. They were understandably resentful since
as Board members they would be held responsible for all Concilio
acts, even if they knew not what the Concilio was doing. That at
least some of her intentions were unacceptable to the Board became
apparent when one day she announced to the majority of them that they
were fired. (One assumes that she was going to appoint replacements
from among her friends in Boston or among the Jayuyano population
in Cambridge, although one cannot be sure.) However, because it is
impossible according to the by-laws to fire the entire Board of
Directors, or even a majority of it (although four-fifths of the
Board can fire one of its members), and because the Jayuyanos of
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Cambridge would not support this act of vengeance, she did not suc-
ceed in removing the members of the Board. The Cambridge Jayuyanos
had been satisfied with the forced exit of the first Director; they
were even; they would not be used in this Director's vendetta. She
never suggested that there should be new elections for membership
on the Board, the only procedurally correct way to replace Board mem-
bers, either because it did not occur to her or because she knew that
the people who would come out to such a meeting would reelect the
same Board.
Thus the Board found itself putting up with an Executive Direc-
tor who had tried to fire them, in violation of the by-laws. But
once again they were afraid to try to fire her, or press the issue
with CEOC, for fear that CEOC would cut them off from their funds.
The Board carried on as best it could. The undated summary of
Concilio's first year, written by the President of its Board, probab-
ly in September of 1970,1 betrays the frustrations that the year had
brought.
In 1969, this office was established, [and] it was a hard
task, in order to help resolve many of the problems and obsta-
cles that confronted the Hispanos in this city. It was hard
at the beginning to confront this. Our first goal was to attack
the federal offices called CEOC (Cambridge Economic Opportunity
Committee). It cost us two weeks of demonstrating to get funds
to operate this agency. It was not easy, but we succeeded.
Since this report describes the tenants' union at Columbia Ter-
race as CAST, and it lists as one achievement the hiring of one Hispa-
no by Model Cities, and since this person was hired in September 1970,
one can assume that it was written after August, and since there is
no mention of the negotiations to incorporate CAST, it must have been
early autumn.
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That was our first task. The second was to educate the City
of Cambridge to demonstrate respect for Hispanos, for in those
days there existed none for a part of this city. There only
existed discrimination and terrible abuse against us Hispanos.
He went on to detail the accomplishments that had been brought
about in negotiations with the Department of Police, with the Housing
Authority, with the courts, the Department of Welfare, the City Hos-
pital, the owners of the factories (with the assistance of the Massa-
chusetts Commission Against Discrimination), and to describe the pro-
posals being prepared for future programs. What he saw was not just
the accomplishments, but rather the gaping canyon that separated the
still dismal realities of the present from a future in which the His-
panos would be able to solve their "problems and obstacles."
It would be a long and sad history of our past, were we to
put it down for the record. And it is for this reason that we
must maintain this office in order to continue serving as the
VOICE of our community and to deliver services to all those who
need them....It is necessary that the community support us so
that we can continue to search for a better future. We do not
want to return to that era of 1969, when there were no services
for the Hispano community. We want to clear the way for our
children, so that they do not have to go the same path that we
have in this city, in those past years of discrimination and
anguish. We shall be thinking of improving every day, for the
good of our community.
This is a good surmary of what we have done to this date.
Many people have been involved to make this reality possible,
many have worked hard in search of a better future, and many
have served the Hispano community, without pay.
That the President of the Board dwelled upon the need for the
continued existence of the Concilio suggests that he had had a pre-
monition of what the second (Jayuyana) Director would eventually
attempt. Realizing that she did not have the support of the Board,
nor the community, she decided to abolish Concilio. She had convinced
107
the CEOC Board that they were wasting their money (they were apparent-
ly not hard to convince), and that they should just cut off the funds
and watch it die. The Concilio Board was in an extremely difficult
position. Though they did not control their own funds, and these
funds were but a pittance, CEOC nevertheless subjected them to the
same kind of program evaluation as they used on other more autono-
mous and affluent programs. The Board, however, managed to concen-
trate their attention long enough to prevent Concilio's demise. Then
they set about to fire the second Director, not on the grounds that
she had tried to abolish the agency, for CEOC had been involved in
that attempt too, and it was CEOC that had to permit her dismissal.
On the grounds of her administrative deficiencies, however, after a
long struggle, they finally succeeded in firing her. And although
one could hear Jayuyano grumblings on the sidewalks and in the bars
-- "You haven't changed, anyhow: you hire a Jayuya, then you get rid
of her"--there was no real protest over her departure.
The third Executive Director was hired in May, 1971, and she
continued to serve until June 1975. She was an Anglo, one of the
Spanish-speaking social workers hired by the Department of Welfare
in August 1969 at the behest of the Spanish Council. The Board that
hired her was more or less the same Board that had fought the first
Director for merely hiring an Anglo secretary in 1969. This later
decision was a measure of their frustration in dealing with the
disunity among the Puerto Ricans. The Coameno first Director had
gone down in infamy; the second Jayuyana Director had tried to des-
troy the Council. They hoped an outsider would at least bring peace
and services.
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That the Board had hired an Anglo to run the Concilio provoked
more negative comment from the Anglo city officials than from the
Hispano community itself, although it would be an exaggeration to
say that the Hispanos were unconcerned. But the Anglos continued
to make remarks to the effect of how could this woman represent the
community, and occasionally they just refused to deal with her at
all. Although this attitude on their part did cost the Concilio
some benefits, it had another side-effect that the Board came to
appreciate. That is, with both the first and second Directors, the
Board had extreme difficulty in persuading the Anglo officials that
they, and not their employee, over whom they had somewhat less than
full control, represented the Hispano community of Cambridge. They
were that community's elected representatives, and even though there
were serious shortcomings with regard to their ability to represent
the Jayuyano constituency, they did truly represent the majority of
the Hispano population. They had been hurt and angry when their
policies had been ignored in the past, in favor of those of their
employee, the Director. Now that the Anglo officials felt constrained
in their dealings with the Director, and thus forced to deal with
the Board, they were able to see the silver lining in this cloud.
Complaints that issued from the Hispano community had as much
to do with the fact that the third Director was a social worker as
they did with the undeniable fact that she was Anglo. They were
afraid that she would operate as a welfare worker, that she would
know all their business, and that she would make unannounced visits
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to their homes. The Director, however, was sensitive to this prob-
lem and did her best to overcome it in discussions with the people,
and she did eventually succeed in persuading them that they were in
no danger.
And there was the usual crescendo of disparagement from the
sidewalks and the bars, marking Jayuyano unhappiness that they had
not been consulted about her hiring. This too eventually faded, and
the third Anglo Director became a second-choice mediator between the
dissatisfied Jayuyanos and the Coameno-controlled Board. (The Jayu-
yanos' first choice was Father Sheehan, the Spanish-speaking priest
of Irish extraction at St. Mary's, a phenomenon that will be dis-
cussed in a subsequent chapter dealing with the role of the Church.)
It was also during the years 1971 and 1972, in the early days
of the Anglo third Executive Director, that the Board attempted to
broaden its base and improve its image by appointing an additional
four persons to the body, thus enlarging it to 13 members. They
made a concerted effort to appoint people who were not from the
municipality of Coamo. They did not succeed, however, in appointing
persons from the municipality of Jayuya. Instead the appointees
turned out to be professional people from other Latin American coun-
tries, some of whom were serving the Governor of Massachusetts in
various capacities related to the fact that they were Hispanos. This
attempt did not evoke any response, positive or negative, from the
Jayuyanos.
In 1973 elections were held to form a new Board of Directors,
the first such elections since 1969. Applications for candidacy were
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mailed to everyone on the Concilio's client list, and they were dis-
tributed at all the Hispano businesses in the area, as well as handed
out at the Concilio. No Jayuyano filled out such a form and asked
to run, and the Board elected in 1973 was essentially the same as
that elected in 1969, Coameno-dominated. Nor did the elections of
1974 and 1975 change the composition of the Board significantly or
add any Jayuyanos, since none chose to run.
In 1974, with the advent of the state-funded CETA program (in
which CETA would pay an individual's salary and assign him to work
at a non-profit agency), the Concilio, through the efforts of the
Anglo third Director, acquired a Jayuya employee. Her presence at
Concilio provoked an angry response from the Board, not because the
woman was a Jayuya, but because of her reputation among Hispanos,
regardless of their place of origin. This woman was not liked, and
the reasons had little to do with the fact that she was from Jayuya.
Thus, as an individual, she was a bad choice if the purpose of hiring
her was to overcome the Jayuyano-Coameno division. The Jayuyanos
were not enthusiastic about her presence, and the fact that the
Board felt compelled to object to her presence meant that they were
forced to add fuel to the fire of discontent that continually burned
among the Jayuyanos. That the Executive Director was an Anglo, and
thus not sensitive to the undercurrents of opinion in the community,
meant that the Concilio became a victim of its own Director's token-
ism. Once more, they suffered from the ignorance of the outsider,
and although they refrained from forcing the dismissal of this employ-
ee, mainly because she was a Jayuyana, she resigned after a few
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months, of her own volition.
In 1975 the President of the Board, a man who had served from
its very formation, stepped down, and his half-brother was elected
President. The new President attempted to broaden the Board's com-
position by appointing a Jayuyano to the body. The Jayuyano was a
friend of his from Somerville, an early arrival in Cambridge who had
married -an Anglo woman. An obviously adventurous and brave soul,
he insisted on playing on the Coameno-controlled softball team in
Cambridge, even though he was subject to much abuse both from the
team and the fans. Having thus proved his talents for putting up
with the Coamenos at their worst, the second President thought that
he might survive as a Board member. He did not. He resigned after
two months when he found out that there was little that he could do
for Somerville that the Coameno-controlled Board was not already
doing, and that they did not listen to him, anyway.
Under the Anglo third Director, the Concilio did manage to re-
build its reputation of responsibility with regard to the delivery
of services, and in November 1971 it finally managed to incorporate
as an independent agency with full powers over its own budget and
the right to raise its own monies. Finally the Board was able to
work with its Director without CEOC mediation. Every year new pro-
grams were added, new funds found, new lines of communication created
between the Concilio and other agencies, and other city programs
persuaded to make provisions for the Hispanos. Although the Concilio
still was plagued with internal disputes, and the Board was in a
position to respond to them, uninhibited by outside forces. The
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most serious heritage from the past was the Board's inability to
build a staff that could organize the population for political ac-
tion, for the application of pressure to sensitive points in the
City's power structure. The style of the staff lent itself only to
indirect and less effective tactics that produced incremental im-
provements, but did not produce major changes in the balance of
power within Cambridge. This meant that the staff's time was con-
sumed in the delivery of larger and smaller crumbs.
All in all, the Concilio from 1969 to 1975 was a Coameno-domina-
ted institution that went through occasional ineffective spasms of
concern for sharing this control with non-Coameno Hispanos, including
the Jayuyanos, but that such efforts with regard to the Jayuyanos
were ineffective. When the Jayuyanos complained that Concilio is
controlled by Coamenos, and that they have no role in the decision
making, they are right. And when they complain that they are not
invited to all its functions and special events, they are usually
right.
But it must also be said that the Jayuyanos have never made a
concerted effort to participate on this Board, much less challenge
it, and that it has always been due to Coameno initiatives that they
have been included on its staff or appointed to its Board. One
might even add that the war at Central Square was indirectly a Coa-
meno initiative, since two Coameno members of the Board had reques-
ted their presence that day, and had even suggested that they come
in force. Even when the Jayuyano Director was at the Concilio, or
even when there was a CETA employee from Jayuya at the office, the
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Jayuyano population did not respond, and they did not support these
people. And they did not want to use the services of Concilio; they
came as a last resort. The Coamenos have mishandled this situation,
but it is not entirely their fault that the Jayuyanos have not shared
equally in the power of Concilio, or in the benefits that it has
delivered. Nor should one conclude from the fact that Concilio did
not succeed in including many Jayuyanos in their activities and on
their Board, that they did not try. In a later section on the Church,
it will be shown that Father Sheehan, too, was unsuccessful in his
attempts to elicit Jayuyano participation in various Church activi-
ties, and no one has ever impugned his motives just because he also
failed.
After Concilio was formed, its political, recreational, and
service-delivering predecessors, the Hispano clubs, changed. As Con-
cilio took over more and more of their political and service func-
tions, they gradually evolved into purely recreational, profit-making
organizations. Their management was no longer by a Board of Direc-
tors, but by two or three partners. Sometimes during this process
they were simply owned by one person. The volunteers were replaced
by salaried managers. One obvious indicator of the change was that
the women no longer frequented the clubs. Their attention now cen-
tered on Concilio and the Church.
Thus, starting in June 1969, the clubs began their gradual re-
treat out of the political arena, a process that was complete by 1971,
when Concilio finally incorporated. They remained, however, a locus
of Jayuyano-Coameno tension, and the clubs continued to open and
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close, due to the costs of repairing their battle sites. The first
club, The Latin American Sports Club, was forced to close in 1970
after an outsider came in one night and shot a man. Not one club
was open throughout the entire period from 1970 to 1975. And even-
tually these fights led to the complete exclusion of Jayuyanos from
the clubs, for all of them were owned by Coamenos.
In an effort to overcome the increasing separation of Jayuyanos
and Coamenos, one of Concilio's Board members opened a new club in
1972, the Cartucho Club. He went out of his way to include the
Jayuyanos, but it did not work. The club closed in 1973. The
following is the history of this effort in his own words.
The last club that I open the Jayuyanos were allowed to
participate. That was my mistake. Some of them started trou-
ble and the.last thing they do was to wreck the place apart.
One night they came and they started to fight with some of
the boys. I ask them to get out. Then they want to fight with
me. So the boys put them out and one of them (a Jayuyano) had
a cut over his eye. That same night, they waited until I closed
and then they break the place by throwing bricks through the
windows. So I closed the club. Today in Cambridge, you don't
see clubs like before and to some extent it is better. We have
two clubs today, one in Washington Street and the other one in
Columbia Terrace. The one in Washington Street is in the base-
ment of a house, so if the owner doesn't want to let me or you
to go in, he doesn't have to open the door. The same in the
Terrace. This is how we have been able to control these people.
They know this now and they don't come around. Second, this
way we let in whoever we please.
Concilio has thus limped along on its functioning one Conmeno
leg. The VOICE that the first President of the Board referred to
has been heard, but it has not evoked a substantial official response,
at least not the kind of response that the Board had hoped to elicit.
The situation is discouraging, for everywhere the Jayuyano looks in
Cambridge, he sees the Coamenos in control: in the clubs, at Concilio,
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at the Church, in the athletic association, or at the Hispano hous-
ing project CAST. And what is even more distressing, the Board of
Directors of Concilio has become an interlocking directorate for all
these centers, since the activists in each of the above areas, not
to mention the newly created experts on housing and employment, be-
long to Concilio's Board, or have close connections with it. The
Jayuyano's cultural heritage has not encouraged him to participate
and certainly does not encourage him to try to join, to break into
such a network of Coameno control. The dismal details of this re-
gional division as it has manifested itself in housing, employment,
and at the Church follow.
SECTION III. THE CAIBRIDGE SCENE
PART THREE. THE PROBLEM OF NUMBERS.
A. The 1970 Census.
How many Spanish-speaking persons there are in Cambridge, and
the relevant characteristics of this population (location, employ-
ment, income, education, and so forth) are not matters of idle curi-
osity. Nor is the desire to accurately count the population merely
an instance of a group trying to build up its own image, either for
its own ego gratification or to impress city officials or candidates
for public office. These numbers matter. Federal, state, and local
programs base the size of their programs in a given area upon such
numbers, and if a target group is undercounted it is very likely to
be underserviced. The Model Cities program, the Community Action
Program (of which CEOC is the local Cambridge manifestation), and
the Revenue-sharing and Community Development Bloc Grants are all
federal programs that specifically base the amount of their aid to
any given community upon formulas, one variable of which is the number
of people to be served. Various hiring programs, especially those
involving affirmative action, are also affected by population pro-
jections.
Ever since 1969 the question of just how many Hispanos live in
Cambridge has been a matter of contention. When the community
picketed CEOC that spring and when they went to the City Manager in
August, Hispano leaders claimed that there were 5,000 Hispanos in
Cambridge, a figure that few non-Hispanos believed. And then came
the results of the 1970 Census that declared the Hispano population
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to be 1,954 persons. That the city officials, especially the City
Manager remember this dispute is clear from the interviews of 1976.
In his interview the City Manager twice mentioned that "although you
were exaggerating the numbers," he nevertheless thought that the re-
quests were legitimate. The author does not believe that 5,000 was
an exaggeration in 1969; it was an estimate, an educated guess, and
he would still maintain that even if it was by no means a systematical-
ly calculated figure, it was still the best estimate available.
The purpose of this chapter, therefore, is to demonstrate that
the Spanish-speaking population of Cambridge was grossly under-
counted in the 1970 Census, and that the Brown Report of 1973, in
spite of its many shortcomings, is the best information available
regarding the size and characteristics of this population.
That the leaders of the Spanish-speaking community in Cambridge
insist that their community is not properly counted should come as
no surprise to anyone who is familiar with the controversies sur-
rounding official census figures. Very few would contest the fact
that minority groups in general are undercounted. This was first
suggested in 1955 by Ansley J. Coale, and yet, in the 1970 edition
of Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan's Beyond the Melting Pot, the
authors lament, "it was not until our book was [first] published [in
19631, amazingly enough, that this became general knowledge among
social scientists, aside from some specialists in demography."
Glazer and Moynihan also pointed out that since the Negro male popu-
lation in New York City was seriously undercounted, the degree of
economic distress in the ghetto was underestimated, and programs
118
designed to ameliorate these conditions were insufficient.
The impact that such knowledge has had, however, seems to be
limited to the insertion of disclaimers into the census reports. In
1973, for example, the Planning and Development Department of the
City of Cambridge, Massachusetts, published a report on the 1970
census, entitled Social Characteristics, Cambridge, 1970. In this
report they explain that "...the exact magnitude [of the U.S. popu-
lation] is not known, but it is estimated that in 1960 the census
missed about 5.7 million people, or 3 percent of the country's popu-
lation. The undercount was more severe for certain groups within
the population...[A second instance] where census counting is probab-
ly inaccurate is among the sizeable community of recent immigrants.
Because of their real or imagined fears of illegal status in this
country, language problems in understanding and filling out the cen-
sus mail-back forms, and the high frequency of address changes, many
recent immigrants have not been counted. Moreover, city surveys show
that this group is a rapidly growing one, and has undoubtedly in-
creased significantly in size in the three years between the census
and the date of this publication" [Social Characteristics, p. 9].
They go on to explain that caution should be used whenever planning
is based upon such figures, especially estimates of the number of
foreign-born or foreign stock (the children of the foreign-born).
Furthermore, because the census is really an estimate based upon
sample interviews, there can be technical errors of five to ten per-
cent or more. "In general, the smaller number in the sample, the
larger possible error" [Summary Statistics, p. 2].
119
Based upon such observations, one might expect that the under-
count of Spanish-speaking persons is greater than the undercount of
Blacks that Glazer and Moynihan pointed out. Like the Blacks, they
are often found in ghettos and many of the most destitute males are
difficult to locate due, in part, to the nature of our welfare laws.
In addition, the Spanish-speaking, unlike the Blacks, fall into a
second undercounted category, the imigrant, and into a third, the
non-English-speaking population. Since the 1970 questionaires were
mailed out, rather than delivered in person during the initial stage
of the process, and since none of the forms were translated into
Spanish, and since none of the census workers who did the follow-up
on non-returned questionaires spoke Spanish, this single factor, that
the population under investigation here did not necessarily read or
speak English, would alone account for a gross undercount. In addi-
tion, the warning that the mere mechanics of a census can lead to
an undercount (for example, the size of the sample) is also relevant
since the number of Spanish-speaking persons interviewed in Cambridge
in 1970 was only 122.
But the above explanations of why the number of Spanish-speaking
persons has been minimized is not the end of the story. An addition-
al problem has been the manner in which the data have been analyzed
and presented by the Department of Planning and Development of the
City of Cambridge, Massachusetts, a department that resides within
City Hall. The people of this department were the ones who in 1972
released the information that the Spanish-speaking population of Cam-
bridge equaled 1,954 individuals, of whom 522 were Puerto Rican.
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Why they happened to choose these numbers has become something of
a mystery.
For our purposes here the most relevant publication of the De-
partment is the August 1972 1970 Census Summary Statistics for Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts (hereafter, Summary Statistics). On page 13
the planners address themselves to the question of population com-
position, and there the confusion begins. Under the heading "Popula-
tion Totals" they list the breakdown of the population, derived, one
supposes, from the answers elicited from a section entitled "Color
or Race" on the mail-in questionnaire. The composition, as listed,
was as follows: White (91,794), Black (6,636), Other Races (1,987),
and Spanish-American (1,954). Leaving aside the question of why
what is essentially a cultural identification is here mixed in with
"racial" categories, one faces the dilemma of why in this publica'd
tion "Spanish-American" has been added, when it was not one of the
responses in the questionaire. (One could choose from White, Negro
or Black, Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, Hawaiian, Korean, or Other.
After "Other" were instructions to write in the "race.") Perhaps
1,954 persons spontaneously and unprompted wrote in Spanish-American,
and thus the planners counted up a total Spanish-speaking population
of 1,954 persons, a number which constituted less than 2 percent of
the total population.
Although in a 1976 interview with the author the planners were
unable to explain how the number 1,954 was derived, it is quite
clear that it was not computed in the manner described in Department
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publications as the usual method by which such figures are calcula-
ted. If they had done as they said they had done, they would have
taken the total number of Spanish-speaking within the sample, 122,
and multipled it by the set rate of persons per household, 4, and
then multiplied that product by 5, since the sample was stated to
be twenty percent of the total number of Spanish-speaking persons
counted. If one does these calculations, one comes up with the
number 2,440, which is considerably larger than 1,954.
To further confuse the issue the authors used several different
terms to refer to the same population(Spanish language, Spanish-
speaking, Spanish indicators, and the "5 Spanish Categories"), and,
interestingly enough, they produced a figure of 2,352 people of
Spanish origin or descent [Summary Statistics, p. 13]. Obviously
these people are native speakers of Spanish, they are Hispanos, and
so one'wonders why they decided that the Spanish language population
was only 1,954. When asked this question, they answered that they
were unsure.
Furthermore, the Department of Planning and Development elimi-
nated a possibly significant measure of the Spanish-speaking, the
question of origin. Although the 1970 questionnaire asked what coun-
try one's mother and father were born in, and in each case it clearly
instructed that the reply should be, "Name of foreign country; or
Puerto Rico, Guam, etc.," the information that appears in the Sum-
maly Statistic [p. 14] completely obscures the nature of the replies.
With the exception of track sumnaries, it merely divides the popula-
tion into two categories, "Native Population" and "Foreign Born,"
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and Native Population includes those people born "in the United
States, Puerto Rico, or a possession of the United States."
Actually, one can at least suggest where the number 1,954 came
from. It would appear that it is the sum of all those people listed
in the tract summaries as Spanish-speaking. That is, the total of
all those listed in the various summaries also comes to 1,954. And,
one also finds that if one adds up all those persons listed in the
tract summaries as "Other American," one arrives at a figure of 2,352,
which is identical to the number of persons listed as members of the
"5 Spanish Categories."
Although "Other Americans" was not defined in the glossaries,
the Department census-takers say that it means those people from
Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central and South America, or to put it
simply, it means Hispanos. Even this number is not complete since
the number of "Other Americans" in a given tract was listed only if
that group constituted one of the three largest categories of "Coun-
try of Origin of Foreign Stock." The point of leading the reader
through a simplified description of the many contortions that one
must go through when attempting to use such publications is only to
demonstrate that the Department chose the smallest of several pos-
sible numbers (numbers which appear in their own publications) when
they proclaimed 1,954 to be the number of Hispanos in Cambridge.
Not only were the numbers grossly inaccurate, but so in turn
were the figures which purported to describe the characteristics of
this population. What the 1970 census did manage to do well was to
count the Spanish-speaking student population of Cambridge, those
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persons, most often graduate students, who were attending MIT and
Harvard. These students could read and write English, and they
filled out their mail-back forms. As a result, the census maintains
that about one-third of the total Spanish-speaking population was
enrolled in school (663 out of 1,954), and that about half of those
people between the ages of 3 and 34 who were attending school were
attending a private university (330 out of 663) [Summary Statistics,
pp. 23-24). Furthermore, the census proclaims that 37.6 percent of
all Spanish-speaking males in Cambridge have completed at least five
years of university work, whereas the percentage of all male resi-
dents of Cambridge is only 29 percent [Ibid, p. 251. Since there
is no male-female breakdown on these figures for the Boston area as
a whole, one must lump the males and females together in order to
compare these figures with a larger and more representative urban
population. This has the effect of diluting the Spanish-speaking
figure, since the number of females who have completed more than
five years of college work is only 14.6 percent. One also has to
compare those people who have completed four years instead of five.
Even so, one comes up with the patently absurd result that the num-
ber of Spanish-speaking who have completed four years of college
approaches the point of being 4 times greater than that for the whole
Boston area, and even twice as large as the figure for all of Cam-
bridge, a high-density area for the educated.
These students, needless to say, are not representative of the
much larger non-student Spanish-speaking population of Cambridge.
The data concerning their origin, standard of living, income, or
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almost any characteristic that one could choose to examine, would
not accurately describe the majority of this population. For exam-
ple, consider the question of just where this population lives. The
census states that it was in Tract 3534 (Riverside, or Area 7) that
one could have found the neighborhood with the highest percentage
of Spanish-speaking, 11.7 percent, and that the area with the largest
number (258) of Spanish-speaking, as opposed to the largest percen-
tage, was Tract 3531 (or Area 2) [Social Characteristics, p. 29].
The former has a rather large student population, and it had been,
prior to 1970, a center of Coameno concentration. However, by 1970
it was quite observable to anyone who cared to walk down the streets
of Cambridge that Area 7 was no longer the area with the highest con-
centration of Spanish-speaking, that many of the Coamenos had moved
to form a larger and denser concentration in Areas 3 and 4, the Model
Cities Neighborhood. The latter, Tract 3531, encompasses MIT stu-
dent housing. Although this information might be useful if one wanted
to commend MIT's recruiters of the Spanish-speaking throughout the
world for the fine job that they seem to be doing, it is of no use
to those persons concerned about the problems of the ordinary, hard-
working, but poor immigrant.
This problem of grossly undercounting and otherwise misrepre-
senting the Hispano population is not just a problem of Cambridge.
It is nationwide. Several national organizations, including La Raza
(an organization of Chicanos) and the President's Cabinet Committee
on Opportunities for the Spanish-speaking, not to mention local or-
ganizations, such as the Greater Boston Hispanic Advocacy Agency
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and the Puerto Rican Forum, have rejected the national census as
an accurate measure of this population, and have condemned the con-
sequent erroneous projections based upon it. In spite of such
warnings, however, planners do tend to use this material, since they
claim that they have nothing else upon which to base their projec-
tions. In Cambridge, officials from seven agencies indicated that
they use the 1970 Census, although two added that they also use
Concilio-produced materials and five indicated that they do use
their own records. (The latter practice, while superior to use of
the 1970 Census, could, in some cases, merely serve to reinforce a
pattern of under-servicing Hispanos.)
B. The Brown Study.
It was in June, 1972, shortly after an announcement by the
Department of Planning and Development that there were only 1,954
Spanish-speaking persons in Cambridge, that Dr. Susan Brown, an
anthropologist, came to the Boston area in search of a Spanish-speak-
ing population to study. She was the recipient of a post-doctoral
fellowship from the Center of Urban Ethnography of the University
of Pennsylvania; that is, she brought the funds for such a study
with her. At that moment in time, the Concilio was still smarting
from the announcement that the Spanish-speaking population was so
small, and indeed, their very existence was being threatened. Who
was going to fund a program for 1,954 people? The need for docu-
mented proof of the size of the Spanish-speaking population, and its
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conditions, was desperate. The Concilio needed something to prove
that the 1970 census was inaccurate, since its data was official
and assumed to be credible by all agencies and foundations that might
serve the population. Dr. Brown was welcomed with open arms at the
Concilio, and she agreed to do her study in Cambridge.1
Although Dr. Brown had a fellowship to do such a study, the
funds were not unlimited. Neither did the Concilio have any funds.
For this reason, and because she and the Concilio felt it would lend
increased credibility to the study, they decided to secure additional
money and services from outside funding sources and to involve the
Department of Planning and Development as much as possible. As a
result, funding ($500) and consultant services were given by Har-
vard University, MIT donated money ($500) and computer time, and
the Department of Planning and Development offered consultant time
and the final printing of 3,000 copies of the report.
A second and harder decision, imposed by the limited nature of
the funds, was the choice between making an all-out effort to count
every Spanish-speaking person in Cambridge or to concentrate on
eliciting the characteristics of that population, at the expense of
counting. The latter would mean accepting a sample population, but
examining it in depth. It was felt both by Dr. Brown and by the
third Executive Director of the Concilio that due to the scattering
of the population throughout eastern and northern Cambridge, its
mobility, and the staff and funding limitations, an all-out effort
1much of the information in this section comes from an interview
with the third Director of the Concilio, and from the Brown Report
itself.
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to count was not feasible. It was also felt that in-depth informa-
tion about the problems and desires of the Spanish-speaking would
do more to improve the services offered by Concilio than a purely
numerical study, and it would also help put pressure on agencies
designed to serve communities with problems. Furthermore, the in-
depth study was much more feasible, given the limitations of staff
and money.
Thus it was decided to develop a Master List of all Spanish-
speaking households in Cambridge, in so far as that was possible,
and then to select a sample from that Master List which would be
interviewed in depth. By acquiring names and addresses from the
Police Department, the Welfare Department, Cambridge City Hospital,
and the Concilio client list, some 900 households were located, and
a random sample of 137 households containing 593 persons were inter-
viewed. The study began in the summer of 1972 and lasted eight
months [Susan E. Brown, The Hispano Population of Cambridge: A Re-
search Report, 1973, pp. 3 and ii].
The Brown Report is most interesting in terms of the manner in
which it totally discredits the results of the 1970 census. For
example, she managed to locate 900 households, almost half as many
households as the census counted people. Furthermore, Dr. Brown in-
tentionally excluded all the Spanish-speaking university student
households from her Master List (it being unlikely that they would
show up on the records of the Police Department, Welfare Department,
Concilio client list, or Cambridge City Hospital Records, anyway),
and as pointed out in the previous section, many of those counted
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among the 1,954 of the 1970 census had been university students.
In the end, Dr. Brown projected a total Spanish-speaking population
in Cambridge of 4,500 persons, and one should remember that the pri-
mary purpose for which the study was designed was to elicit charac-
teristics, not numbers.
The Brown Report also makes completely clear that the popula-
tion most sampled by the 1970 Census was the university student
population. To give just a few examples, the 1970 Census declared
that only 36 percent of Hispanos were blue-collar workers, whereas
the Brown Report demonstrates that the percentage is more like 84
percent. College graduates do not constitute 37.6 percent of the
population, but less than 1 percent. The unemployment rate is not
7.0 percent, but more than twice that, 14.5 percent [Brown, pp. 38,
34, 35, 25. Also see Appendix for charts comparing 1970 Census with
Brown Report].
Dr. Brown also managed to successfully locate the major con-
centration of Spanish-speaking within the Model Cities Neighborhood
(roughly Areas 3 and 4). She estimated that 30 percent of the esti-
mated total populat.ion of 4,500 persons lived within Tracts 3523
through 3528, those located completely within this neighborhood, and
she further estimated that if one included Tracts 3530 and 3531, the
percentage of this population would exceed 40 [Brown, p. 7]. The
exact number of households from these tracts that appeared on the
Master List was 501, out of a total on the Master List of some 900
households. She also found 61 families in Tract 3533 (Cambridgeport,
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or Area 6) and 54 in Tract 3534, which had produced the highest per-
centage of Spanish-speaking in the 1970 Census.
Of equal importance was the fact that the Brown Report, unlike
the publications of the Department of Planning and Development, broke
down the Spanish-speaking population both by country of origin and
by municipality of origin within Puerto Rico. The results showed
that Puerto Ricans constituted 64 percent of the Cambridge Spanish-
speaking, that the Cubans were the second largest group (12 percent,
and that the Colombians and Dominicans were the third and fourth,
each of them with 4 percent. No other single country yielded more
than 2 percent, although another fourteen countries were represented
(see Table 8 of the Brown Report].
With regard to the municipality of birth among the Puerto Ricans,
it was found that in 1972 and early 1973 the largest single group,
the Coamenos, constituted 40 percent of the Puerto Rican population.
Those from Jayuya were second, making up 22 percent, and those from
Pcnce were third, constituting 8 percent. After Orocovis (5 percent)
one drops off to San Juan, from which only 3 percent of the Cambridge
Spanish-speaking population had come. It is interesting to note
that the first four municipalities listed above are within Senatorial
District VI, the Ponce District, and thus one could say that 75 per-
cent of this population in Cambridge comes from one Senatorial Dis-
trict in Puerto Rico (and the island has eight all together [ Brown,
p. 21]).
Other exceedingly important facts that the Brown Study elicited
were that 95 percent of the Spanish-speaking in Cambridge had arrived
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within the last five years (since 1968), and that 63 percent of the
population had come to Cambridge straight from their homes on the
island, with no intermediate destination [Ibid, p. 161. Unfortunate-
ly, the latter statistic is not broken down between Jayuyanos and
Coamenos, and therefore it is impossible to say how many Jayuyanos
have arrived in Cambridge straight from the highest mountains of
Puerto Rico. However, from personal observation, this author
believes that most of them have come directly to Cambridge, and this
fact has had major implications with regard to their cultural pre-
dispositions, and thus their ability, or rather inability, to adapt
successfully to the Cambridge scene or to work with the Coamenos.
(Since they come from an urban, more conventionally politicized en-
vironment, it is not as crucial that Coamenos might arrive here
directly from the island.)
The Brown study was thus a life-saver, both for the Concilio
and for the community generally. It received the support and thus
the endorsement of two major univeristies, Model Cities, and Cam-
bridge City Hall, and it demonstrated that there was a sizable popu-
lation in need of services. These needs became more clearly defined,
and defined in ways that the traditional agencies could understand.
Funding possibilities for the Concilio improved, and even though it
then found itself competing with the traditional agencies for monies
with which to service the Spanish-speaking (since having had the
group pointed out to them they used it to try to bolster up their
own increasingly scarce funds), the end result was that the Spanish-
speaking did receive more services, from whatever source, public or
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private. The prestige of the Concilio and its visibility also in-
creased, since it had demonstrated a comendible capacity in coor-
dinating such an effort from the beginning stages of its development
and staffing through the final publication of the results.
That the Brown Report succeeded in finding the non-student
Spanish-speaking population, and of eliciting valuable information
about it, should have been a lesson to the Department of Planning
and Development about how to go about measuring such populations and
their characteristics. One lesson that they might have learned was
that the success of the study was very much related to the fact that
the researcher made extensive use of the personnel and resources of
the Concilio. Among other things, she consulted with the Concilio
about the design of the questionnaire, the hiring of Spanish-
speaking interviewers, and she consulted extensively with Concilio
personnel in the latter stages of analysis. As a result, given the
limitations of time and money, the Brown Report was a valid and use-
ful document. And yet, officials from only two agencies in Cam-
bridge said that they used the Brown Report in their program plan-
ning. The other agencies do have this report; indded, one official
read from it at his interview. Whenever he was asked a question
about the Hispano community, he would look up the appropriate page
and read the answer, which was not what he was supposed to do.
At the same time one should point out that the existence of
the Brown Report, the only source of reasonably accurate informa-
tion about the Hispano population, was an accident: Dr. Susan Brown
happened to come to Cambridge looking for a population to study.
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Its existence is not at all related to any effort on the part of
the responsible city officials, or Model Cities, or CEOC. They
contributed, insofar as they did contribute, only when asked, and
their responses were very much token responses. And only a few
agencies have seen fit to use this information, even after it had
been produced by someone else.
Two and one-half years after the Brown Report was printed by
the Department of Planning and Development, they carried out their
1975 Mid-Decade Census, the results of which have not yet been re-
ported.
Although it is too early to evaluate the accuracy with which
it will reflect the Spanish population, the author is not optimistic.
The Department of Planning and Development rejected an offer of
help from the Concilio, and it hired only one Spanish-speaking per-
son to participate in the count, an Hispano who had lived in Cam-
bridge only one year. This one Hispano employee was not a permanent
employee. He was hired through the CETA program and was used only
during the initial stages of the census, and was not consulted during
the later stages of compilation and evaluation. (This information
is based on an interview with this employee.) Thus the community
is still waiting to see if it has been counted, officially.
SECTION III. THE CAMBRIDGE SCENE
PART FOUR: EMPLOYMENT
A. The Hispano Community.
Any discussion of employment among the Hispano population of
Cambridge must begin with the generalization that the overwhelming
majority is employed, and employed in blue-collar jobs, and that
very few of them earn enough money that they can avoid worrying
about how they are going to pay their bills. Even within those limits
there are great variations in living standards and types of employ-
ment among Hispanos, and one great divide is that between the Coameno
and the Jayuyano.
The publications of the City of Cambridge's Department of Plan-
ning and Development indicate that from 1960 to 1970 the blue-collar
portion of the city's labor force declined from 13,496 persons to
only 9,642 persons. They also report that those persons engaged in
manufacturing declined from 12,058 to 8,021. From these figures one
might conclude that the blue-collar work force of the city had been
seriously depleted in the last ten years; that almost one-third of
it had suddenly exited the city. Perhaps, or perhaps the City of
Cambridge could not count those workers who had left (mostly Irish
and some Black), and did not count their replacements, because their
replacements were not native speakers of English. From the 1970
census, however, this idea would never occur to anyone, since it
reports that 64% of the Hispano population hold white-collar jobs. 1
1 Social Characteristics, p. 92-95.
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The Brown Report (1972-73), however, a report carried out not
by the City's planners, but by an anthropologist who picked Cambridge
as the site of her research, found that the employment pattern
among the Hispanos was exactly opposite to what the census had shown.
Instead of being a white-collar force, the Hispanos turn out to be
a blue-collar force; indeed, 84 percent of them reported jobs classi-
fied "blue-collar." Among the white-collar force, 7 percent were
secretaries ( a position that, in spite of what it deserves, does not
command the salary or respect that other jobs in that category do),
and thus if one subtracts the secretaries from the white-collar
force, one finds that not 65 percent of the Hispanos are white-collar,
but a mere 9 percent. Among those 84 percent classified as blue-
collar, 52 percent said that they worked in factories, 4 percent
described themselves as laborers, and the rest (none constituting
more than 4 percent) were carpenters, seamstresses, mechanics, cooks,
painters, laundry workers, or domestics [Brown, pp. 39-40].
And, one might add, this working force is not well paid. Count-
ing only those households that have at least one breadwinner, only
17 percent brought home an income, after taxes, of more than $200.00
per week, or $10,400 per year. Furthermore, if one considers that
the average American household in 1973 reported (in a Gallup poll)
that they required $149.00 per week just to make ends meet, just to
pay bills, and if one considers that prices on the eastern coast of
the United States, and especially in highly inflated Cambridge,
would make that average figure considerably higher, then one comes
to the conclusion that approximately 80 percent of Hispano households
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are worrying about how they are going to keep a roof over their
heads and food on the table, even when the head of household has a
job. 1
That this is not the condition of Cambridge residents in gene-
ral is apparent from a few comparisons. Fully half of all Cambridge
households had an income of $9,815, which is just a few dollars a
week less than what this small 17 percent of Hispanos had. The
median household income for the total Hispano population, on the
other hand, was a mere $5,616 per year, or $108 per week, only 58
percent of what half the households of Cambridge brought home.
Furthermore, the average size of household in Cambridge generally
was 2.5, whereas the average Hispano household was 3.9 persons
[Brown, p. 25], and thus the Hispano households were feeding and
sheltering 36 percent more people on 58 percent less money.
Hispanos come here to work and they usually succeed in finding
something. More than 70 percent of all male Hispanos, 16 years of
age or older, in Cambridge were employed in 1972, and if one elimi-
nates the high school and college age population, and looks only at
those who are 22 to 24 years old, one finds that a remarkable 94.7
percent of them were employed. The figure for the group 25 to 34
years of age was 85.5 percent, and for those aged 35 to 44, it was
70.6 percent. And, in addition to the men, almost 40 percent of the
1Brown, p. 46, and George Gallup, "Americans Say Family of Four
Needs $177 a Week to Get by," The Boston Globe, February 29, 1976,
p. 58. The figure in the headline refers to 1976, but the article
also gives the figure for 1973. The question asked was, "What is
the smallest amount of money a family of four needs each week to get
along in this community?"
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women work. Only 11 percent of the total Hispano population aged
16 or over had never held a job in Cambridge. Aside from those still
in high school, most of that 11 percent were probably the wives of
employed husbands, wives who chose to stay home to care for small
children. And, it would appear that once they get a job, they keep
it, since 47 percent of the working population had only held one
job in the entire time that they had been in Cambridge. Only 10 per-
cent of the population that had had jobs had had more than four since
their arrival in the city [Brown, pp. 40-41].
In spite of the fact that they come to Cambridge to work, and
that they obviously accept jobs that do not pay well, many Hispanos
do have extreme difficulties in finding work. In 1974 the Division
of Employment Security indicated that in Boston, for example, the
Hispanos have the highest rate of unemployment of any group in the
city, at least 15.9 percent. (The rate for Blacks was 12 percent,
for Chinese, 7.6 percent, and for whites, 7.4 percent["Hispanic Job-
less rate 61% or 15.9 %," Boston Globe, March 5, 1974, p. 3].) The
Brown study found that in Cambridge 19 percent were unemployed, but
actively seeking work. If one were to adjust this figure to comply
with Department of Labor unemployment criteria, it would probably
produce a rate of about 14.5 percent among Hispanos. (The unemploy-
ment figure for the general population of Cambridge is only 4.0
percent [Social Characteristics, pp. 83-85].) Of those not working,
36 percent said that they had to stay home to take care of small
children, 30 percent said that they were ill, and 11 percent explained
that they were simply too old to work. Another 7 percent said that
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they were students; 5 percent expalined that they were very preg-
nant. Only 4 percent said that they could not find work, and only
an additional four percent said that they could not find work be-
cause of a language problem. Two percent said that they had been
laid off. That leaves only 1 percent unaccounted for [Brown, p. 38].
Nor is this Hispano immigrant population beating a path to the
doorstep of the Department of Welfare. Of the 1,663 households re-
ceiving assistance under the category Aid to FAmilies with Dependent
Children, only 129 were Hispano. Only 27 families out of 405 re-
ceiving General Relief and only 1 percent of those receiving old age
assistance were Hispano [Brown, p. 44]. These percentages are more
or less the same as the percentage of Hispanos in the relevant age
group in the general population. Indeed, the figures gathered in
the Brown study indicate that, based on the income and employment
data, there were many Hispano households in Cambridge who were
eligible for assistance but who were not receiving it. That these
families did not want to ask for help, that they were unwilling
even to acknowledge that they could use some assistance is indicated
by the fact that 88 percent of the Hispanos interviewed would not
admit that they had an economic problem [Brown, p. 52]. Why they
would not admit it might be related to their Spanish sense of per-
sonal dignity (a quality that suffers as much from the Department
of Welfare's application process as it does from the need itself);
it certainly was not related to their true economic situation since
over 80 percent of that population, by the standards of the average
American as revealed in the Gallup poll, did not bring home "the
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smallest amount of money a family of four needs each week to get
along in this comnunity" [Gallup, Boston Globe, February 29, 1976,
p. 58].
Furthermore, most of those Hispanos receiving assistance from
the Department of Welfare were women with children, but no spouse.
Not even all of those spouseless mothers resorted to welfare, since
the 129 AFDC families identified by the Welfare Department as His-
panos (or 16 percent of the households on the master list of the
Brown study) does not constitute but about 36 percent of those
households headed by females (or 25 percent of the total number of
Hispano households). That.these women tend to return to the work
force once their children are school age is suggested by the break-
down on working women. Among those aged 20 to 21, 50 percent work,
whereas the percentage of those working falls to 34.6 percent for
those women 22 to 24. However, the percentage of women working then
climbs back rapidly to 50 percent among those aged 25 to 34 [Brown,
p. 36]. That those who chose to stay home with their children were
probably the relatively unskilled is indicated by a simple mathema-
tical calculation. The median weekly income of employed Hispano
women is $70.00 [Brown, p. 47], and a mother with three children
could receive approximately $73.00 a week from the Department of
Welfare ["Committee Backs Mass Bill to Foot $8M OEO'Cost,"Boston
Globe, March 21, 1973, p. 3}. They are not lazy; they either can-
not afford child care, or they do not see the merits of working when
they can save money by staying home with their children.
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B. Differences between Jayuyanos and Coamenos.
As described in the earlier section, the process of differen-
tiation between the Coameno and the Jayuyano had already begun to
develop before the establishment of Concilio. The more appropriate
urban industrial and craft skills and the higher level of education
that the Coameno had brought with him began to matter once he also
had learned the English language, and slowly but surely the Coamenos
left the Jayuyanos behind in the low-paid jobs. This shift in the
skill level of the jobs that Coamenos could obtain also produced a
change in companies. The electronics industry emerged as the major
employer of Coamenos in Cambridge, as workers moved to the plants
of the Electronics Corporation of America, Honeywell, Shintron, and
the Advent Company [Interview, (Hispano) CEOC employment specialist].
Furthermore, unlike the Jayuyano, the Coameno was able to es-
tablish a reputation as a capable and ambitious employee, and some
of them thus began to move into positions of responsibility, as
inspectors or supervisors. (This was no doubt related to the fact
that Coamenos often were employed in jobs that did not begin to use
their skills to capacity, and compared to the Anglos working the
same jobs, they were much more educated. It was only language [and
possibly Anglo prejudice] that was holding them back. To give just
one example of this, a man who had worked as an accountant in Coamo
became an ordinary factory worker in Cambridge. Over the years, how-
ever, he has worked his way up to plant supervisor.) And the Coamenos,
because they had built up a reputation for being good workers, were
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often asked by their employers to find new employees for openings
as they occurred. They then found members of their family or good
friends, people over whom they could exercise some sort of control,
since they not only assumed responsibility for training them, but
also supervised their work habits, so that the new person did not
damage their own reputation. If they could not find anyone over
whom they could exercise these sorts of controls, they sent home to
1
Coamo for someone else to immigrate, with a job waiting for him.
The Jayuyanos were different, not only because they did not
arrive with such marketable skills or education to list on their
resumes, but also because of their predilections regarding work.
The Jayuyanos are loners when it comes to employment. Even when
tilling the fields of Jayuya they did not live or work in villages;
rather they tended to find some isolated hollow that they could call
their own, and to work alone, subject only to the vagaries of nature.
Factory production did not afford them many opportunities to satisfy
this desire for independence, and so the Jayuyano tended to settle
for second best. If the Anglos cooperated and merely left him alone,
which they did without any instructions, then the only real threat
to his style was another Puerto Rican. And the Jayuyanos, whether
by conscious design or merely due to his lack of contacts, tended
to go to plants or factories or other employment sites where there
1Personal observation of the author, who from 1961 to 1969, that
is for nine years, worked at numerous jobs (atypically, according to
Brown), including several different types of factory work (such as
sheet metal worker), truck driving, and mechanic.
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were no other Puerto Ricans. If he had a choice, that is what he
did. And, for the same reason, he was not anxious to-bring in his
friends or relatives from Jayuya. Neither did the boss ask him to
do this, nor did he volunteer his services.- For this reason it is
much more difficult to trace the movement -of Jayuyanos-through the
Cambridge factories, but due to the fact-that-there are relatively
few places that hire people without marketable skill, they do, in
spite of themselves, occasionally clump in the same companies' plants.
According to the Employment Specialist for CEOG Manpower, those
companies with identifiable concentrations- of Jayuyanos-in the period
after 1970 were Deran's Confectionary, the Cambridge Plating Company,
and American Biltrite. (This description of work attitudes is based
on the author's own observations, in so far as he worked in Cambridge
and knew many Jayuyanos; and his own impressions have been confirmed
by Hispano employment specialists at CEOC.)
Throughout the 1970's there was continued if not spectacular
improvement for both Jayuyanos and Coamenos in terms of the kinds
of work that they could get, both in terms of skill level and level
of responsibility, and the pay checks that they could thus command.
Some of this improvement was due to the natural course of events,
that Coamenos learned English, functionally if not elegantly, and
that Jayuyanos gained experience and seniority, if not skills. But
much of this improvement was also due to the indefatigable efforts
of the Spanish Council, and the intense, if erratic, pressure that
they put on various federal, state and local agencies in Cambridge.
Not only did they try gentle and not so gentle persuasion upon
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these agencies, especially those dealing with employment, but they
also pressed upon the latter the need for including Hispanos in their
programs.
The first agency related to employment that responded, when the
weeks long picket line in front of CEOC was still fresh in their
minds, was the local office of the state Division of Employment Se-
curity (DES). In August 1969, as a result of the meeting in the
City Hall Chambers, DES agreed to hire one Hispano Employment aide.
When he left them (to work for CEOC's employment office) they re-
placed him with an Anglo, but Spanish-speaking employment specialist.
(There has been no objection to this, because the Anglo in question
has served the community well.)
In 1970, after a sit-in first by the working committee of the
pre-incorporation Cambridge Alliance of Spanish-speaking Tenants'
and then by the entire population of CAST (men, women, and children)
iwho thus were able to attract Model Cities' Board of Directors' at-
tention to the fact that they had not been servicing the Hispano
population of their designated territory. Model Cities was persua-
ded to hire one Hispano in their employment program. (The man ac-
tually worked out of the Cambridge Learning Center. When the Federal
Government abandoned Model Cities, and City Hall took it under its
own wing, this employment specialist moved to the employment office
of the City of Cambridge. [Based on interviews with those involved.])
It was also due to Concilio's unsolicited help in spotting over-
sights on the part of Anglo administrators that the DES C-TEP (career
training) program of 1971-72 accepted four Hispanos into their program
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(two Puerto Ricans and two Cubans), and that the Neighborhood Youth
Corps (NYC), a federal program funded by OEO and administered by
CEOC, began to accept Hispano applications in 1971. The NYC found
summer jobs for high school students, aged 14-18, that would give
them money (to help them stay in school during the rest of the year)
and experience (to help them find work once they had finished). And
since a youth had to come from a family whose income fell below a
nationally set maximum in order to be eligible to participate, this
program became the one and only that truly addressed itself to the
Jayuyano population more than to the Coamenos. Concilio made a con-
certed effort to enroll Hispanic youth in the program, keeping in-
formation forms in its own office, and publishing information about
it in its monthly newsletter, and after 1972 it produced a bumper
crop of Hispano participants, annually.
At first, for reasons best understood by CEOC, most of these
youths were assigned to work at Concilio, which used them as cleri-
cal help and recreation workers in the summer programs for younger
children. However, because CEOC was not assigning particpants to
Anglo institutions, Concilio had more help than it could use. Nor
could it properly supervise them with its own small staff, and thus
it seemed on some days that they were more trouble than they were
worth. The Anglo third Director thus spent much energy convincing
CEOC that Hispano youth did not necessarily have to work for the
Spanish Council, that there might be other places in the city where
they could also gain experience, and thus some of the surplus was
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negotiated away.
In August, 1972, DES finally, after lengthy negotiations, in-
stalled a job-bank machine at the Concilio (to read the daily list
of openings which come on microfiche cards) and agreed to train one
of Concilio's outreach workers as an employment aide. Once he was
trained, he went to work for CEOC's employment office, and Concilio
was unable to get DES to train another worker. They did manage,
however, to persuade DES to supply them on one morning a week with
its own Hispano employment aide, and to persuade Model Cities to
loan them theirs for the same morning. After the DES Hispano moved
to CEOC, and the Model Cities employee was moved to the City's em-
ployment office, the Spanish-speaking Anglo (whom DES had hired to
replace the Hispano) came to Concilio two days a week. By the end
of 1973, the Concilio office service had counseled 400 people, had
placed 92 in jobs, and was predicting even larger numbers for 1974.
Furthermore, Concilio used its various publications, throughout its
history, to publicize specific job openings, various employment coun-
seling services available in CAmbridge, and various special programs
that any agency in the city might be operating.
Nevertheless, Concilio has suffered disappointments in this
area of great concern. As mentioned above, DES did not follow up
its first success by training a second employment specialist from
among the Concilio workers, and even though Concilio from 1972 to
1 Information compiled from interviews with Concilio Director,
CEOC Employment aide, and from the monthly newsletter of the Con-
cilio.
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1975 made numerous grant proposals that included provisions for a
full-time employment specialist of their own, they have received
their grants, minus the employment specialist. In 1975 Concilio was
still operating its employment counseling service only two days a
week, with the Anglo (Spanish-speaking) specialist on loan from DES. 1
Although other training programs did exist and were very popu-
lar with the general public, the program that Hispanos, especially
Coamenos, were most enthusiastic about was CETA (the Comprehensive
Employment Training Act), which began in 1974. In Cambridge, CETA
came in two parts. The City of Cambridge administered the CETA
Public Service Training Jobs, which were jobs for which the city
paid the salary (with federal money) while the person worked for
some non-profit service-oriented agency. Only due to the fact that
it adamantly insisted, Concilio was able to hire three people through
this program in 1975: one Spanish-speaking Anglo, one Coameno, and
one Jayuyano. (The Jayuyano was the woman referred to in the section
on Concilio, the one and only Jayuyano employed through the CETA
program.) Exactly how many Hispanos were hired is not known, since
the City of Cambridge Employment Office claims that it is unable to
provide such statistics. However, in interviews with the various
Hispano or Spanish-speaking employment specialists involved, it was
lInformation taken from interviews with the various employment
specialists, Concilio documents, including newsletters, grant propo-
sals, and a pamphlet entitled "Concilio Hispano de Cambridge," which
on the basis of internal evidence was published in 1974.
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possible to determine that the Coamenos were the most numerous group
of Hispano participants. The second part of CETA, the CETA I Train-
ing Program, was administered by CEOC, and it too provided paid em-
ployment and training, although it did not involve non-profit insti-
tutions. The emphasis in this program was on the development of
employable skills, such as welding and mechanics. It too was popu-
lar with Hispanos, especially the Coamenos, and it too was under-
utilized by Jayuyanos.
Thus by 1975 the Cambridge Hispano community had managed to
develop three employment specialists from its own ranks (in 1975 two
were employed by CEOC and one by the city). None of these indivi
duals was a Jayuyan1o; two were Coamenos and one was from Colombia.
Again, wherever it mattered, the Coameno had come prepared and had
managed to get involved, and the Jayuyano had not. That Jayuyanos
did participate in the Neighborhood Youth Corps, the one program
with a maximum income limit as an eligibility, suggests that their
underutilization of these programs was due not to any lack of in-
terest on their part, but to a failure in program design. In most
cases the problem lay in the eligibility requirements, which instead
of ensuring the inclusion of the most disadvantaged (as in the NYC),
ensured their exclusion. Most programs (like CETA) required more
education, skills, and experience than the most disadvantaged can
offer.
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SECTION III. THE CAMBRIDGE SCENE
PART FIVE. HOUSING
A. Living Conditions
In May of 1974 at a conference of urban planners held in Cam-
bridge, Massachusetts, Professor Hortense Dixon of Texas Southern
University "decried the lack of commitment to housing the nation's
poor and warned that the urban crisis 'is still alive and kicking.
In fact, it is very healthy. It has not died simply because build-
ings are no longer being burned"' [Boston Globe, May 4, 1974]. That
Cambridge is no exception to these remarks is quite clear from the
"Issue Papers" produced by the Department of Planning and Develop-
ment. "Over the last decade, a variety of pressures has affected
the condition of the city's privately-owned housing stock. Increas-
ing absentee ownership, declining home ownership, conversions and
cutting up of apartmentsare a few examples" ["Issue Paper No. 2].
Furthermore, "In the late 1960's soaring rents began forcing many
either to seek government assistance or to leave Cambridge. While
some did leave, others unable to benefit from public programs simply
paid more than they could afford. This situation has been amply
documented in studies which show the large number of families and
elderly paying an excess of 35 percent of their gross income for
housing." ["Issue Paper No. 3"].
In the Brown report, housing was listed as a major problem by
32 percent of all Hispano households, and thus it tied with language
difficulties for first place among all problems mentioned. In 1970
less than 5 percent of all H1ispanos in Cambridge owned their own
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homes, and only 6 percent lived in owner-occupied buildings. (One
would assume that the latter units are usually in buildings with a
smaller number of better maintained units.) That they end up in the
less desirable neighborhoods is clear. A housing survey (published
in 1973, but based on the 1970 census) indicated that in those
tracts with the highest concentration of Hispanos, 80 percent of
the houses had been built before 1939 and that 84 percent of the
buildings needed major repairs. (The above report was cited in an
undated Concilio pamphlet, "Concilio Hispano de Cambridge." From
internal evidence it would appear to be a 1973 report.)
That this population is unlikely to force the landlords to
make repairs or to provide the usual plumbing and heating facilities
or to report these landlords to the city authorities is clear, con-
sidering the present system of enforcement. Cambridge has never
undertaken a systematic housing inspection program on a neighborhood
to neighborhood basis, and usually inspections are made only when
tenants complain to the Housing Inspection Department. That this
system does not work is apparent to the Department of Planning and
Development. In their own words, "it is clear, however, that a very
large volume of code violations are not reported; while many occu-
pants are not apprised of their legal rights, others fear retalia-
tion from the landlord. Many are simply afraid that if improvements
are made, their rents will be raised."[Housing Needs in Cambridge,
p. 29]. And considering that in 1970, neither the Housing Authority,
the Housing Inspection Department, nor the Rent Control Board had
one Spanish-speaking employee, it was even more unlikely that Hispano
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tenants would be aware of their rights or that they would lodge a
complaint with the proper authorities.
But the condition of the housing is not the only problem. It
is overcrowding that presents one of the hardest problems for the
Hispano family. The Massachusetts Department of Community Develop-
ment has reported that Cambridge is in dire need of an additional
8,580 units of low and middle income housing [Report cited in "Con-
cilio Hispano de Cambridge," 1973?]. The City's Department of
Planning and Development has indicated that family-size apartments
are the hardest to come by [Social Characteristics of Cambridge,
p. 155]. And "the vast majority of Hispano households are comprised
of the nuclear family, that is, of a couple and their children"
[Brown, p. 23].
Although the 1970 Census indicates that 16.9 percent of all
Hispano families are living in overcrowded conditions, Concilio
housing workers, when interviewed, stated that from their experience,
that figure is much too low. According to their statistics, which
apply only to public housing, 65 percent of all Hispanos in these
projects are overcrowded. There simply are not enough large apart-
ments, and those that do exist are occupied and the turn-over rate
is low.
Nor does the private sector offer the Hispano family a viable
alternative. Landlords are responding not to the blue collar family,
but to the more affluent young professionals who are settling in
Cambridge in increasing numbers. The 1970 census indicated that be-
tween 1960 and 1970 the number of one-room units rose 25.8 percent,
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while the number of units with 6 rooms declined 12.2 percent, the
number with 7 rooms declined 24.4 percent, and the number of units
with 8 or more rooms declined 9.4 percent [Social Characteristics,
p. 155]. The Concilio housing workers also pointed out that when
a large apartment in the private sector can be found, and the land-
lord is willing to rent to a family with children, the rent is
usually too high for most Hispanos to pay.
It would thus appear that Hispano parents and their children
are among those bearing the brunt of Cambridge housing problems.
According to the 1970 Census, Hispanos pay a higher percentage of
their gross income to live in more delapidated apartments under
more crowded conditions [Brown, p. 26]. Such poor conditions have
no doubt created severe problems for these families and exacerbated
other problems, and may actually have limited the number of Hispanos
moving into Cambridge.
It is in this context that the general lack of interest shown
by the Housing Authority in these problems becomes even more distress-
ing. As far back as 1968 the Cambridge Housing Convention, an ad
hoc group of concerned citizens called together in response to a
CEOC report on Cambridge housing problems, pointed out the Authori-
ty's lack of enthusiasm.
It can build new public housing units with [federal and
state] government money, but in fact has provided only eighty-
eight units in the last fourteen years. CHA can also provide
inexpensive living arrangements for low-income citizens by
giving them a rent supplement under the Leased Housing Program,
but out of a four hundred unit authorization available to CHA,
less than one hundred have been used, and that figure was
achieved only after continual pressure from various Cambridge
groups and residents.
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And after negotiations with the Housing Authority, they concluded
that, "Meetings with the CHA have produced little positive response
from the agency...The Housing Convention feels very strongly that
CHA is not adequately meeting its responsibilities to the people of
Cambridge" [Cambridge Housing Convention, December 14, 1968, pp. 9-
10]. That was in 1968. The Housing Authority does not seem to have
reversed this pattern in the years from 1969 to 1975.
Although public housing in Cambridge is often old and run-down
(some of it has been around since the 1930's), and some of the
projects have become the scene of racial violence, there were His-
panos who wanted to move in. The Concilio Board felt that there
were many vacancies in some projects (due to their lack of desirabili-
ty), even though there were long waiting lists for projects in
general. Thus in putting pressure on the Housing Authority to admit
Hispanos, they went offering the agency a way out of its own dilemma.
At least that was the Board's understanding of why the Housing Au-
thority agreed, in August 1969, to admit Hispanos. In the seven
years that have passed, however, public housing has not exactly been
overwhelmed by Hispanos. They occupy only 6 percent of those units
which are in projects that include low income units (117 units out
of 2098), and they occupy only 2 percent (50 out of 2105 units) of
those projects that include middle income or market price units
[see Appendix, "Hispano Families Living in Publicly Assisted
Housing," Chart B].
When the author was doing the research for this thesis, the
Housing Authority was the one institution from which he was unable
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to get a response. There was only one individual who had been at
the Housing Authority throughout most of this period from 1969 to
1975, and who had had the responsibility for assigning the limited
number of apartments to the many applicants, and he was the indivi-
dual from whom an interview was requested. Although he never re-
fused to be interviewed, he was never available, even at those times
when he had specifically made an appointment with the interviewer.
Furthermore, if a Hispano tenant in 1975 had been inclined to go
to the Housing Authority, or the Rent Control Board, or the Housing
Inspection Department with a complaint, he or she would have found
that there was still not one Spanish-speaking employee in any of
these three offices.
B. Geographical Distribution.
The geographical distribution of the Hispano population con-
tinued to develop along the same lines of regionalistic concentra-
tion that had appeared in nascent form in the earlier period. One
new development was the appearance of a Cuban concentration.
In the earlier period there had been no obvious concentration
of any nationality other than Puerto Rican. The Cubans, Dominicans,
Colombians, and various others were dispersed throughout the eastern
and northern parts of the city. By 1970, however, the first non-
Puerto Rican concentration, that of the Cubans, had formed in East
Cambridge (Area 1). Although none of the other nationalities have
coalesced into such an easily identifiable neighborhood (due probab-
ly to the relative smallness of their numbers, compared to the
1970-1975
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Puerto Ricans and Cubans), there is a concentration of several Cen-
tral and South American nationalities along Harvard and Green Streets
in the Mid-Cambridge area.
Among the Puerto Ricans, concentration by municipality of
origin continued to characterize their geographical distribution,
but there was considerable movement of these concentrations. In
the earlier period, Coamenos had located in the Cambridgeport-
Riverside area (Areas 5 and 7), whereas the Jayuyanos had tended
to locate in the Mid-Cambridge area (Area 6). By the late 60's,
however, the Coamenos had begun a gradual expansion into the Central
Square area, an expansion that reflected not only a movement of the
population, but also a growth in their numbers. The Jayuyanos had
remained, more or less, in the Mid-Cambridge area, and rapid growth
was not yet apparent among them. During the 1970's a number of
different forces would combine to produce a movement of both Coamenos
and Jayuyanos into the area north of Central Square, into Areas 3
and 4, and the most rapid growth was among Jayuyanos. The end re-
sult of this growth and these movements was that Central Square
and the area to its north have become the center of the Cambridge
Hispano community.
The movement to the north of Central Square (into Areas 3 and
4) of the Coamenos after the formation of Concilio in June 1969 was
no longer just a search for urban amenities. Particularly after
the publication of the first Executive Director's editorial in
Noticiero Hispano in October 1969, this movement was the result of
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a conscious effort on the part of Concilio clientele to make them-
selves eligible for programs being offered by Model Cities in its
Model Neighborhood Area (MNA). Even though that letter had been
full of misinformation about who was running the program (Model
Cities, not Concilio) and exactly which area constituted the MNA,
these matters were eventually straightened out.
Model Cities, a federal program under the Department of Housing
and Urban Development, had been established by Congress in 1966 and
charged with the responsibility of assisting cities of all sizes
throughout the country in improving the environment of their most
"blighted" areas. The program designers' philosophy not only pro-
vided for the removal of visible "blight"; it emphasized the develop-
ment of the neighborhood residents' skills as the most effective
method of stimulating an end to "blight."
Model Cities programs should focus on the residents of
the model neighborhood. All programs and activities should
be directed at facilitating their full participation in the
economic, social and political mainstream of urban life.
Communities should deal not only with the educational, health,
employment, income, housing and other problems of disadvan-
taged neighborhood residents, but should also consider in what
ways the initiative and mobility of neighborhood residents
are impeded by attitudes and behavior of residents of the
wider community and develop a workable program to deal with
those impediments....The process of involving residents in.
planning, decision-making, and program implementation should
result in a plan and program that is responsive to their
needs and both recognizes and develops their competence as
individuals and citizens.1
1 This quotation comes from a 65-page document, which appears to
have been procured by the national office for the purpose of informing
employees of Model Cities as well as neighborhood activists recruited
by them of the goals, procedures, vocabulary, and so forth of Model
Cities. It has no title, or at least no title page extant, but the
quotation comes from pp. 1-2.
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One certainly could not fault its designers with setting their
goals too low, and their philosophy of starting with the people made
good sense. In response to this declaration of help on the way, and
its publication in Noticiero Hispano, the Coamenos accelerated their
move north into the Model Neighborhood area, which then had a popula-
tion of some 18,000 souls of diverse origins: middle-class white,
black, Hispano, Italians, Portuguese, the elderly, and poor white,
as well.
In reality, these people were in some ways moving into a neigh-
borhood worse than the one from which they had come. Both Areas 3
and 4 are characterized by industrial and commercial enterprises
that under present zoning laws would not be allowed to establish
themselves in the city. The resulting traffic problems (congestion
and scarce parking), trucking, noise, odors, and visual blight do
not make this area a desirable place to live.
According to the 1970 Census, Area 4 had the most children
under 18 in Cambridge, and the city's lowest median family income.
It also had the most female-headed families (with or without chil-
dren), the highest number of AFDC cases, the most juvenile delin-
quency cases, and the highest rates of unemployment. That it also
contains the highest percentage of people with incomes that place
them below the poverty line is not surprising. Area 3 is not far
behind Area 4 in children under 18, female-headed families with
children, and percentange of families below the poverty line. In
addition, Area 3 ranked first in number of Old Age Assistance and
General Relief Cases, and it had the most crowded population in
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Cambridge, nearly 130 persons per residential acre, almost double
the city-wide average. Area 4 was only 34% more crowded than Cam-
bridge in general. And both had median rents of $77.00 a month,
the lowest in the city [Neighborhood 4 Profile; Neighborhood 3 Pro-
file].
Nevertheless, in hopes of obtaining help with regard to finding
better employment, job training, and day care, as well as to avail
themselves of up-graded schools, English language programs, and the
multitude of promised services, they came. It is also possible
that some of these families were being pushed out of the Cambridge-
port-Riverside areas by rising rents. The Coamenos found housing
throughout the MNA, but most significantly around Columbia Street,
and eight-block-long thoroughfare running roughly north-south
between Main Street and Cambridge Street. As services improved,
and Concilio, following its own advice, relocated into the MNA, other
Hispanos followed.
Although Jayuyanos were not as active as Coamenos in the 1969-
1970 Concilio-encouraged movement into the MNA of Model Cities,
Concilio did have an effect on their location and housing patterns.
Under pressure from the Concilio, the Housing Authority began to
admit Hispanos into public housing projects, and most of those in-
volved, particularly with regard to low income projects, were Jayu-
yanos. Most Coamenos (although not all), because they generally had
higher incomes, could avoid these projects, even if at great sacri-
fice. For the most part, Coamenos lived in privately owned buildings,
although a few do live in low, middle or mixed income projects [Au-
thor's observations, confirmed by Concilio's housing workers].
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Even though the low income projects, particularly those that
have no middle income units, are undesirable places to 'Live, by any-
one's standards, they, unfortunately, looked good to the Jayuyanos.
Many had been living in the Mid-Cambridge Area, more specifically
in Census Tract 3530, a tract in which almost 30 percent of the
units lacked some or all basic plumbing (such as hot water), and
over 22 percent did not have complete kitchen facilities. In this
regard, Tract 3530 is the worst in the city [Social Characteristics,
p. 154].
That they could not afford better apartments, plus the fact
that they tended to have large families convinced many of them that
they had little choice but to seek low income public housing. Ac-
cording to the housing workers who assisted them in their efforts
to get such units, and according to Father Sheehan, to whom they
complained, the Jayuyanos really did not want to be there. It is
the observation of the housing workers that, given a choice, the
Jayuyanos tend to move away from any Hispano concentration, into
their isolated hollows (at least isolated from Spanish-speaking per-
sons), or the closest approximation they can find. In the same way
that their lack of marketable skills creates their concentrations
in certain factories, economic necessity creates their concentrations
in low income public housing.
The very first households that Concilio managed to see placed
in public housing were two Jayuyano families who in 1969 went to
live in Washington Elms, a run-down project located in the south-
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eastern corner of the Model Neighborhood Area. The first public
housing project to offer a significant number of large apartments
to the Hispanos, however, was the Jefferson Park project in North
Cambridge, and it soon became a second area of visible Jayuyano
concentration as many families moved there from the Mid-Cambridge
area. In their minds, Jefferson Park had two advantages: better
living conditions and distance from the Coamenos.
Originally they were pleased about their relocation, but their
pleasure soon turned to regret. They did not like being so far from
the Spanish grocery stores of Central Square, the Concilio, St.
Mary's Spanish-language mass and their friends, and so far from
ready employment. Furthermore, the Black population of North Cam-
bridge was growing rapidly (especially at Walden Square and Rindge
Towers, both of which are public projects, as well as at Jefferson
Park), and explosive tensions developed between the Blacks and the
withes. The Jayuyanos became a confused third party, not identify-
ing with either group, and unable to make themselves understood in
an increasingly untenable situation. Fights broke out daily, van-
dalism escalated, and frequently the Jayuyanos became caught up in
the violence. Many thus began to ask for transfers out of Jefferson
Park, or they simply left without giving notice.
Many of those families concerned, due to efforts mounted by Con-
cilio and the Housing Authority, were relocted to the Washington Elms
project. Although Washington Elms also suffered from racial tension
and vandalism, at least it was close to Central Square. By 1974 this
movement out of North Cambridge, plus new arrivals from the island
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created a Jayuyano concentration alongside the Coamenos in Area 4,
within the MNA of M1odel Cities. Other non-Puerto Rican Hispanos
followed them (although no national concentration was apparent), and
many Hispanos also began to move into Newtowne Courts, which is
right next door to the Washington Elms project. By 1975 there were
72 Hispano families in'the two projects. Forty-six of them were at
the Washington Elms, where Hispanos lived in 14 percent of the
available units (see Appendix, "Hispano Families Living in Publicly-
Assisted Housing," Chart A].
C. CAST, A Success Story.
This location of the Coamenos within the MNA of Model Cities
did eventually produce results, at least in the area of housing. In
December of 1970 the tenants of Columbia Terrace, at the southern
end of Columbia Street, formed a corporation and bought a controlling
interest in their own buildings. In the following year they made
arrangements to add another building, bringing the total number of
families served to 52. The creation of the Cambridge Spanish-speak-
ing Tenants' Union, Inc. (CAST Associates) was a major achievement,
especially if one considers that it doubled the rate of home owner-
ship among the Hispano population of Cambridge.1 (Five percent of
'The story of CAST is based on interviews with members of its
Board, its Superintendant, the Director of Model Cities throughout
the period of CAST's organization, and a personal familiarity with
all of the following events, since the author was intimately involved
with the whole process, beginning in 1969, through the completion
of all arrangements for CAST II in late 1972. Furthermore the author
has had complete access to all of CAST's files.
-n
C.A.S.T.(Columbia Terrace) Before
rehabilitation.
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900 households would equal about 51 households.) But the story of
CAST's creation is a long and winding story if one follows it from
its very beginnings to 1975.
Actually, the first group that became interested in improving
the lot of the Spanish-speaking residents of Columbia Terrace was
not Model Cities at all, but the Students for a Democratic Society
(SDS). In 1968 or early 1969, as a part of a larger effort to or-
ganize tenants, members of SDS came to Columbia Terrace in order to
mobilize the tenants of Lark Realty in order to force the landlord
to make needed repairs, without raising the rent.
Although SDS did not succeed in organizing a successful tenant's
union, they did manage to create certain expectations, in a manner
very similar to the expectations created by the abortive 1968 CEOC
Community Development Program, Fraternidad Hispana. SDS was not
successful for several reasons. First, the organizers did not
speak Spanish, and secondly, the tenants viewed them with suspicion
since they believed SDS to be a Communist organization. But probab-
ly most important was the fact that the attempt to organize a tenants'
union exposed the residents to reprisals from the landlord, reprisals
against which SDS could not defend them. When the local leader of
the SDS-sponsored effort was evicted, enthusiasm for a tenants'
union plummeted to zero.
Nor was Model Cities the second organization to concern itself
with the plight of Lark Realty tenants. That organization was CEOC,
which in the late summer of 1969 sent two "expert" organizers to
persuade the tenants that they should form a union and withhold their
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monies, until the landlord made the needed repairs. CEOC had recent-
ly hired their first Hispano, a Coameno, and they sent him along too,
as an interpreter, since they had decided on a strategy of organi-
zing a core group of Hispanos. (The rest of the Columbia Terrace
population had seemed even less enthusiastic about a union than the
Hispanos.) These experts went from family to family extolling the
virtues of a rent strike, and purposely neglecting to mention the
possible consequences of such an act. But the residents did not have
to be reminded; they could remember the eviction of the local leader
of the SDS-sponsored union without any help from the experts. Al-
though in the presence of the organizers they would agree to with-
hold their rent, as soon as collection time arrived, they would pay.
The second effort was no more successful than the first.
The third attempt to unionize the tenants succeeded. The Coa-
meno, who had been brought along mainly as an interpreter and a
"native" expert, had been following the experts around, house to
house, and watching them and the reaction of the residents to them.
He had tried to persuade the CEOC lawyer that they were going about
it the wrong way, but he could not. After they obviously had failed,
he finally persuaded them to let him try his way, in the spring of
1970. He, too, went door to door talking to the tenants, but he did
not come with a program. He simply let them talk, and let them de-
fine their problems, their way. Yes, they were upset about the con-
dition of the buildings, but they were also afraid. "Well," he
would ask, "would it hurt just to talk to the landlord7 You don't
have to threaten him with a rent strike, just talk to him." That
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they were willing to do, and he succeeded in putting together the
Columbia Terrace Tenant's Union and its "orking Committee," most
of whom, need one add, were Coamenos. There were no Jayuyanos
among them. They drew up a list of things that they wanted done,
and went with their list to the landlord. This list included: re-
pair all windows; repair all plumbing; repaper all apartments; ex-
terminate all roaches and other insects; and hire a Spanish-speaking
superintendent or assistant-superintendent. What the landlord saw
this time was numbers, unanimity, and a group that was willing to
give him a way out. After two meetings Lark Realty agreed to do all
of these things, provided the tenants provide the labor. The land-
lord would provide the materials, and train one tenant to repair
broken windows. The tenants happily accepted the conditions. In
fact, they thought that they were excellent ideas. The new "Working
Committee" was a success and thus it gained the confidence of the
tenants generally. The CEOC experts had still played a role this
time around, but merely as technical consultants who answered the
questions that they were asked.
At approximately the same time that the working committee was
beginning to function and consultations were going on between the
tenants at Columbia Terrace and CEOC, certain problems arose for
CEOC that would inspire it to move on this issue. Late in 1970 OEO
informed CEOC of their decision to terminate its housing program.
It had been an experimental program, designed for only three years,
and 1971 was to be its third and last year. In danger of losing
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funds, CEOC sought to renew the program, and thus they needed an
easily demonstrable success that could be shown to the national of-
fice.
It was only after Lark Realty had actually begun supplying the
materials and the repairs were underway, that the CEOC lawyers came
up with the idea that the Columbia Tenants' Union should form a
corporation and enter into a limited partnership under the provi-
sions of the 236 Federal Housing Program, a program designed to
create privately run, non-profit, low and moderate income housing
developments. The 236 "limited dividends" program also provided
that one must rehabilitate such premises after purchase. The law-
yers called a meeting with the Working Committee, and although they
left the committee somewhat confused about the technicalities of
the 236 Program, the tenants did agree to discuss the purchase of
the buildings with the landlord. After negotiations, the landlord
agreed to sell 42 units for $250,000. Having secured this agreement,
the tenants then faced the problem of where they were going to get
the $10,000 required to conduct a feasibility study, a study that
was required to demonstrate that the project was eligible for par-
ticipation in the 236 Program. The CEOC solution, as usual, was to
ask someone for the money. This time the suggested agency was Model
Cities. And thus the lawyers helped CAST draw up a technically com-
petent proposal to Model Cities.
Model Cities at the time was in the low posture of the prover-
bial sitting duck. In spite of its lofty purposes, it had little
to show in terms of what it had done for the Hispano community, and
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nothing to show for what it had done to develop low and middle in-
come housing. There were no Hispanos on its Board, it had hired no
Hispanos, indeed it had hired no one that even spoke Spanish, al-
though it had given a few dollars to CEOC for the unpopular (with
the Hispanos and Portuguese) Foreign Language Referral Service, and
it was funding an English as a Second Language program. Just to
drive the point home, the Columbia Terrace Tenants' Union decided
at this time to change their name to the Cambridge Alliance of
Spanish-speaking Tenants (CAST), in order to emphasize two things:
that they were Spanish-speaking and that the object was housing.
This emphasis was needed to point out to Model Cities the oppor-
tunity that they were being offered: to help a group that they
had previously ignored, and to do something about a problem that
they had neglected.
The sitting-duck, Model Cities, came through with the $10,000,
but only after the Working Committee carried out a sit-in at a Model
Cities Board meeting. Once the money had been obtained, and the
study completed, and the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency had
ruled positively on the feasibility study, the tenants found out
that they needed more money in order to become part-owners of the
corporation. In fact, they needed to borrow $65,000. As far as CEOC
and the tenants were concerned, Model Cities was the only possible
source for this money. No bank was ever going to lend so much to
people with so little collateral. Although the Model Cities staff
seemed to be in favor of granting such a request, its Board of
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Directors was not. They were opposed to giving (or even loaning)
an LiLspano group so much money, and, consequently, so much power.
Another sit-in was called for, and the Concilio Board and
every man, woman, and child from CAST came to that Board meeting.
Complete with crying babies, prying toddlers, and troops of boys and
girls equipped with toy percussion instruments and guitars, the
mothers, the women warriors of Borinqudn, were out in full force.
No Board of Directors could have withstood them, and the Model Cities
Board said yes, yes to anything, just to get the women out of there.
On December 15, 1970, the agreement was signed; thus was the $65,000
loan obtained (to be repaid within one year); and thus was the Cam-
bridge Alliance of Spanish-speaking Tenants, Incorporated, or CAST
Associates, created. In May 1972 CAST II (9 units) was successfully
negotiated, making a total of 52 units in the Columbia Terrace pro-
ject. The tenants own a 28 percent interest in CAST I and a 49
percent interest in CAST II, and they control the management and
tenant selection for the entire project through their own elected
Board of Directors.
In a March 1976 interview, the man who had-been Director of
Model Cities in 1970 and 1971 confirmed the above impressions of the
Concilio Board members. He explained that when CAST had first ap-
proached them, he and his staff had been so busy trying to salvage
the Cambridge office of Model Cities generally that they had given
little thought to the Hispano community. When CAST did approach
them, "They [the CAST members] were upset that Model Cities had not
helped them. They made it very plain that they expected some help
to be forthcoming."
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On the other hand, "The most that the leadership had intended
to do was the minimum--to provide maybe twenty to twenty-five
thousand dollars worth of services that they hoped would keep the
Spanish community more or less in place." Even with regard to that
money, they worked out an arrangement with CEOC, so that CEOC monies,
too, would be used. "CEOC would take some responsibility....It
would not be all Model Cities' money."
Resource allocation for the Hispanos was "almost insulting
[since] the level of effort that we had made was so low. And it was
pretty obvious that the Spanish-speaking people had not been well
represented in the planning process of Model Cities and they cer-
tainly were not well represented in the disseminating process of
Model Cities."
The Concilio's estimation that the Director and his staff sup-
ported them was also accurate. "We had some funds left over that
we were trying to recycle and...one of the proposals was the one
from CAST....I was very excited about that. I thought that was the
kind of thing Model Cities should do."
But the Board was not in favor. The Director attributed their
opposition to a number of factors. First, the Board would lose con-
trol over the money and the jobs produced by the money. Another
major factor was prejudice. "A good portion of money was going to
Spanish-speaking people....They were suspicious of that....They
didn't believe that the Spanish organization had the capability to
deal with this proposal."
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The ex-Director who spoke so frankly in March of 1976 was no
longer an employee of Model Cities or any other agency in Cambridge.
He does speak Spanish; he was in the Peace Corps in the Dominican
Republic; and he has spent some time in Puerto Rico. His parting
comment was, "I don't think the Board ever really understood the
Spanish community." In one sense, CAST was very fortunate that he
happened to be the Director at the time the proposals were submitted.
The ex-Director of Model Cities called CAST "a landmark." He
was referring to the way in which community participation had led
to a concrete, viable program. But CAST's success was not limited
to its origins. Its real success has been its ability not only to
sustain, but to improve the condition of the buildings and the in-
dividual units. Indeed, this success has mystified the Massachusetts
Housing Finance Agency (MHFA). Faced with a generally dismal situa-
tion in which the usual low-income housing project rapidly deterio-
rates into as bad a slum as it was meant to replace, Columbia Terrace
has earned the somewhat dubious distinction of being an "exception."
Indeed, its success is so rare that whenever this author has attemp-
ted to use it as a model to the MHFA, their response has been that
the success of CAST is so rare, so completely atypical, that it,
therefore, proves nothing.
CAST's secret of success, however, is not unfathomable. The
tenants themselves hire a realty management agent to run the project.
If that agent does not maintain the buildings properly, they can fire
him, given sixty day's notice, and hire another. (The one that they
do use is one of the three partners in CAST Associates.) Thus the
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residents have indirect control over all maintanence decisions. An-
other secret is that the buildings involved are old--built before
the days of modern slap-dash technique--and its brick exterior is
sound and easily maintained. Culturally it matters that the Coa-
menos and their friends who live there share the positive attributes
of the Anglo middle-class that contribute to the upkeep of local
pride and appearance. But most important is the sense of community
that is maintained, in part due to tenant control over new tenant
selection. Every family, Hispano or Anglo, is well acquainted with
every other family, and all their children. Furthermore, the super-
intendent is personally acquainted with all the tenants, and with
their children. He cashes everyone's checks, and when the children
carry them down for their mothers, he not only hands out the cash
for their mother, but lollipops for the messenger. By creating a
personal relationship with the children, he has the authority and
the respect necessary to stop the children from doing any sort of
damage, before that damage is done. It is much cheaper that way,
and that CAST does not have the large maintenance bills that most
projects have is one more secret of their success.
In essence, CAST operates as a small village. The cohesiveness
of the group and the power that they have over tenant selection
which maintains that cohesiveness has both a positive and a negative
side. On the one hand it makes possible the sense of responsibility
and cooperation that all residents have for the project, and, on the
other hand, it has also produced hard feeling among and charges of
discrimination from those groups that are not represented in the
project: the Jayuyanos and Blacks.
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The successful organization of the Columbia Terrace Tenants'
Union and its transformation into CAST, Inc. provide an excellent
lesson in community mobilization. First of all the organizers and
the planners must acquaint themselves with the communites that they
intend to serve. That two attempts failed and that one succeeded
in organizing these people demonstrates that it was not that the
tenants could not be organized, but that the experts did not know
how to do it. For an outsider to approach a community with a pro-
gram already prepared is to ask them to support what the outsider
wants and to deny them an opportunity to express what they want.
To be insensitive to their fears, to be willing to jeopardize their
tenure in a building without providing protection, is to use them,
not to help them. To be dishonest by not frankly describing the
possible repercussions of any given policy does not fool the people,
it merely makes them suspicious of the outsider.
It is the adamantly held opinion of the Coameno organizer that
this effort succeeded not so much because he was a Coameno, or that
he spoke Spanish, but because he was willing to sit and talk and
listen. He was willing to meet the people; to know them as indivi-
duals. He was willing to let them decide their own strategy. With
regard to the process of organization, the tenants benefitted from
the experts only when those experts subordinated themselves (un-
willingly and as a last resort) to the community's will, but once
the Tenants' Union was organized, and only then, it v4as possible to
suggest to them a more long range solution, the 236 Federal Housing
Program. In the same way that it is the CAST tenants' control over
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their own housing that has insured its success, it was the tenants'
control over the goals and strategies of their organization that
made it a success. The organizers must determine what the communi-
ty wants, and do that, not what they want, if they are to succeed.
Yet another lesson is that the community cannot just wait for
the appropriate agencies to deliver. Both CEOC and Model Cities
had been mandated to develop such housing projects, and neither one
had done so as of late 1970. In the case of CEOC, it was only when
they were faced with a possible loss of funds that they moved; in
the case of Model Cities, it was only when two sit-ins had been
carried out that they saw their duty. The mere fact that people
needed housing and that these agencies were supposed to develop it
was not enough to produce low income housing. CAST is a success,
but it represents a success for the 52 families who live there, not
for any public program, not for the organizers, and not for the com-
munity in general.
Although CAST may serve as an example of how to cure urban
blight, it has not solved the Hispanos' housing problems. Consider-
ing the size of this population, 52 units do not constitute a solu-
tion.
1W
CA.S.T. 11
Rehabilitation,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Client: Cambridge Alliance of Spanish Tenants.
Sponsor: Better Cities, Inc.
Management: Edwin D. Abrams.
Financing: MHFA 236 Rent Supplement.
Architect: R. Wendell Phillips.
Consultants: Environmental Design Engineers -
Mechanical and Electrical.
Contractor: Sid Kumins, Inc.
Site: Existing run-down row houses on Columbia
Street.
Program: Complete rehabilitation including new
Heating, Ventilating and Electrical Systems. Parti-
tions were replanned to allow improved living, eat-
ing and sleeping relationships. Plans were devel-
oped with tenant participation and since the tenants
have a 49% ownership through Limited Dividend
Corporation they will have a strong participation in
the management.
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D. Jayuyano-Coameno Tensions Produced by Housing and Geographical
Location: El Batey de Polaroid.
CAST I and II, a fourth Coameno stronghold after the St. Mary's
clubs and the Concilio, has created further tensions within the
Puerto Rican community. The Jayuyanos feel that the Comenos have
effectively excluded them from CAST, and they are right. To date,
not one Jayuyano family has been admitted. The 1976 population com-
position within CAST, according to the superintendent, is as follows.
POPULATION OF CAST BY ORIGIN OF FAMILIES
Origin Number of Families Percentage
of Families
Coameno 22 42%
Other Puerto Rican,
but no Jayuyanos 9 18%
Dominican 7 13%
El Salvador 1 2%
Anglo 13 25%
Total Families 52 100%
The composition of CAST is no accident. Its Board of Directors
has a Coameno President, a Coameno Vice-President, a Coameno Secre-
tary, and an Anglo Treasurer, and these people, who control tenant
selection, do not want Jayuyanos (or Blacks, it would also appear)
in the project. In 1976 the author interviewed the President of
CAST's 'Board, and asked him why there were no Jayuyanos. He replied,
"...The reason that there are no Jayuyanos in the complex is simply
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because Jayuyanos do not apply for apartments in the complex. The
same goes for Blacks." When the ouestion was pursued, he replied,
"...Not only they don't apply, but I feel that the remaining [mem-
bers) of the Board will not allow me to recommend one of them. They
have established a very bad reputation around the Terrace, plus you
know that Coamenos and Jayuyanos are like water and oil, they do
not mix. So before we accept one and then find ourselves with all
kinds of problems, we just don't encourage them to apply." Essen-
tially, as with the clubs, the Jayuyanos have learned that they are
not wanted, and as a matter of pride, they do not apply.
The Coamenos, too, are developing a bad reputation for using
strong arm tactics. On one occasion, at least, Dominican residents
of CAST felt that the Coamenos were treating them unfairly, and
they sought the intervention of Concilio on their behalf. Concilio
recommended that they express their feelings to the CAST Board, and
the results were disastrous. The Board, as soon as they heard that
the Dominicans had gone to Concilio, called the Dominican residents
to a CAST Board meeting and threatened them with reprisals (report-
ing them to the Welfare Department or to Immigration) if they ever
tried to get outside intervention again. The CAST Board President,
when asked about the situation, replied, "The Dominicans can say
thank you for the Board letting them occupy apartments in the com-
plex....After that incident they have been very silent."
Not only is Concilio aware of the problems, but the larger
community too. In a 1976 interview with the President of the Area 4
Planning Team (who in 1970 at the time CAST was formed was Chairperson
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of the Housing Committee of the Model Cities Board), she indicated
that she had "many questions" about the CAST project. To date, she
declared, "...CAST has given an apartment to none of the Neighbor-
hood people." One should point out, however, that they have pro-
vided apartments for some people: Coamenos, Hispanos other than
Jayuyanos, and Anglos, and that these people, too, are "Neighbor-
hood" people.
The Polaroid Parking Lot: Front-line Batey of Cambridge
Between Columbia Terrace, the site of the Coameno stronghold
CAST, and Washington Elms and Newtowne Courts, the public projects
where many Jayuyanos have moved since 1973, lie just three short
blocks, a large part of which is taken up by the Polaroid Company's
parking lot. Although the Terrace residents had originally viewed
the lot as a convenient place to park their automobiles after working
hours, the President of CAST now admits, "Things have not worked out
as we expected. I don't know what it is with this parking lot that
everyone ends up here, and I mean everyone; people from everywhere
come here." The descendents of the Borinquen may have no mountains
to flee to, and the surrounding walls may not be carved or painted
with the face of the gods, but Polaroid's parking lot is known
throughout Area 4 as "Puerto Rican Plaza."
Everyone gathers for card games, dominoes, a few bets here and
there, boxing, basketball, occasional movies, and not infrequently,
various illicit activities. The popularity of the lot has even at-
tracted Hispanos from out of town, people completely unknown to the
rhe batey(polaroid parking lot),
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Cambridge community. Although both the strangers and the Jayuyanos
know that they are not welcome, they come. Excluded from the clubs,
from control of Concilio, and from the apartments af the Terrace,
the Jayuyanos have staked out the batey for their last stand. The
fights that used to take place in the clubs now transpire at El Batey
de Polaroid, and the violence and the presence of strangers has made
the residents of the Terrace afraid-afraid for their children and
for themselves. Many of those who have moved out of the Terrace
have given the parking lot scene as their reasons for leaving.
The residents of the Terrace have, several times, sent delega-
tions to Polaroid and to the police asking that something be done.
They asked Polaroid to shut down the lot after working hours--to com-
pletely seal it off, but the most that Polaroid was willing to do
was to shut off the lights at 10:00 p.m. "We don't understand why
they can't close the place at night and on the weekend. Sometimes
the police has to come three or four times down here. This is not
good. This is giving a bad name to the Terrace." Part of the prob-
lem is a question of jurisdiction between the police and the private
security guards hired by Polarbid. The police are reluctant to
tread on their territory, and thus they do not always patrol the
area as closely as the situation warrents.
If something is not done about the situation, a tragedy of some
sort is very likely to occur. The escalating seclusionism of the
Coameno, both in his clubs and at CAST, and the ever-growing number
of Jayuyanos in the Washington Elms and Newtowne Courts area is con-
tinuing to feed the flames of the Jayuyano-Coameno hostility. Some-
day soon the batey of Polaroid may explode.
SECTION III. THE CAMBRIDGE SCENE
PART SIX. THE CHURCH: FATHER SHEEHAN ATTEMPTS TO WORK MIRACLES
That the Concilio is not the only institution in Cambridge
that has been plagued by the Coameno-Jayuyano problem, and that
it is not the only institution that has failed to overcome the
problem is apparent from the story of St. Mary's Church, and its
priest, Father Daniel Sheehan. No matter how impartial he tried
to be, his organization, too, was identified by the Hispano com-
munity as "Coameno." Neither was he able to put Jayuyanos onto
the parishoners' committees. They were led by Coamenos, and no
Jayuyanos asked to serve. Equally frustrated as the Concilio
Board, he threw up his hands and left Cambridge. No amount of
pleading could persuade him to stay and deal with what he felt was
an insoluble problem.
It was in 1969 at about the same time that Concilio opened
its doors that Padre Jose, the Spanish-speaking priest at the
Church of the Blessed Sacrament in the Cambridgeport section of
Cambridge was transferred out of the city. His removal from the
scene, combined with the influx of Hispanos into the Central Square
area brought the Spanish-speaking Irishman at St. Mary's into the
Hispano limelight. Father Daniel Sheehan, who had been in Cam-
bridge since 1968, was approached by a group (Coamenos, of course,
but not exactly the same people who had formed the police delega-
tion over the bar issue), and asked if he would conduct masses in
Spanish at St. Mary's. Thus from 1969 until his departure at the
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end of 1975, Father Sheehan attempted to guide St. Mary's Hispano
flock, which numbered at least 1,000 by the end of the period.1
Prior to the formation of Concilio and the concentration of
the Hispano population in the Central Square area, tensions between
the Jayuyano and the Coameno at the Church were not obvious to the
unschooled eye. This was due in part to the small number of His-
panos attending the Church in this early period, and to the fact
that most people just came and listened to the mass, met their
friends, and left. For perhaps as long as one year, Father Sheehan
remained happily oblivious to this undercurrent in the Hispano
sea, in spite of the fact that all of the various committees that
supervised charities and activities within the Hispano part of
the congregation were composed of mostly Coamenos, and no Jayuyanos.
Indeed, the pillar of the church committees was a Coameno woman
who had been a founding member of the Concilio Board of Directors.
But Father Sheehan did not remain oblivious for very long.
After he had begun giving the Spanish language mass at St. Mary's,
his reputation grew, and he was asked to give masses in other
parts of the Boston area, some as far away as Peabody and Salem.
Thus in the early 70's he began to follow the Hispano population
around, from town to town, and in the process he learned his first
lesson in regionalismo. Father Sheehan had hoped to serve the
1The information in this part (Section III, Part 6) is based
on interviews with Father Sheehan and with one of the most active
members of the Church, the Coamena who was a founding member of
the Concilio Board, and with the third Executive Director of Con-
cilio, unless otherwise indicated.
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Hispano community generally; instead, he found himself in the ser-
vice of Hispano regionalism. The variniu churrces b ienti-
fied not with where the Spanish-speaking now lived, but from where
they had come. The mass in Salem was attended by Puerto Ricans,
while the one in Peabody attracted the Dominicans. Dominicans who
lived in Salem traveled to Peabody for the mass, and Puerto Ricans
in Peabody traveled to Salem. The Spanish-language mass held in
the Allston-Brighton section of Boston became identified with the
Cubans, and those Cubans who lived in Cambridge duly went to Allston-
Brighton to mass, rather than to St. Mary's, which was much closer.
Once the Cuban concentration in East Cambridge developed, they es-
tablished their own "Cuban" mass in their own neighborhood.
Thus Father Sheehan learned his first lesson in Spanish region-
alism.
Hispanos tend to identify with their own community instead
of their local parish, [and they] don't identify with the
Hispano community as a whole. Presently there is a problem
in that the Cuban and Dominican populations [in Cambridge]
identify the church [St. Mary's] as Puerto Rican. They say
that I favor the Puerto Ricans instead of the others. I
didn't mean to exclude anyone, but it has happened. We have
a lot of activ'ties for the Hispano community [as a whole),
but [their mutual participation] is really artificial, and
doesn't carry over [into other areas of their lives]. There
is no general unity within the Ilispano population.
Once Father Sheehan became aware of the problems between Jayu-
yanos and Coamenos, and many of the Jayuyanos had moved to North
Cambridge, he started a Spanish-language mass in North Cambridge.
le wanted to avoid any charges of favoritism, and to make mass at-
tendance more convenient for the Jayuyanos living in the Jefferson
Park and Waldon Square public housing projects. One problem that
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worried him was the growing influence of Jehovah's Witnesses among
the Jayuyanos, a phenomenon that was not apparent among Coamenos.
Furthermore, after St. Mary's had lost its nunnery in 1973, it
made some sense to develop activities in North Cambridge, where
there were still nuns to help him.
Once again, Father Sheehan's good intentions were thwarted
by the Hispanos. No more than some 30 people ever chose to attend
the Spanish-speaking mass in North Cambridge. The Jayuyanos con-
tinued to attend St. Mary's, even though its committees were run
by Coamenos. They wanted to meet their friends in the Central Square
area and spend the day with them. Some of those who lived in North
Cambridge even began to ask Father Sheehan if he would pick them up
and give them a ride to mass at St. Mary's, when he had just finished
giving a mass right on their own doorstep. "They are driving me
crazy," was his parting comment.
Even though Father Sheehan became well acquainted with the
manifestations of Hispano regionalism, he nevertheless continued
his valiant efforts to serve this community, and to maintain what
he characterized as an "artificial unity." That he was not able to
overcome such factionalism was not because he did not try. But it
became more and more difficult for him to maintain his reputation
of impartiality as his own funds dwindled. He could not help the
Jayuyanos who came to him; he had to refer them to Concilio. And
the more he had to rely on the Concilio and the Parents' Advisory
Committee of the School Department's bilingual education programs
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at St. Mary's, the more he became associated with the Coameno-
Jayuyano problem that had manifested itself in these organizations.
This artificial unity was most apparent in the various recreation-
al and educational activities that Saint Mary's sponsored. With the
growth of the community had come the concurrent need for recreational
programs for all ages, but the city's already existing programs made
no provisions for this new Hispano population. Hispano children
were not encouraged to participate in summer programs, and the adults
either had to provide their own entertainment, or content themselves
with movies and programs that they did not understand or relate to
culturally. Thus church-going and church sponsored activities tended
to become even more important to the Hispanos in Cambridge than they
had been in their countries of origin.
Father Sheehan in 1969 and 1970 began by organizing English lan-
guage classes for adults, at the church. Supplemented by such
services and amenities as babysitting, transportation and refresh-
ments, these classes were taught by the nuns of St. Mary's Convent,
some of whom spoke Spanish. Father Sheehan also sponsored parties
for the children, dances for everyone, religious plays, and various
retreats and excursions. The Hispano community was impressed by
his efforts and appreciated them, since they provided much needed
inspirational and recreational activities. Indeed the Board of
Directors of Concilio in 1970 invited the Irish priest to become a
member of the Board, thus making him the one and only Anglo ever
honored in this manner, but Father Sheehan declined the invitation.
He did not want to become identified with either the Coamenos or
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the Jayuyanos, and he was afraid that joining the Board of Concilio
would enbroIl hIm In such problems. "..T don't get involved in
the politics of it, after what happened with the First Director."
Nevertheless, Father Sheehan continued to cooperate with the
Concilio, and in the summer of 1971 he organized the first summer
program for Spanish-speaking children, ages 3 to 14. During the
early part of 1971 Father Sheehan had been invited by Cambridge Com-
munity Services, Inc. (CCS) to sit on their Board and represent both
St. Mary's and the Hispano community. When he learned that CCS was
a funnel for foundation monies earmarked for summer recreational
programs, he agreed. He then went to the Anglo, Spanish-speaking
third Executive Director of Concilio and together they drew up a
proposal, which CCS approved.
Thus the program began, at St. Mary's, with the nuns from Saint
Mary's Convent along with some additional staff providing arts,
crafts, and religious training, as well as occasional outings.
The latter, for which the children were loaded onto buses, became
a pathetic measure of the lack of any such opportunities for adults.
Parents, starved f or recreation themselves, came with the children,
and then there was not enough room on the buses. Additional buses
would be hired, and still there would not be enough room. In the
end, people had to be turned away.
Due to the expanded number of participants projected for 1972,
Father Sheehan sought new sources of funds and personnel to run that
summer's program. This need for funds was met by the happy coin-
cidence that the legislature had just made Massachusetts the first
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state to mandate bilingual education, in 1971, by passing the Tran-
sitional Bilingual Education (TBE) Act. (This law was passed only
after a 1970 study, The Way We Go to School: the Exclusion of Chil-
dren in Boston, demonstrated that the schools were not addressing
themselves to the problems of non-English-speaking immigrants, and
that as a result, in Boston alone, over 5,000 Hispano children were
not even attending school.) The new law stipulated that "in every
school district which had twenty or more students of limited English-
speaking ability in a particular language group, a full bilingual
program must be provided for these children (Bilingual Education,
p. 5)."
The new law also stipulated that the parents of these chil-
dren should play an active role in the entire process through the
organization of a Parents' Advisory Committee (PAC) for each language
group concerned. Actually, the Cambridge Public School Department
already had such a committee, a Bilingual Advisory Committee, that
had grown out of a community initiative, rather than a legal require-
ment. Concilio personnel (Coamenos), parents, and teachers had par-
ticipated, although Concilio tended to shoulder most of the burden
of running the committee. The committee helped to identify potential
teachers and aides for these classes, an important function since
the criteria used in selecting regular teachers did not necessarily
qualify a person to deal effectively with Hispano children. The
TBE Act, in addition to providing funds for the regular school year,
also offered funds for summer cultural and recreational programs,
and due to the obvious success of St. Mary's 1971 program, Father
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Sheehan and the Concilio personnel were able to add TBE money to
the funds that they had acquired from CCS.
Concilio further assisted St. Mary's 1972 program by hiring
teenagers, (both Coameno and Jayuyano) through the Neighborhood
Youth Corps, whom it then reassigned to St. Mary's summer activities
program. Thus jobs supervising the recreational aspects of the
program were made available, and St. Mary's acquired the requisite
additional staff. Although there was money available for a summer
program for the teenagers themselves, unfortunately no proposals
were made. In all fairness, however, one might add that the teen-
agers were more interested in jobs than in recreation or educational
programs.
In 1973, however, a series of misfortunes were to seriously
affect the ability of St. Mary's to maintain the activities which
it had been sponsoring for the Hispano community, and more and more
of these functions were to evolve into Concilio programs. This
process contributed to Father Sheehan's increasing difficulties with
regard to keeping his flock peacefully together.
One of the first programs affected by the cutbacks was the
children's summer program. Since St. Mary's was unable to run a
full-time program in 1973, the Department of Public Schools estab-
lished a morning class at Roberts School, using TBE funds. Con-
cilio provided lunch, and supervised the children's walk over to
St. Mary's, where afternoon recreational activities were provided
by the Church, with CCS funds.
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In 1974 and 1975, after St. Mary's Convent had closed, the
nuns had departed, there had been a bad fire at the church, and the
church had closed one of its parochial schools. St. Mary's had to
give up the idea of a summer program altogether, and Concilio in-
herited the recreational aspects of the program, while the TBE
program continued to fund morning classes at Roberts School. Father
Sheehan had assisted the Concilio in writing and presenting its pro-
posal to CCS, asking that they continue to fund the recreational
programs, under Concilio sponsorship.
Under Concilio sponsorship there were considerable differences
in the kinds of summer programs offered. In 1974 and 1975, Concilio
did not provide regular play periods for the children, but ran a
series of programs that would include the whole family. Furthermore,
Concilio actively recruited personnel and participants for the sum-
mer programs of other institutions and agencies in Cambridge, and
encouraged these programs to make special provision for the Hispano
community. Although at first CCS was somewhat dubious about the
design of Concilio's program, especially since they were addressing
themselves to adults as well as children, the new program's mix of
trips to the mountains, crafts, and films, and other assorted ac-
tivities has been a success, and CCS is quite satisfied with the
results.
The increasing involvement in and ultimate adoption of one of
Father Sheehan's programs by Concilio and the TBE Parents' Advisory
Committee (PAC) meant that Father Sheehan's artificial unity suffered.
Concilio's problems in this arena have already been related, and so
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this section will confine itself to the regionalism that appeared
to split PAC. In reality, PAC had always been run by the Concilio,
not by parents, regardless of its name or any theories to the con-
trary, but in 1974 Concilio made a noble effort to turn the reins
of power over to the parents, unsuccessfully. Instead of the parents
taking over, the employees of the bilingual program, the teachers
and aides, became the dominant group, and PAC became a battleground
between the parents and the administration on the one hand, and the
teachers on the other. These battles exacerbated a factional strug-
gle that had originated within the Concilio Board of Directors,
among Coamenos, but had taken on a regional appearance, since the
faction that had been ousted used a Jayuyana woman as their osten-
sible leader. Actually this woman was the wife of a Coameno. (Al-
though such marriages are extremely rare, they do happen.) The
Coameno husband had been involved in a dispute with various members
of the Concilio Board, and when his side lost, he retaliated by
attacking the Coamenos in PAC, through his Jayuyano wife. Thus to
the unschooled eye, it appeared that the Jayuyanos were attempting
to unseat the Coameno leadership in at least one of their strong-
holds. In reality, this was not the case. This woman did not rep-
resent the Jayuyanos, and they did not come out to support her when
she claimed that she did. They, too, knew to whom she was married,
and, perhaps, what the battle was about. They were not interested.
The Coameno husband lost again, and by the summer of 1975 PAC was
firmly in Concilio hands again. That this battle, which at least
appeared to be between Coamenos and Jayuyanos occurred at a time
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when Father Sheehan's own resources were being cut back, and thus
his own responses were being further limited, meant that he became
a more and more frustrated man.
Many people, mostly Jayuyanos, come to me looking for
help, but what can I do, except tell them to go to the Con-
cilio? But they don't go. (They do go, but only as a last
resort.] A lot of Jayuyanos come here or see me on the street
and complain about their housing situation, jobs, and so
forth. What can I do, especially when the Concilio is res-
ponsible for these services? However, I know that they don't
want to go to Concilio because they think that the Concilio is
for Coamenos. The same thing happens at the Church. St.
Mary's is looked upon by other Hispanos as a Coameno church,
especially since the leadership of the church's Spanish Parent
Committee is Coameno. I just don't see how we can bring these
groups together.
Of particular concern to Father Sheehan was the placement of
Jayuyano families in the various Dublic housing projects, particular-
ly into the Washington Elms project. They Jayuyanos complained to
him that they were being discriminated against because Coamenos were
not placed in such rundown projects. He relayed this message to the
Coameno most involved in their relocation out of Jefferson Park
(North Cambridge) into the Washington Elms project (Model Neighbor-
hood Area), relocations that had been made at the request of the
families involved. The housing worker, who really was not trying
to discriminate against the Jayuyanos, tried to explain to Father
Sheehan, so that he could explain to the Jayuyanos, that it was not
a plot, and that the problem was related to the general housing
shortage in Cambridge, the fact that these families could not afford
to pay the rent in other places, and that there were not enough
large apartments in the public housing projects, and these families
could not afford large apartments at market prices. If he were
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going to put a roof over their head, he had to put them into Wash-
ington Elms.
At least Father Sheehan, as a member of the clergy, was not
expected to be an all-powerful and benevolent hacendado. It was
only expected that the clergy should communicate with the powers
that be, on behalf of the offended parishoner. Concilio, on the
other hand, was expected to deliver, but it could not deliver what
the Jayuyanos wanted, and so the parishoners continued to complain
to Father Sheehan. Father Sheehan, in the end, only wanted out,
and in late 1975 he found himself a replacement and left.
Father Sheehan never understood that he was caught up in a web
of expectations and assumptions that were rooted deep in the soil
of Otoao, even though he was, no doubt, the only Anglo in Cambridge
that had been to both Jayuya and Coamo, not once, but twice. In an
effort to better serve the community he went to the island, and
even after observing the tremendous differences between the two
places, he still did not understand the cultural origins of this
problem and attributed it, instead, to the fact that Coamenos pre-
dominated among the early arrivals, and thus they "[had] everything,"
whereas the Jayuyanos, having predominated among the later arrivals,
had been left out. "I went to Coamo and Jayuya during my two visits
to the Island--not to study the communities, but to visit the fami-
lies of people from here. Every place is very different, and charac-
teristics vary from community to community." But when asked why the
two groups cannot get along, he replied, "The Jayuyanos are more
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recently arrived here than the Coamenos, and they may think that
the Coamenos have everything. I know also that Jayuyanos are ar-
riving in bunches lately."
That Father Sheehan, one of those persons most knowledgeable
about the Hispanos of Cambridge and a man who was genuinely con-
cerned about their welfare, was oblivious to the fact that the
completely divergent cultural baggage with which the two groups
arrived was the primary cause of the problem, and that all the
other problems have grown out of this fundamental, unavoidable
fact, is most discouraging. Ascribing the Jayuyano's adaption to
the Cambridge environment as inadequate due to a factor of timing
suggests that time alone will remedy the problem. But time will
not, for although many Jayuyanos have arrived recently, there are
those among them who have been here as long as any of the Coamenos,
and they are still handicapped by their lack of marketable skills
and the great cultural gap that looms between the batey of Otoao and
the batey of Polaroid.
That Father Sheehan also continued to avoid any direct associ-
ation with the Concilio, in his vain attempt to overcome St. Mary's
reputation as a Coameno controlled institution, frustrated the Con-
cilio leadership. They knew that they were not serving the Jayuyanos
effectively, and in an attempt to overcome this nagging problem, they
had asked Father Sheehan, in 1975, if he would establish an office
for himself at the Concilio. Perhaps if he were sitting in the same
room with the various people from the Welfare Department, DES, and
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so forth, and he personally delivered these people to the appropriate
desk, they would have more confidence in the sincerity of Concilio's
efforts. And, perhaps, since the Jayuyanos prefer to talk to him,
they would come to the Concilio more often, thus facilitating the
identification of their needs and their desires. Perhaps they would
even overcome their feelings that Concilio did not want to serve
them, just because in many cases it could not deliver what they
wanted.
Father Sheehan declined the request. He insisted that working
independently but cooperatively remained his philosophy, and he
believed that this arrangement "operated very, very well and without
duplication." Even though he knew, and Concilio knew, that his own
committees at the church were Coameno committees, that they had no
more Jayuyano representation on them than did the Concilio Board of
Directors, and that the community identified his church as Coameno,
he would not join the agencies that operated at least part-time out
of the Concilio office.
This attitude on his part caused a number of disappointed Board
members to believe that in part Father Sheehan's decision was based
upon a never openly expressed, but nevertheless real rivalry between
St. Mary's and the Concilio. As a separate "Hispano" institution
in the community, he wanted to maintain his own base, and not lend
his own influence to his rival. This undercurrent of real or per-
haps only imagined rivalry, however, has never interfered with
cooperation between the two institutions. Rather, if it has had
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any effect, it has been to increase the number of joint programs
A cooperation An orde to at least"c ra an &mage of good ill
and united action. Nevertheless, some Board members continue to
feel that this separatism on the part of St. Mary's is unproduc-
tive, needless, and a bother. Father Sheehan's replacement, a
Spaniard, arrived in late 1975, but it is still to soon to deter-
mine what his response will be to this problem, the problem that
Father Sheehan believed to be insoluble.
SECTION IV. THE CONCLUSION
PART ONE. THE OFFICIAL RESPONSE TO THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE CAM-
BRIDGE HISPANO COMMUNITY
This concluding section shall approach two overall questions.
The first is, what can this discussion of the Puerto Ricans on the
island and in Cambridge tell us about the official response to the
special problems of this community; which agencies and institutions
in Cambridge have responded and why? The second question has three
parts: how can the community make these agencies more responsive;
what must the community itself do to overcome the problem; and third,
what can these agencies and the community leaders, together, do to
solve the problems that this cultural legacy has caused in Cambridge?
Although the preceding saga is not the complete story of the
Hispano community from 1969 to 1975, it nevertheless outlines the
general nature of the demands emanating from that community and the
response that those demands elicited. To sum up, private institu-
tions (such as the Catholic Church) were more responsive than any
public agency. Indeed, the Church was the only institution that res-
ponded upon request, without sermonizing, and without the need for
pressure. Father Sheehan did not attempt to serve this community
from behind a desk, or to acquaint himself with it merely by reading
books. lie spoke Spanish and so he could talk to the people: he went
to Coamo and Jayuya. He was the only Anglo leader, official or unof-
ficial, who knew that the problem that divided the Hispano community
was a problem between two groups of Puerto Ricans, and not between
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the Puerto Ricans and other Hispano nationalities. But even Father
Sheehan did not understand the origins of the problem. He did not
know the history of these people, and so he could not understand why
the community acted in this manner. And therefore he could not tackle
the problem. He declared it insoluble, and he left.
The Mayor of Cambridge is second only to Father Sheehan in his
knowledge of this community. Since 1965, when he was a City Coun-
cilor, he has been aware of this community and what he affectionate-
ly calls its "big mouths." After the City Council had elected him
Mayor in 1970, he went to Puerto Rico, and to Coamo, to visit the
families of Cambridge residents, and he stayed in the home of the
Concilio Board President. Over the years he has accepted all invi-
tations to various Hispano functions and festivities. Indeed, in
1976 he met the Maraton San Blas (Coamo) team at the airport when
they arrived to compete in the Boston Marathon; and he escorted
them royally, with siren blaring and lights flashing, all the way
to Columbia Terrace. As a result of this socializing, the Mayor is
familiar with the Coamenos, and with their problems. He is not, how-
ever, familiar with the Jayuyanos and their problems.
Both Father Sheehan and the Mayor understood that a city is
made up of people, not numbers, and they responded to the Hispano
community as people. And the Hispano community has responded by
giving them their respect and their support. But unfortunately
neither one of these people was in a position to tackle some of the
most basic problems facing the Hispanos. As the Mayor quite readily
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admitted, "I have responded the best I could with what power I have
and through cooperation with the Spanish Council." But the Mayor
of Cabridge is not the decision-making official; the City Manager
is.
Among the public agencies of Cambridge, those that have been
most responsive have been agencies that were either state agencies
(such as the Department of Employment Security, the Massachusetts
Commission Against Discrimination, and the Department of Welfare),
or they have been local agencies that receive considerable amounts
of state and federal funds, and must therefore be sensitive to the
various affirmative action laws and guidelines that dictate a cer-
tain degree of responsiveness. These agencies include the Depart-
ment of Public Schools, the Cambridge Economic Opportunity Commit-
tee, and the pre-1973 Model Cities program. (The one exception to
this rule has been the Housing Authority, which in spite of its out-
side funding has responded very minimally.) One must add, however,
that these agencies responded only after pressure had been applied.
The Mayor, who is also the Chairman of the School Committee, summed
it up very nicely: "(Which has been most responsive?] The School
Department, because of state and federal laws and Puerto Rican pres-
sure."
The least responsive agencies have been those most directly under
the City Manager, those over which this chief executive of the City
has the most control. To give just one example, the Hispano communi-
ty has been asking Cambridge City Hospital to hire Hispanos and
Spanish-speaking personnel ever since the August 1969 meeting which
192
the City Manager arranged. And yet, in January of 1976 the Hospital
still did not have even a Spanish-speaking interpreter in its emer-
gency room, the most critical spot. (The problem is not with the
Hospital's Director; it seems to lie in the Department of Planning
and Development.) As a result, in January of 1976, the Concilio
Board President resorted to holding up the approval of a city clinic
in order to force the City Manager to sign a memorandum declaring
his intention to hire Hispanos at the Hospital. Thus the City Mana-
ger was made aware of a problem that was seven years old. [See Appen.]
Cambridge City Hospital is just one recent example of the City's
lack of response, but the problem dates back to the days when the
first Hispanos arrived. As the history of the Hispano community in
Cambridge demonstrates, the only responses that the Hispano communi-
ty had provoked from city agencies prior to its picket of CEOC in
1969 had been undesirable responses. The police were the first to
notice the Hispanos, and they responded by arresting them for public
drunkenness. Then CEOC dreamed up its "Fraternidad Hispano" program
in 1968, a program that did not respond to any community. It was
only the community's picket line in front of the CEOC offices that
drew the attention of the city's officials.
Many officials came down to see that picket line and to talk
to the people on it. The City Manager, the Mayor, the City Counci-
lors, and the officials of Model Cities came, among others. They
came down to see what was happening, some because they wanted to
help, and some because they were just curious. Others came for their
own benefit. They came in order to establish communication with
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the Hispano community, for fear that their offices were next on the
Concilio's list of targets. They had nothing to fear, however, for
as soon as CEOC agreed to the formation of the Concilio, the picket
ended. It was not until the next year, 1970, that Concilio walked
into the offices of Model Cities and stayed there for three days,
until its Board finally decided that they would meet with the His-
pano community. The then Executive Director of Model Cities remem-
bers that scene well.
What I think the Spanish-speaking people were saying was
that the Model Cities Board had some very clear deficiencies
and this didn't happen after I arrived here, this has been hap-
pening for some time. The problem had started in 1968-1969,
when the planning [for the agency] took place. These people
weren't coming to me saying something is wrong with you and the
program, they were saying something has been wrong and we hope
you can correct it. This is the way I took it. I think that
the Model Cities Board discriminated against everybody except
themselves.
The Hispano sit-in at Model Cities, as the ex-Director perceived,
clearly was the result of unfulfilled expectations and promises.
Model Cities had not spontaneously sought out the Hispano community,
nor had it, of its own accord, sought to serve them.
There is no doubt that the city officials responded only when
pressure was applied, but this does not tell us very much. In every
society, in every community, political pressure exists, and it exists
because it is necessary. So all that we have learned is that Cam-
bridge is no exception to the rule. One city official made this
point explicitly.
Some of the approaches of the Spanish Council, Spanish-
speaking, were successful. I don't say that the Agency [Model
Cities] went along willingly in all cases.--It's like a number
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of things in a democratic process: people bring pressure to
bear to get what they think is best for them and that is good.
Sometimes professional people feel that they know what is best
and therefore want that followed and unless there is pressure
introduced to do something else-as the Spanish-speaking wanted
to do--[only then] will it happen in a special way. [Emphasis
added.]
Even though every city government is the object of pressure
groups, and must respond to those groups, some cities, however, do
manage to plan relatively effectively. One wonders about Cambridge.
The Executive Director of the Cambridge Welfare Department, an em-
ployee of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, responded with the
following comment when asked how she thought the City could be made
more responsive to the Ilispano community.
...I think its awareness...and I think activities of the Spanish
population itself bringing it to the attention of the officials.
This city responds, unfortunately, very much to pressure. And
they don't do as much planning and assessment as they should.
Sometimes they respond to pressure that doesn't really exist.
...I don't think they always evaluate where the pressure is
coming from. I think they just respond, and I think that in
most cases, they responded to the Spanish community itself say-
ing that we need this assistance. [Emphasis added.]
The Mayor has this to say:
School yes--city no. Because politicians in City Hall are
wrapped up with bureaucracies and are not compassionate, con-
cerned with rarcial, ethnic, Hispanic or Puerto Rican problems.
They only understand the pressure of organized groups.
The Mayor is not the only official who referred to bureaucratic
rivalries over who has control over what and who is responsible for
what. One small example of the problems that this can create, even
in the writing of a thesis, concerns the interview with the Executive
Director of Planning and Development. lie would not discuss the 1975
reorganization of the City's Planning Department, and only wanted to
discuss those areas that he controlled prior to 1975. These bureau-
cratic problems are not the subject of this thesis, and therefore
they shall, for the most part, be ignored.
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Unfortunately Model Cities' definition of creativity was, as
this description hints, nothing more than responses, under pressure,
to "everyone with different ideas." And when its second Executive
Director tried in 1971 to impose a coherent planning system for the
agency, the Board and other officials objected. Furthermore, the
lack of assessment of the results of "different ideas" meant that
the Model Cities Board and staff never asked themselves why "some of
the approaches of the Spanish Council, the Spanish-speaking, were
successful." And it therefore never learned the lessons that the
example of CAST offered, and it did not follow up these successes
by continuing to fund the kinds of projects that had been successful.
Not only do these statements confirm the author's conclusion
that pressure is absolutely necessary, but they also suggest .some-
thing more: that in Cambridge, pressure upon the city may be the
only way to provoke a response form its officials. The author's own
experience with these people, and his observations of them over the
years, would force him to agree that the City's officials "don't do
as much planning and assessment as they should." One ex-Director
of Model Cities described their methods.
Model Cities was a model of a lot of a lot of things. Some of
the things that we demonstrated with federal money failed, but
unless you are prepared to endorse the status quo, which never
has been a good thought, you experiment and try some creative
way to solve some of these problems. That's what we try to do
at Model Cities--everyone with different ideas. We tried a lot
of them. Some of the approaches of Spanish Council, Spanish-
speaking, were successful.
If the Spanish programs were so successful, then why didn't they fol-
low them up? The above, then, shows the lack of assessment and
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evaluation of what was a success and the reasons why.
As a result of these planning deficiencies in the agencies of
Cambridge, the community has always had to go over the heads of the
planners, to the City Manager, to get a response; or they have had
to picket, sit-in or threaten legal action to attract the attention
of the planners and their Boards. Not once was there a positive
response elicited simply on the basis of reason.
But why are the Cambridge City officials so thoroughly unable
to take the initiative? And worse, why are they so slow to respond?
Many Cambridge residents tend to look at the City Manager and the
City Council as the key persons in Cambridge decision-making. But
one must not only look at the pinnacle of the structure, the tip of
the iceberg. One must look at the City Manager's staff, the city's
planners. The City Manager, the chief executive of the city, does
have the final say on almost all matters that concern the city, and
he must approve any matter before it may be taken before the City
Council. In some sense, then, he is indeed the "Big Boss" of all
the departments of the City of Cambridge. If a given community can
communicate with thi City Manager it has a much better chance of get-
ting what it wants. And some people would ask, therefore, "Why bother
with the planners, the administrators of the various programs, and
those officials who are essentially the City Manager's staff?"
But there is a good reason for bothering with those who hold
professional planning positions in Cambridge. The City Manager does
not really run everything--he merely coordinates everything, and
makes the final decisions. He is extremely dependent, therefore, on
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this staff for the production of plans and for information that is
fed into his decision-making process. The officials who write these
p.lanIs and who gather t01e .fLrmatJLULIAion iave a very importan m
on the alternatives from which the City Manager can choose.
The spotlight, therefore, should be turned upon the planners,
those officials who during these years have been most responsible
for shaping the direction that Cambridge and its 13 Neighborhoods
whould go.
In the body of this paper I have purposely refrained from re-
ferring to them as individuals since many of them have held several
different posts in several agencies. To name them first as employ-
ees of one office and then another would only have confused the
reader. Similarly, I have referred throughout this paper to the
Department of Planning and Development, but the reader should be
reminded at this point that there are two names that apply to the
city's planning department. Not only is it referred to by the desig-
nation used in this thesis, but by yet another name: the Community
Development Program. The latter was superimposed upon the Depart-
ment of Planning and Development in 1975. The responsibilities of
the Director of Planning and Development were reduced, and the Direc-
tor of the Community Development Department was, in theory, installed
over him.
The following is, therefore, a list of officials who have had
much to do with planning for the City of Cambridge; some of them
also are members of the Boards of various other agencies. Again
they are listed not by name, but by letter. Also listed are some
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relevant facts about each one, so that a general assessment of their
characteristics can be made.
ff441 A Orl41 A hs b1 e- wrking for the City for approxi-
mately 6 years. A. first came here as an attorney for Model
Cities, and then was promoted to become its third Director. Sub-
sequently A. became Assistant City Manager for Community Deve-
lopment. A. does not live in Cambridge, nor does A. speak Spa-
nish.
Official B. Official B. has been working for the City approximate-
ly 9 years. B. was the first Chairman of the Board of Model
Cities, and then became its Director of Program Operations. B.
is now an administrator of planning and program development for
the City. B. is a resident of Cambridge (in fact, a resident
of the Model Cities MNA), but does not speak Spanish.
Official C. Official C. has worked in Cambridge only six months,
and is by training a social worker. As State Coordinator of
HUD, Region I, IPA. Official C. is on loan to the City for two
years as Human Resources advisor. Official C. neither lives in
Cambridge nor speaks Spanish.
Official D. Official D. has been working in Cambridge for three
and one-half years. A lawyer by training, D. was Planning Di-
rector for Model Cities, and then became Deputy Administrator
for Community Development for the City. D. does not live in
Cambridge, nor does D. speak Spanish.
Official E. Official E. is a planner by training, and has worked
in the City for 8 years. E. has been Executive Director of Plan-
ning for the City. E. does not live in Cambridge, nor does E.
speak Spanish.
Official F. Official F. has worked in Cambridge for four years
as an administrator. F. was the second Director of Model Cities.
F. does speak Spanish, but does not live in Cambridge. At the
time of the interview F. was no longer an employee of the City.
Official G. Official G. is a social worker, and Director of the
Welfare Department since 1970. F. does not live in Cambridge,
nor does G. speak Spanish.
The first thing that one notes about these people who have
shaped the general direction of Cambridge is that only two live in
Cambridge. Only one speaks Spanish (and none speaks any of the other
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foreign languages heard on the streets of Cambridge). Only one is
a planner by training. Those that are attorneys had not specialized
in relevant branches of the law befnre cnming here. These facts
raise several questions. Since they do not live in this city, have
they acquainted themselves with it and how have they done this? How
much have they learned about the various ethnic neighborhoods of
this city? And have they acquainted themselves with the Hispano
community? Do they realize that Cambridge is in part a.city of im-
migrants, and that the poor are not all alike, just because they are
poor?
The following are responses that the author received from some
of these planners when he posed a few of these questions to them.
Question: Are you familiar with the community?
No....I know that there is a course given at Harvard on
Puerto Rico, but I didn't take it. But that course did dis-
cuss...the towns. I know that when new workers come aboard I
mention it to them....I have workers here who are familiar with
the population, but I myself can't communicate, and therefore
I don't have much knowledge of it....Prior to coming here I did
a manpower training program, and in that I made sure that in
Boston that the workers read this study about Puerto Rico. [Who
did the study?] Five Families...Vida [The title of the latter
book is La Vida]...So, I had a feeling of the culture and so
forth....[Five Families is about Mexicans; La Vida is about a
very atypical family of prostitutes.]
question: What kind of planning has Model Cities done for the
Hispano community? What services has Model Cities delivered
to the Hispano community?
[Model Cities] disputed with the Concilio [how best to
provide services for the Spanish-speaking]. I think Model
Cities' view of what should happen in Cambridge was that the
existing institutions, like the hospital, the School Department
and so forth ought to change themselves in order to have more
bilingual people in them, and I don't want to paraphrase Conci-
11o's viewpoint, but it was almost a development of a mini-
Model-Cities with all kinds of subdivisions, such as recreation
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and education. It was just a different viewpoint of how to
serve the community. [What this official was trying to say
was that Concilio thought Model Cities should provide services
directly to the community, and that Model Cities thought that
"existing agencies" should do that, not Model Cities itself.]
Question: What services does the Department of Planning and
Development offer to the general community? To the Hispano
community?
We are not an agency that delivers services to people.
[Emphasis added.] We tend to operate on the policy level.
We deal with fiscal and physical policy level matters, dealing
with the City administration, the City Council, or city-wide
things, rather than people.
The above responses indicate that these people who have been
formulating and administering the programs offered by the City of
Cambridge since 1970, and some of them even before that date, are
not really familiar with the Hispano community. At best, they have
communicated with the Concilio and have had some sort of personal
involvement with one or more individuals in that community. But they
do not know that community; they do not know who they are or from
where they have come. They are completely dependent on people tel-
ling them about that community, or, worse, they are dependent on
what they have learned from books or various other materials such
as the 1970 Census. But a census is no more than numbers, and in
the 1970 Census, those numbers are wrong. Nor are many of the books
which people tend to read very helpful. As one Department Director
indicated, she recommends the works of Oscar Lewis to all new work-
ers; and if there are worse books than these with regard to communi-
cating the culture of Puerto Rico and Spanish America generally, the
author has not read them.
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But most of these planners are not even reading bad books about
Hispanos. An Executive Director of the Department of Planning and
Development, the only professionally trained planner in the City, not
only admits that he does not know this community, but he maintains
that his Department has nothing to do with this community. He in-
sists that other agencies are responsible for these neighborhoods,
and that his own Department is only concerned with "fiscal, physical,
and policy-level matters." Does he really fail to see that fiscal,
physical, and policy matters are basic matters that have an impact
on everything else? Does he really believe that the problems of the
Hispano community are unaffected by policy decisions regarding the
census or the City's overall budget? Or is this failure to see the
fundamental relationships between overall policies and special
neighborhood problems an excuse for ignorance of these immigrant
neighborhoods that make up much of Cambridge?
If the Director of the Department really believes that there
is no fundamental relationship between the parts and the whole, then
there is a perfectly obvious explanation of why the planners of the
City of Cambridge dc not respond to the needs of the residents who
support the "fiscal, physical and policy level" planning of this
Department. Such beliefs might explain why the Department has not
hired one Hispano or Black as a planner for one of these 13 Neigh-
borhoods.
Such attitudes also go far to explain why the City does not plan
effectively for its various communities. They might also explain
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why the City of Cambridge does not seem to plan, and why when it does
come up with a plan, that plan evokes so much negative response from
the residents of Cambridge. This applies not only to the Hispano
community, but to all those communities in Cambridge. It was not
the Hispanos who raised a protest against the Kennedy Library on the
Kendall Square site.
The City Manager might not have found himself backed against
the wall so often (as in the case of the Hospital) if his planners
had been more sensitive to the desires of the people for whom they
plan. If the planners had known this community, then they would
have known that they were not planning for some undifferentiated mass
of poor, or only for whites, or Blacks. There were Hispanos, too.
And these groups do not think alike. Even a Black Puerto Rican does
not respond like a mainland Black. If the planners had known the
experience of CAST and the way the Hispano community feels about pub-
lic housing, they would not have been surprised when the Concilio
objected to a proposed housing development plan that made no provi-
sion for anything but public housing. Evidently, however, they
thought that because the spokesmen for the whites and Blacks had
liked it, Hispanos would too. And they were wrong.
Considering the attitude of these planners it should come as
no surprise that the City Manager, who is dependent on them for his
own information, is no expert on the Hispano community of Cambridge,
either. Yet it is somewhat surprising that he did not realize that
the major problem among those Hispanos was not between Puerto Ricans
and other nationalities (which was what he thought) but between two
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groups of Puerto Ricans. Since he was City Manager in October 1969,
at the time of the Battle of Central Square, one would have thought
that he might have heard something to that effect, or that he would
have asked who was fighting with whom on the main thoroughfare of
the city. Or perhaps he did ask, and these officials told him that
it was "the Spanish." And perhaps this City Manager who "wants to
do that thing right" and "approach these problems" would be aware
that the agencies over which he has the most control are those that
were the most sluggish in their response. Then he would not cite
the Department of Employment Security (a state agency) as the City's
most unresponsive public agency, when those agencies most directly
under his own control have been much less responsive than DES.
Faced with this unresponsive iceberg, what can the 13 Neighborhoods
of Cambridge do? And, in particular, what can the Hispano community
do? Obviously if the planners feel no need to go to the community,
then that community must go to them, in the only manner that they
understand, with political pressure. As the history of these last
six or seven years demonstrates, these officials will continue these
acts of arrogance, this "fiscal, physical, and policy level" plan-
ning that does not service people, unless the various communities
take it upon themselves to stop them.
And with regard to the Iispano community, the leaders and the
community must realize that this political pressure cannot be applied
by the leaders alone. They can complain, cajole, and threaten, but
only numbers, the numbers of the Hispano community, can force an end
to such not-so-benign neglect. These leaders have been caught in
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a vicious circle. In order to build credibility with the community,
they must deliver the services. In order to deliver the services
these agencies must respond. To make the agencies respond, they must
prove that the community is behind them. If, however, they cannot
make the agencies respond, then they lose credibility, and the com-
munity does not come out in numbers large enough to enable these
leaders to deliver. So they cannot build the credibility that they
need to turn these numbers out. As a result, the leaders blame the
agencies for not delivering, but they also sometimes get disgusted
with the people they are trying to serve, which is an understandable
but not very productive response.
Since it is the tip of that iceberg, the City Council and the
City Manager, that is most vulnerable, the Hispano community must
organize, register, and vote in order to be able to reward ant punish
city councilors, who in turn will see that the City Manager does not
damage their own chances for reelection by offending this community.
The City Manager, in turn, will seek to direct his staff so that he
is not caught between the City Council and the community. It is only
when these councilots know that the Ilispanos can give or withhold
between 1,000 and 2,000 votes that the census-makers, the hospital,
the Rent Control Board, the Housing Inspection Office, the Traffic
Department, and so forth will do their duty to this body of constit-
uents.
If the Hispanos could get organized, then the planners of the
city could be taken to task. Then they would listen to what is
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merely common sense, the realization that you cannot plan effective-
ly for a community unless you know that community and what it wants.
The planners would pay more attention to those programs that have
succeeded, those that, either by accident or design, coincided with
what the people wanted and served the needs that the people perceived.
The summer recreation programs started by Father Sheehan and carried
out by Concilio were oversubscribed; the Neighborhood Youth Corps
attracted not only the highly motivated Coameno, but the more reti-
cent Jayuyano. And CAST works, too, because both in the early stages
of planning and in its present state its structure has made it respon-
sive to both the desires and the fears of its residents. Both
of the two former Directors of Model Cities have said that CAST is
a success; so why has this model, this idea, not been followed up?
Our numbers have to be organized and concentrated upon targets,
and the target should be the City Council. And that brings us to
the tragedy of the Battle of Central Square, the war between the Coa-
menos and the Jayuyanos, and, in a larger sense, the regionalismo
and the suspicions and divisions that it fosters in every Puerto Ri-
can community on the mainland. Although most communities have not
been faced with mixtures quite so explosive as that in Cambridge,
regionalism has prevented all of us from learning the value of
subordinating these differences, and gaining the rewards of a uni-
ted community.
The leaders of our communities must recognize that they are
dependent upon these numbers, and that they must do more than is
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normally expected of multi-service and advocacy agencies to deal
with their extraordinary problems. They have exhausted themselves
trying to do it alone, trying to do what only the community as a
whole can do. Like Father Sheehan, they are frustrated and discour-
aged, and they feel that that community does not appreciate their
indefatigable efforts, that it betrays them by not coming out in the
requisite numbers to support them. Thus as individuals, or as a
Board, they are left extremely vulnerable to retaliation from city
officials whose pride has been wounded, or whose hands have been
slapped.
It is difficult when one is constantly fighting for survival
to redirect one's attention from the source of the external threat
to the source of internal dilemmas that weaken them from within.
Always the external threat appears more pressing. The leaders must
realize that they are involved in a two-front struggle, and that
their only security lies in addressing themselves to the origin of
their weakness. If they cannot do this thing first, they must do
both things simultaneously. And they, like the planners, must listen
to their community, to a community a part of which has not yet found
its voice.
But there is room for hope. Neither the community's leaders
nor the City's officials can shirk this responsibility. As the City
Manager has said, "But the one thing we ought to do is try." Amaz-
ingly enough, although the whole community is wrapped up in this
regionalism, in its pride and its prejudice, very few people realize
why they have these attitudes or even that they do have them and that
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they are acting upon them. It is only when it is pointed out to
them that it suddenly dawns upon them that their own little peeves
toward others, as well as their sense of who they are and what they
represent, are all part of an island-wide web that has ensnared us
all.
This community, therefore, in whatever city it finds itself,
must isolate this disease-carrying agent, stick it under a micro-
scope and stare at it in all of its ugliness, and stare at the damage
that it has done to us all. The organizm of this disease must be
analyzed. Its,:origins in the history of the island, the history of
hurricane-like forces that first destroyed the lives of the Borin-
quen, and then deposited new peoples, layer upon layer, valley
after valley, in their separate worlds. We must also realize that
over the centuries there has been little to weave them together for
their own purposes; they have shared only the sufferings of Borinquen.
They have never had the opportunity to share in a successful united
struggle for their own benefit. Their unity has never been rewarded.
We must stop blaming each other, pin-point the source of our problems,
and wipe out this disease. But to do this we must be willing to
stare it in the face, to acknowledge that it exists, and we must be
willing to swallow the bitter cure.
Perhaps in Cambridge in 1965 the problems could have been avoid-
ed if we had been aware of the problem. But we were not; the body
politic has already been damaged. The community's institutions will
now have to adopt measures that have been recommended for the Island,
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even if they have not been implemented, measures designed to deal
with this problem of cultural difference. With regard to the moun-
tain hinterlands, planners have noted the following:
other sector of the Ponce region reaches into the most re-
mote mountains...[including] the town of Jayuya....The develop-
ment of two such disparate sections requires entirely different
types of planning. Similarly in the San Juan area, there are
isolated municipalities-Orocovis and Barranquitas. [Bourne
and Bourne, 1973, p. 15.]
Such separate communities require separate planning, and that means
that Jayuyanos must be involved in that planning. And since Conci-
lio is the Hispanos' voice, that means that there must be Jayuyanos
on Concilio's Board. This has not happened when events were allowed
to follow their own course, so we must take measures to ensure that
Jayuyanos are represented. In short, Concilio will probably have
to add some sort of quota system to its by-laws concerning the elec-
tion of Board members. There seems to be no other way to ensure
proportional representation for this group.
This will not be easy. And it will not work unless the commu-
nity leaders, the members of that Board, realize that such a system
is absolutely essential to the community's future development. Fur-
thermore, and even more difficult, they must convince the already
organized portion of that community, the mass of Coamenos, that such
measures are necessary. Otherwise, putting Coamenos and Jayuyanos
on that Board, seating them around the same table, will only facili-
tate further misunderstandings, further disaster.
Nor will it be easy to find Jayuyanos to run for election, to
sit on that Board. They have not produced leaders in the almost
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unconscious way that the Coamenos have. All those Jayuyanos who
have been at Concilio, as Executive Director, as Board member, or
as CETA employee, have been there because the Coamenos put them
there, in the absence of any Jayuyanos who wanted to be there. As
a result, they were not leaders produced by the Jayuyano people.
They had no constituency, no credibility within their own group, no
support from that group, and they did not serve that group. The
only Jayuyanos in this saga who are even likely candidates for the
title of leader are those three men, jailed by the first Executive
Director, who led the people to what became the Battle of Central
Square. And since two of those three have left Cambridge, even they
are not a realistic possibility. But as Gordon Lewis suggests in
his lament about island politics generally, "the capacity of any
people for 'self-government' rests in the last resort upon the prac-
tical opportunities that are given to it to undertake the experi-
ment." [Lewis, 1963, p. 111.] It is up to the leadership of Con-
cilio to persuade the Jayuyano that participation is worth it, to
him and his community.
There is nothing in the Jayuyano's past experience, either in
Otoao or in Cambridge, to convince him that his participation mat-
ters. As a hired hand of the hacendado, or as the independent, but
marginal subsistence farmer completely engulfed by the hacendado's
world, or as the object of the omnipresent citified Coameno's slurs,
nothing in his experience has given him any reason not to retreat to
his mountain stronghold of isolation and non-participation. It is
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therefore incumbent upon this community's present leadership to
demonstrate otherwise.
The leadership must therefore go beyond the normal call of duty
with regard to this group and give it special consideration. The
Concilio must conceive some plan by which the services are brought
to their very doorsteps. Perhaps by setting up branch offices in
the neighborhoods where they live, by bringing these services to
them, they can be convinced that the Hispano leadership intends to
include them, too. The staff who work in these branches must be
trained; they must be educated so that they understand the origins
of this community, the assumptions that it makes, the conclusions
that it necessarily draws. This staff must be patient, for it must
overcome a lifetime of experience and a tradition hundreds of years
old that have taught these people to survive in one particular way,
perhaps the only way in which they could have survived against the
series of disasters that have struck Jayuya. They must realize that,
essentially, what they are proposing to do is to deprive these people
of the habit of withdrawal, their one successful port in the storms
that have buffeted them for centuries.
Quota systems and other programs that give special privileges
are not without their own problems. They are by no means an ultimate
solution. They are not anyone's goal. They are, however, useful
tools. When some groups are better endowed than others by their
historical experience with the means of survival, such systems of
special treatment are necessary. Until the means of survival, the
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means of success, however one defines it, are equally dispersed, the
more fortunate and the less fortunate cannot meet as equals, because
they are not equally powerful. And if the Puerto Ricans and other
Hispanos are willing to apply such reasoning to themselves in terms
of their relationship to the Anglo community, they should be able
to learn to apply it within their own community. Until the Jayu-
yanos begin to acquire some of these survival skills, they will not
be the Coamenos' equals, politically. And if they cannot meet the
Coamenos as equals, and unify with them on the basis of political
equality, they will not meet them, they will not unify with them.
There is no point to their participating as tokens. Nor would their
pride let them participate except as equals.
Not only are the leaders dependent upon the whole community,
they could also use a little help from the City's officials. Not
only should the community leaders not give up, but the city's offi-
cials also must assume their responsibilities. They, too, must ac-
quaint themselves with the community's origins and its problems, and
what is required to solve those problems. Father Sheehan was the
one man who knew this problem, but he did not understand its origins,
and thus he could not understand how to begin working on a solution.
But those who know its origins, who know why the various groups act
the way they do, can do something about it.
So what can they do? First, they should stop trying to place
the blame on anyone's shoulders. The problem should not be blamed
on the Coamenos, or the Jayuyanos. Perhaps the two groups should
have handled their problems better, but they did not cause their
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problems. If one wants to blame people, then the City officials
should share the blame. They can be blamed for their ignorance and
its various manifestations: the way in which they have made things
difficult for the community's leaders, the way they have not listened
to what they were told, and the way in which they have not assisted
as much as they could have in the delivery of services.
They too have a responsibility. Or, as the City Manager said,
'bne delivers these services because it is a mandate of the people."
The City Manager could begin by hiring Hispanos in those agencies
that have or should have some relationship to the community. His-
panos on their boards and as their employees would ensure that they
are not planning in the dark, that they are not making decisions
without the necessary understanding. There were no Hispanos on the
Board of CEOC when it designed the ill-fated Fraternidad Hispana,
nor did Model Cities have any Hispanos on its Board when they failed
to deliver on their promises.
And the officials of the City could acquaint themselves with
a few basic facts about the community, so that their ignorance does
not tie the hands of the community's leaders. It was the scene in
the bars and the clubs that started the problem, but the event that
sealed the community's fate was the Battle of Central Square, and
in that the City's officials were not totally blameless. The Board
of Directors had wanted to fire the man who sparked that violence,
they had wanted to fire him for a long time, but the Director of
CEOC had not listened to them.
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The obvious solution to this problem of ignorance would be for
the officials to talk to the people for whom they are planning. But
if they cannot do that, and they will not hire U1ispanos, then they
should at least listen to that community's leaders when they are
trying to tell them something.
And they must assume that these leaders know what they are
doing. One can only ascribe to prejudice the Board of CEOC's refu-
sal to let Concilio have control over its own funds from 1969 to
1971. The Board of Model Cities was quite explicit, in front of its
second Director. They had no faith in the capacities of the Hispano
leadership to handle so much money and so much control. One can
only attribute such attitudes to ignorance or prejudice. As they
proved to CCS, and to Model Cities, the programs that they have
designed and implemented have been successful. The recreation pro-
grams and the housing programs, in particular, have demonstrated
that this all-pervasive lack of confidence is totally unwarranted.
Furthermore, one can only ascribe to prejudice the assumption
on the part of officials that Hispanos do not understand and know
their own community. The author often complains about the books by
Oscar Lewis; the reason he does so is that the officials of this
city, when they do read books about Hispanos, read Oscar Lewis. And
when an Hispano, a Puerto Rican, tries to tell them that Five Fami-
lies is about Mexicans, not Puerto Ricans, and that La Vida applies
to one particular family, and is not a description of all Puerto
Ricans, they do not believe the Hispano. To his face, they tell
him he is wrong, that Five Families is about Puerto Ricans. One
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wonders if they would dispute the word of another Anglo, if that
Anglo were describing to them a book about their home town.
In short, the officials could begin by admitting that to plan
successfully for an ethnically diverse city like Cambridge they
need to know something about the cultures of its communities. Then
they could admit that they are ignorant of these communities, and
then they could try to remedy that ignorance. Then they might be
able to gain some credibility and build trust between themselves
and these communities.
In Cambridge, with regard to the particular course that region-
alism has taken between the Coameno and the Jayuyano, the community's
leaders and the City's officials should work together to build trust.
And to build that trust they themselves must make an effort to find
out what it is that these people perceive to be their problems and
then help them solve at least one small problem.. Even a small be-
ginning in the right direction is better than nothing, and better
than blocking that road. They could be of great assistance to the
Concilio by helping it deliver, to help it overcome the centuries-
old mistrust of the urbanite that quite-.reasonably dwells in the
Jayuyano's mind. Instead, they have kept Concilio fighting to sur-
vive, and have forced Concilio to fight so hard for every "favor"
bestowed that Concilio has been seriously handicapped in its ability
to deal with this problem. It would also help if they would stop
tossing Concilio around like a football in their bureaucratic games.
It is an extremely difficult problem that cannot be solved over-
night. But if the officials are willing, Hispanos might be able to
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solve some of their problems; and they might begin to solve the big-
ger problems. But the arrogance of ignorance, a sense of superiori-
ty, and impatience with these people, either on the part of other
ispanos orthe ffcials will prevent a nythg from bcin d
It will make this an insoluble problem. For if the leaders or the
officials act like hacendados, the Jayuyanos will treat them like
hacendados, and they will hold them responsible for not delivering
the services to them, not because they could not, but because they
would not.
What planners must know if they are to produce results is what
people think, and if they want to change the status quo,'they must
first change the people's minds. Ultimately what matters are not
the services delivered, or how often these people vote. These things,
like the quotas, are just means to an end. What does matter is that
the people of Otoao learn that they can solve their problems. The
first Executive Director delivered some services, but he convinced
the people that he, personally, had brought them these things, which
was a lie. That he was in a position to pretend was only because
of the numbers that the city officials believed that he controlled.
He did not serve these people, they served him. What matters is not
what is delivered but the process of delivery, for that is what will
change their minds. This process must convince the people of Otoao
that they can begin to control these hurricanes that have torn them
by the roots from the soil of Otoao and blown them to Cambridge. The
process must convince them that "fate" can be changed, that men
create these hurricanes and that men can stop them.
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APPENDIX A
Regional Differences between the Towns: Comparisons and Contrasts
1. The 1970 Census:
a.Age by Sex, for Municipios: 1970
COAMO
Median Age:
Males
Females
Total
18.6
19.8
19.2
(Table 28)
JAYUYA
17.1
17.6
17.3
OBSERVATIONS: Coamenos tend to be slightly older than the average
Jayuyano.
b. Household Relationship, for Municipios, 1970 (Table 29)
COAMO JAYUYA
Persons per
household: 4.69 5.19
OBSERVATIONS: Jayuyanos demonstrate a larger household composition
than the Coamenos.
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c. Social Characteristics for Municipios, 1970
COAMO
All Workers
Worked in Municipality
of Residence:
Worked outside of Muni-
pality:
Place of Work Not Re-
ported:
4,389
2,828 (64%)
1,183 (27%)
378 (9%)
(Table 98)
JAYUYA
1,935
1,430 (73.9%)
142 (7%)
363 (19%)
OBSERVATIONS: A significantly greater number of Coamenos work out-
side of their respective municipality than Jayuyanos.
Public access may be considered a major factor here.
d. Employment Characteristics for Municipios, 1970
Unemployment Rate--
Males, 16+ yrs.
Females, 16- yrs.
Total
COAMO
6.2%
5.5%
5.9%
(Table 102)
JAYUYA
9.3%
6.7%
8%
OBSERVATIONS: Unemployment is higher in Jayuya than in Coamo; male
unemployment is higher than female in both towns,
but to a greater extent in Jayuya.
218
e. Occupation and Earning for Municipios, 1970 (Table 103)
Median Earnings-- COAMO JAYUYA
Males, 16+ yrs. $2,126 $1,590
Females, 16+ yrs. $2,036 $2,558
Total $2,082 $2,074
OBSERVATIONS: Earning of both male and female are more consistent
in Coamo; the earnings of the Jayuyano female are
higher than all other categories, and more than 60%
more than that of the Jayuyano male.
f. Occupations and Earnings for Municipios, 1970 (Table 103)
Occupation-- COAMO JAYUYA
Total Employed, 16+ years: 4,459 1,951
Professional, Technical
and Kindred Workers: 446 203
Mgrs. & Admin., except Farm: 289 124
Sales Workers: 217 98
Clerical and Kindred Wkrs: 286 84
Operatives, except Transport: 998 227
Transport Equipment Operatives: 191 70
Laborers, except Farm: 337 237
Farmers and Farm Managers: 112 77
Farm Laborers and Foremen: 487 372
Service Wkrs., except Household: 474 212
Private Household Workers: 39 45
OBSERVATIONS: Employment concentration in Coamo is more related to
factory work than in Jayuya (1-operatives/factory
work, 2-craftsmen, 3-farm workers), with Jayuya pla-
cing more emphasis on agricultural and manual labor
(1-farm workers, 2-laborers, 3-factory workers).
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g. Income and Poverty Status in 1969 for Municipios (Table 105)
Mean Family Income--
COAMO
$4,503
JAYUYA
$2,339
OBSERVATIONS: Coamenos have nearly double the family income of
Jayuyanos; also, they have fewer individuals in the
family to spend it on.
h. Income and Poverty Status in 1969 for Municipios (cont.)
COAMO JAYUYA
% of families living
below poverty level: 77.2% 83.8%
% receiving public
assistance income: 17.6% 24.1%
OBSERVATIONS: Both towns have large numbers of people living below
poverty level, with Jayuya showing the more serious
condition.
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i. Educational and Family Characteristics for Municipios, 1970
School Enrollment--
Total enrolled, 3-34 yrs:
Median School Yrs. Completed--
Males, 25+ yrs.
Females, 25+ yrs.
Total, 25+ yrs.
COAMO
49.3%
6.0 yrs.
5.1 yrs.
5.6 yrs.
JAYUYA
55%
4.1 yrs.
3.7 yrs.
3.9 yrs.
OBSERVATIONS: Coamenos, 25 yrs. and older tend to be more educated
than the average Jayuyanos of comparable age; both
towns show relatively positive % of present school
enrollment, with Jayuya apparently having a higher %
enrolled. The dropout rate may be an unknown fac-
tor here.
j. Educational and Family Characteristics for Municipios, cont.
% of high school graduates-
Males, 25+ yrs:
Females, 25+ yrs:
Total, 25+ yrs:
COAMO
19.7%
14.0%
16.9%
JAYUYA
13.2%
14.6%
13.9%
OBSERVATIONS: Although Coamo has a higher percentage of males than
females who are high school graduates, the reverse
is true of Jayuya; This could be a factor in the em-
ployment situation in Jayuya.
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k. Educational and Family Characteristics for Municipios, cont.
% of college graduates
COAMO
males, 25+ yrs.
females, 25+ yrs.
total, 25+ yrs.
3%
2%
2.5%
JAYUYA
2%
2%
2%
OBSERVATIONS: The difference between the two towns is practically
negligible; Coamo, however, is the higher, with a
full 1% difference between the males.
Population increases and decreases based upon the 1950, 1960, and
1970 Census
Municipality
1950
1960
1970
COAMO
26,485
26,080
26,468
JAYUYA
15,113
14,632
13,588
OBSERVATIONS: During the period of 1960, both towns suffered a popu-
lation decrease. Between 1960 and 1970, Coamo has
apparently recuperated, but Jayuya continues to de-
crease. From 1950 to 1970, the Jayuya municipality
has decreased by 9.3%. (It is interesting to note
that according to the 1970 Census, the barrios of
Jayuya which have lost the greatest population are
those located near the Cordillera.)
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Urban percentages based upon the 1950, 1960, and 1970 Census
Municipality--
1950
1960
1970
COAMO
43.8%
46.6%
45.6%
JAYUYA
0.0%
16.0%
28.2%
OBSERVATIONS: Jayuya has shown a dramatic increase in urbanization,
between 1950-1960, and also between 1960-1970, a vir-
tual 28.2% increase in 20 years; Jayuya was considered
to have no urban population until 1960 Census reports.
Coamo, on the other hand, has had a relatively stable
urban area for at least the past 20 years. The de-
crease may be attributed to the increase in housing
developments (urbanizaciones) outside of the main urban
area.
% of Manufacturing based upon 1950, 1960, and 1970 Census
Municipality-
1950
1960
1970
COAMO
14.0%
12.3%
26.1%
JAYUYA
2.1%
2.4%
17.3%
OBSERVATIONS: Coamo suffered a decrease in manufacturing in 1950-
1960, but has more than doubled in the last 10 years.
This decrease may have been a contributing factor to
the population decrease of the same period. Jayuya
went through a small increase in 1960, and, like Coa-
mo, a major increase in 1970. Jayuya's population,
however, continues to decrease while Coamo's popula-
tion has apparently stabilized.
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Median Family Income based upon the 1950, 1960, and 1970 Census
Municipality--
1950
1960
1970
CO^ AM 19%
$ 410
$ 720
$1,924
TAVUA
$ 250
$ 649
$1,578
OBSERVATIONS: Both Towns have gained tremendously in median income
during the past 20 years and especially during the
the past 10 years. Coamo has increased 79% in median
income, and Jayuya has increased 84%.
Comparisons with the Island:
a. Population Attrition:
1950
1960
1970
COAMO
26,485
26,080
26,468
1950, 1960, and 1970 Census
JAYUYA
15,113
14,632
13,588
THE ISLAND
2,210,703
2,349,540
2,712,033
OBSERVATIONS: Although Coamo and Jayuya suffered population decline
in the 1950-60 period, the Island increased; in fact,
the Island shows continual increase over the past 20
years.
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Comparison with the Island: 1950, 1960, 1970 Census, cont.
b. Urban Percentage:
COAMO
43.8%
46.6%
45.6%
JAYUYA
0.0%
16.0%
28.2%
THE ISLAND
40.5%
42.2%
58.1%
OBSERVATIONS: Coamo remains relatively stable in urban population;
Jayuya undergoes 2 major increases; the Island shows
a 15.9% increase since 1960, and a steady increase
over the 2 decades.
Comparisons with the Island: 1950, 1960, 1970 Census, cont.
c. Percent of manufacturing:
COA4O
14.0%
12.3%
26.1%
JAYUYA
2.1%
2.4%
17.3%
THE ISLAND
16.5%
17.1%
20.6%
OBSERVATIONS: The increase in manufacturing on the Island as a
whole has been more gradual than in Coamo and Jayuya.
Coamo appears to be more industrialized than average
in comparison with the rest of the Island.
1950
1960
1970
1950
1960
1970
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Comparisons with the Island: 1950, 1960, 1970 Census, cont.
d. Family Median Income:
COAMO JAYUYA THE ISLAND
1950 $ 410 $ 250 $ 503
1960 $ 720 $ 649 $1,268
1970 $1,924 $1,518 $3,063
OBSERVATIONS: Although all three areas underwent major increases
in both decades, Coamo and Jayuya are still way be-
hind the Island in Family Median Income. The Island
appears to have undergone the major percentage growth
between 1950-1960, and all three have more than
doubled in the 1960-1970 period. Although all other
increases for the Island have undergone relatively
gradual increases, it is this category that indicates
the most significant change.
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Appendix E
HISPANO FAMILIES LIVING IN PUBLICLY-ASSISTED HOUSING
(From "Major Publicly-Assisted Housing Developments in Cambridge,"
Department of Community Development, Cambridge, August 14, 1974)
NORTH CAMBRIDGE
Projectf Name -BedrA nItsI Tye Total Units Bispano UnIts
Jefferson Park 152 49% elderly, low 309 12 4%
Lincoln Way 43 77% low 60 1 2%
Rindge Towers 42 5% elderly, 774 2%
moderate
Walden Square 108 45% elderly, low, 240 12 5%
_____ ____ __ ___ _______moderate 
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Sub-totals 345 1383 45
MODEL NEIGHBORHOOD AREA
Harwell Homes 24 43% elderly, 56 2 4%
moderate
Inman Court 18 15% elderly, 116 6 5%
moderate
Newtowne Court 88 30% elderly, low 294 26 7%
Roosevelt Towers 112 49% elderly, low 228 5 2%
Washington Elms 126 39% elderly, low 324 46 14%
Sub-totals 368 1018 85
OTHER AREAS COMBINED
Corcoran Park 78 51% elderly, low 152 2 1%
808 Memorial Dr. 34 11% elderly, low, 301 9 3%
middle, mrkt.
Millers River 0 0 elderly 304 10 3%
929 Mass. Ave. 0 0 elderly, 94 1 1%
market
Putnam Gardens 42 34% elderly, low 123 2 2%
Woodrow Wilson 41 6% elderly, low 69 2 3%
Court
Sub-totals 15 8  1043 26
Totals 871 25% 3444 156 4%
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Appendix E
TOTALS
Total number of units in
pULJ.LiAc LOUoLing projects
that contain Hispanos
(from Chart A)
Total number of units in
public housing projects
(1974)
Total number of units in
public housing projects
that include low-income
units
Total number of units in
public housing projects
that include middle-
income and market price
units, and include His-
panos.
Middle income and market
price units, with or
without Hispanos.
number of
Hispano Units
3,444
4,862
2,098
1,581
21105
156
156
117
50
50
percentage of
Hispano Units
4%
3%
6%
3%
2%
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APPENDIX B
TRACT SUMMARIES
Tract #
3521
3522
3523
3524
3525
3526
3527
3528
3529
3530
3531
3532
3533
3534
3535
3536
3537
3538
3539
3540
3541
3542
3543
3544
3545
3546
3547
3548
3549
3550
PopulatioSpanish Language
-0-
-0-
-0-
4
165
62
59
110
60
187
268
14
192
192
8
114
37
18
178
31
56
6
6
-0-
15
53
25
7
54
10
total = 1,941
Spanish Language Population
Other America Population
1,941
1,185
3,126
OBSERVATION: The Other American population only registered in Tract
Counts as a specific population if it was among the
Top 3 Countries of Origin of Foreign Stock. Other than
that, it was included in the gross Foreign Stock popu-
lation.
n Other Americans
-*0-
-0-
-0-
227
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
156
168
137
-0-
144
357
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
-0-
96
-0-
-0-
-0-
total =1,185
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Appendix B (cont.)
1970 Census:
City of Cambridge
TOTAL ENROLLED IN SCHOOL (15%)
Total Enrolled (3-34 years)
NURSERY
Total
Public
Parochial
Other Private
YINDERGARTEN
Total
Public
Parochial
Other Private
ELEMEN'TARY (1-8 yrs.)
Total
Public
Parochial
Other Private
HIGH SCHOOL (1-4 yrs.)
Total
Public
Parochial
Other Private
COLLEGE
Total
Public
Private
Total Enrolled over 35 years
SPANISH-AMERICAN Os 663
Number
40
12
-0-
23
100.0
30.0
-0-
70.0
50
44
-0-
6
100.0
88.0
-0-
12.0
178
136
39
3
100.0
76.4
21.9
1.7
65
54
11
-0-
330
-0-
330
100.0
83.1
16.9
100.0
-0-
100.0
=16
OBSERVATION: This table affirms the high sampling of Hispanic
college students.
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Appendix B (cont.)
1970 Census:
City of Cambridge
PERCENT OF PERSONS 25 AND OVER BY YEARS OF
SCHOOL COMPLETED (20%)
SPANISH-AMERICAN
Male
NONE COMPLETED
Female
-0-
Total
2.0 1.0%
ELEMENTARY
1 - 4
5 - 6
7
8
3.1
11.3
0.9
8.4
1.6
9.1
2.4
6.9
-0-
6.8
4.0
5.3
HIGH SCHOOL
1 - 3
4
15.5
14.8
6.9
27.5
11.2
21.2
COLLEGE
1 - 3
4
5
6.0
10.0
37.6
100.0
12.2
13.1
14.5
100.0
78.9
11.5
25.1
100.0
All Persons 25+
452 451 903
OBSERVATION: This is another affirmation of the oversampling of
the college student population. Also, the % figure
of 78.9% in the total column for College 1-3 appears
to be a mathematical error.
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Appendix B (cont.)
1970 Census:
City of Cambridge
COUNT OF PERSONS 25 AND OVER BY YEARS OF
SCHOOL COMPLETED
SPANISH-AMERICAN
MAle
All persons 25+
None Completed
452
Female
451
-0- 9
Total
903
3
ELEMENTARY
1 -4
5 -6
7
8
114
51
4
38
14
32
22
62
-0-
31
18
24
HIGH SCHOOL
- 3
4
70
67
31
124
101
19.1
COLLEGE
1 -3
4
5
27
45
170
55
59
66
82
104
236
OBSERVATIONS: More evidence of the oversampling of the college his-
panic population.
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Appendix B (cont.)
1970 Census:
City of Cambridge
MEDIAN AGE
SPANISH AMERICAN POPULATION
Male
22,7
Female
24.3
Total
23.4
OBSERVATION: Although this varies slightly from the author's opinion
that the Median Age of the Puerto Rican population (prin-
cipally male) was approximately 22 years of age, this
discrepency could be due to the number of college stu-
dents sampled, especially fifth-year or graduate students
ofihispanic origin.
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Appendix B (cont.)
MEDIAN AGE OF THE HISPANO POPULATION
Brown Study
14.9
21.0
18.9
1970 Census
22.7
24.3
23.4
OBSERVATION: The Median age for the Brown Study population is approxi-
mately 5 years less than that of the 1970 Census, The
difference for the male population is approximately 8
years; possibly this may be attributable to the elimi-
nation of the college population by the Brown Study.
COUNT OF PERSONS ENROLLED IN SCHOOL BY AGE
Hispano % of Pop. in
Age Group/Brown Study
21.1%
90.0%
96.4%
95.7%
78.9%
26.1%
0.0%
8.9%
8.5%
% of all
persons age
3-34 in school 47.6%
Hispano % of Pop. in
Age Group/1970 Census
21.3%
100.0%
90.5%
90.5%
81.5%
53.3%
49.6%
41.6%
30.2%
45.8%
OBSERVATIONS: Although the Brown Study intentionally did not sam-
ple the college student population, one can observe
the oversampling of that group by the 1970 Census.
Although there are percentage variances between the
two, one can also observe a rather high school enroll-
ment rate for the under-18 population.
Male
Female
Total
Age
3-4
5-6
7-13
14-15
16-17
18-19
20-21
22-24
25-34
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Appendix B (cont.)
PERCENTAGE OF PERSONS 25YEARS AND OVER BY YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED
None completed
Elementary:
1-4 years
5-6
7
8
High School:
1-3 years
4
College
1-3 years
4
5
Brown Study
5 . 2%
12.7%
26.6%
8.5%
5.7%
14.8%
20.4%
4.3%
.5%
.5%
1970 Census
1.0%
1.6%
9.1%
2.4%
6.9%
11.2%
21.2%
9.1%
11.5%
26.1%
OBSERVATIONS: The Brown Study found the highest percentage of the
population studied (26.6%) had completed 5-6 years
of schooling, whereas the 1970 Census found the high-
est percentage in the fifth year of college.
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY OF EMPLOYED PERSONS 16 YEARS AND OLDER (By per-
centage)
Brown Study 1970 Census
White-Collar Workers:
Blue-Collar and Ser-
vice Workers:
16%
84%
64%
36%
OBSERVATIONS: Here the two studies are in complete opposition. Pro-
bably the 1970 Census arrived at these percentages
based upon sampling the student and higher-income
Hispano population. If one were to accept the Brown
conclusions, other contrasting characteristics in terms
of economic necessity and so forth would logically
follow.
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UNEIPLOYMENT RATE OF HISPANIC POPULATION / Contrasted with general
population.
16 years of age
and over
Brown Study
14.5%
1970 Census
7.9%
General pop.
4-0%
OBSERVATION: The Brown study demonstrates a much higher unemploy-
ment rate than the 1970 Census. Furthermore, Dr. Brown
notes in her commentary that "...this 14.5%, however,
does not reflect an accurate unemployment figure for
as is evident, in reality additional non-working per-
sons desire employment but temporarily have given up
looking for work." [Brown pp. 35-37.1 Both studies
show higher %s of Hispanic unemployed than the rate
for the general population. Note: Because the 1970
Census did not give the unemployment rate for Hispanos
in percentages, the 7.9% figure was arrived at by di-
viding the number of unemployed hispanos into the
number of employed.
MEDIAN ANNUAL INCOME FOR HISPANO HOUSEHOLDS 1970/ Contrasted with
General Population.
Brown Study
$5,616
1970 Census
$6,612
General Population
(Census)
$9,815
OBSERVATION: The Brown Study demonstrated a lower family income for
Hispanos than the 1970 Census; however, both studies
demonstrated that the Hispano family income was demon-
strably lower than that of the general population.
HOUSEHOLD CHARACTERISTICS: UNITS BY NUMBER OF PERSONS PER UNIT/ Con-
trasted with General Population.
Brown Study
3.9
1970 Census
3.1
General Population
(Census)
2.5
OBSERVATION: The Brown study found a higher concentration than both
the Census Hispano count and the general count; in the
case of both the Brown Study and the Census Hispano
count, the Hispano population evidenced higher concen-
tration. Thus, we can correlate with the previous ta-
ble. Hispanos have both lower income and higher con-
centration per unit.
Median:
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Appendix B (cont.)
Another important facet of the Brown study was that it took in-
to consideration both Nationalistic Hispanic and Regional Puerto Rican
differences when it addressed the question of Population composition.
The 1970 Census, on the other hand, broke the Spanish language popu-
lation iLnto several categories and did not address itself at all tO
Puerto Rican regional differences. The Puerto Rican population was
handled most awkwardly by this census, and as previously discussed
the Puerto Rican could appear in any one of three categories, if at
all. Brown addressed the question of National Origin in the follow-
ing manner:
PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION BY COUNTRY OF BIRTH
(Table 8, Brown study)
Country of Birth Master List Pop. Household Heads Sample Total
Puerto Rico 64% 64% 44%
Cuba 12% 13% 9%
Dominican Republic 4% 5% 5%
Colombia 4% 5% 5%
Guatemala 2% 2% 1%
Ecuador -1% 3% 2%
Peru 1% 2% 1%
Venezuela 1% 2% -1%
Nicaragua 0% 1% -1%
Honduras 0% 1% -1%
El Salvador 1% 1% -1%
Panama 1% 0% -1%
Spain 2% 0% 0%
Costa Rica 2% 0% 1%
Chile 2% 0% 0%
Argentina 2% 0% 1%
Mexico 2% 0% 0%
Uruguay -1% 0% 0%
Other Latin Country 0% 1% 1%
USA Mainland 0% 2% 30%
Other Country 0% 1% -1%
Total Individuals 576 137 593
OBSERVATIONS: Dr. Brown did an extensive breakdown of Country of
origin. On all lists, the highest percentage was
Puerto Rican. Interesting to note is the 30% total
giving Country of Birth as U.S. Mainland.
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Dr. Brown included in her publication a specific Table of Re-
gional Origins of the Puerto Rican population. The percentage
breakdown offered the following results:
PERCENTAGE OF ALL PERSONS BORN IN PUERTO RICO BY PLACE OF BIRTH
(Table 9, Brown Study)
Percentage Location
40% Coamo
22% Jayuya
8% Ponce
6% Orocovis
3% San Juan
2% Caguas
1% Mayaguez
5% Other Towns
13% Other Cities
OBSERVATIONS: The Coameno population proved to be significantly
larger than all other populations; Dr. Brown placed
the combined percentage of Coamo and Jayuya at 62%.
Another interesting calculation made by Dr. Brown that was un-
available in the 1970 Census was the place of birth on the Mainland:
PERCENTAGE OF ALL HISPANOS BORN ON THE MAINLAND U.S. BY PLACE OF BIRTH
Percentage Location
64% Cambridge
14% New York City
11% Boston
-1% Miami
5% Other locations in Mass.
6% Other
OBSERVATIONS: By far the largest percentage is that of persons born
in Cambridge. If one could assume that the majority
of this population was of Puerto Rican origin, then it
would follow that any count of the Puerto Rican popu-
lation by the 1980 Census would be even more difficult
than the 1970, unless some modification were made.
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Appendix C. QUESTIONNAIRE:
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND
1. Name:
2. Address:
3. Age:
4. Nationality:
5. Relationship to Hispanic/Puerto Rican Community:
II. EMPLOYMENT:
1. Occupation:
2. Employed by:
3. How long have you worked in the Cambridge Area:
4. What services do you or your agency offer to:
a. The general population-
b. The Hispanic population-
c. The Puerto Rican population-
5. Based upon what data available do you offer these services:
6. During your planning process, is consideration given to:
a. General Hispanic needs and differences-
b. Puerto Rican regional differences-
7. Does your agency employ Hispanos? - Nationality:
yes no
III. FAMILIARIZATION
1. When did you first become aware that there was a Spanish-speaking
population in the city of Cambridge: -Year
2. Are you familiar with this population?
yes no
a. If yes, please name the 3 most predominant Spanish-
Speaking populations in Cambridge:
1.
2.
3.
3. Please estimate the size of:
a. The Hispanic population of Cambridge:
b. The Puerto Rican population of Cambridge:
4. Why, in your opinion, would a non-Puerto Rican Hispano claim to
be a Puerto Rican?
5. What are the principal towns on the Island from which our Puerto
Rican population in Cambridge originates:
a.
b.
6. Do you speak Spanish? Any other language?
yes no
7. What is your first reaction when you hear someone speaking Spanish?
8. What, in your opinion, is the difference between an Ethnic group
and a Minority group?
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Appendix C. (cont.) 2
Anglo Interviews
IV. PERCEPTIONS-
1. What, in your opinion, has been the official response to the His-
panic and Puerto Rican population by the City Officials?
2. Do you feel this response has been successful?
yes no
a. Why?
3.
4.
5.
Which agencies within the City do you feel have responded most to
the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population?
a. d.
b. e.
c.
Do you feel this response has been successful?
yes no
a. Why?
Which agencies within the City do you feel have responded least
to the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population?
a. d.
b. e.
C.
6. In your opinion, has your group or agency responded to the Hispanic
and Puerto Rican population?
yes no
a. How has your group/agency responded?
7. To what do you attribute the response by the City officials and
city agencies to the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population?
8. In your opinion, what are the major obstacles confronting:
a. the Puerto Rican population today-
b. the general Hispanic population today-_
9. Are you familiar with the Concilio Hispano?
yes no
a. If yes, what do you feel have been the major successes of
this agency-
b. What do you feel have been its major drawbacks-
10. In your opinion, what are the major needs of:
a. The Puerto Rican population of Cambridge-
b. The general Hispano population of Cambridge-
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Appendix C. (cont.)
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. What type of additional information or data would you like to
see made available to the Anglo public?
2. What recommendations would you give to the Concilio in order to
improve its services:
3. What recommendations do you have for improving services to and the
involvement of the Hispanic and Puerto Rican community by the
Anglo public?
4. What recommendations do you have for:
a. The Puerto Rican community-
b. The general Hispanic community-
5. How would you envision the City and city agencies incorporating
these recommendations into their Planning Process:
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Appendix C. (cont.)
OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA
Section II
Question # C )
(4) What services do you or your agency offer to:
(a) The General Population:
1. Municipal Services 7
2. Advocacy and/or Community Organization 1
3. Technical Assistance and/or Funding 5
4. Child Care 3
5. Employment 3
6. Welfare 1
7. Education 2
8. Other 2
9. No Answer 1
(b) The Hispano Population:
1. Municipal Services 7
2. Advocacy and/or Community Organization 1
3. Technical Services and/or Funding 6
4. Child Care 3
5. Employment 3
6. Welfare 1
7. Education 2
8. Other 2
9. No Answer 2
(c) The Puerto Rican Population
1. Municipal Services 7
2. Advocacy and/or CommunityOrganization 1
3. Technical Assistance and/or Funding 6
4. Child Care 3
5. Employment 3
6. Welfare 1
7. Education 2
8. Other 2
9. No Answer 2
(5) Based upon what data available do you offer these services:
1. The 1970 Census 7 5. "Need" 4
2. The Brown Study 2 6. other 3
3. Federal/State Requirements 5 7. No answer 5
4. Own statistics/records 5
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Appendix c. (cont.)
OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section II, cont.
(6) During your planning process, is consideration given to:
(a) General Hispanic Needs and Differences:
1. yes 14
2. no 4
3. no answer 3
(b) Puerto Rican Regional Differences:
1. yes 1
2. no 17
3. no answer 3
(7) Does your agency employ Hispanos:
1. yes 12
2. no 8
3. no answer 1
Nationality:
1. Puerto Rican 6
2. Non-Puerto Rican Hispanos 4
3. Don't t Know 4
4. No Answer 12
SECTION III
(1) When did you first become aware that there was a Spanish-
speaking population in the City of Cambridge:
1. 1960-1965 2 4. No Answer 1
2. 1966-1969 10
3. 1970-1975 8
(2) Are you familiar with this population:
1. yes 18
2. no 3
If yes, please name the 3 most predominant Spanish-speaking
populations:
1. Puerto Rican 18 4. Other 8
2. Cuban 12 5. Don't Know -0-
3. Dominican 7 6. No Answer 3
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Appendix C, (cont.)
OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section III, Cont.
(3) Please estimate the size of:
(a) The Hispano population of Cambridge:
0-999 -0-
1,000-2,999 -0-
3,000-4,599 5
4,600-6,099 9
5. 6,100-8,099 1
6. 8,100-10,000 3
7. Other -0-
8. No Answer 3
(b) The Puerto Rican population of Cambridge:
0-999 -0-
1,000-2,999 3
3,000-4,599 9
4,600-6,099 1
5. 6,100-8,099 1
6. 8,100-10,000 1
7. Other -0-
8. No Answer 6
(4) Why, in your opinion, would a Non-Puerto Rican Hispano claim
to be a Puerto Rican:
1. To qualify for Federal and State Benefits 11
2. To avoid U.S. Immigration Laws 2
3. Other 3
4. Don't Know 6
5. No Answer -0-
(5) What are the principal towns on the Island from which our Puerto
Rican population in Cambridge originates:
1. Coamo 6
2. Jayuya 1
3. Other 8
4. Don't Know 6
5. No Answer 4
(8) What, in your opinion, is the difference between an Ethnic
group and a Minority group:
1. Race/Color 5
2. Socio-Economic Conditions 3
3. Number 3
4. Public Opinion 2
5. Language 3
6. Other 3
7. Don.t Know/No Answer 6
SECTION IV
(1) What, in your opinion, has been the official response to the
Hispanic and Puerto Rican population by the City Officials:
1. open and responsive 2 5. other- 3
2. somewhat responsive/growing awareness 5 6. don't know/
3. general lack of recognition 5 no answer 2
4. react to pressure only 5
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
2.
3.
4.
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Appendix C. (cont.)
OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section IV, cont.
(2) Do you feel this response has been successful:
1. yes 8
2. no 9
3. Other 3
4. no answer 1
If yes, why?
a. Increased resources available for Hispanos 1
b. Visible results and awareness 2
c. Local pressure 1
d. Federal and State Requirements -0-
e. Relaxation of Tensions 1
f. Hispanos Remain Powerless 2
g. Other 1
h. Don't Know/No Answer 2
If no, why?
a. Lack of internal motivation on the part of the City 1
b. Weakness of Hispano political power 2
c. Inadequate funding -0-
d. Better Response Possible 1
e. Other 2
f. Don't know/No Answer 4
(3) Which agencies within the city do you feel have responded most
to the needs of the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population:
Five most frequently mentioned: 1. Concilio Hispano
2. CEOC
3. Cambridge School Department
4. Welfare Department
5. Cambridge Model Cities
(4) Do you feel that this response has been successful:
1. yes 9
2. no 1
3. somewhat 4
4. Don't know/no answer 7
If yes, why?
a. Federal/State Requirements -0-
b. Increased resources for Spanish-speaking 2
c. Increased awareness 4
d. Visible results 6
e. Other 2
f. Don't know/no answer 1
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Appendix C. (cont.)
OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section IV, cont.
If no, why?
Insufficient funds 1
Political jealousies 1
Lack of motivation -0-
Weakness of Hispano political power 1
Other -0-
Don't know/no answer 1
(5) Which agencies within the city do you feel have responded least
to the Hispano and Puerto Rican population?
Most frequently mentioned:
Cambridge City Hospital
Cambridge Redevelopment Authority
Cambridge City Council
Cambridge Recreation Department
Chamber of Commerce
6.
7.
8.
9.
Universities (Harvard, MIT)
Department of Public Works
Police Department
Cambridge School Department
[Note: It was impossible to limit this to five responses, since the
last five agencies mentioned were tied.]
(6) In your opinion, has your group or agency responded to the
Puerto Rican and Hispanic population:
1. Yes 14
2. No 1
3. Somewhat 3
4. No answer 3
(6a) If yes, how has your group responded?
a. Funding 5
b. Technical Assistance 7
c. Services 9
d. Other 4
e. Don't know/no answer 1
(7) To what do you attribute the response by the City officials
City agencies to the Hispanic and Puerto Rican population:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
and
Pressure 9 10. Other -0-
Growing Awareness 3 11. Don't know/no answer 2
Political Powerlessness of Hispanos 3
"Need" 3
Institutionalized Racism 2
Federal/State Requirements 1
Fiscal Reputation of Concilio 1
Lack of commitment 2
"White guilt" 1
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
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Appendix C, (cont.)
OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section IV, cont.
(8) In your opinion, what are the major obstacles confronting:
(a) the Puerto Rican population today:
1. Limited skills 13
2. Inability to assimilate/isolation 4
3. Language barrier 8
4. Discrimination 6
5. Limited political power/involvement 3
6. Other 4
7. Don't know/no answer 3
(b) the general Hispano population today:
1. Leadership 2 5. Discrimination 4
2. Citizenship 4 6. Inability to assimilate 2
3. Language barrier 4 7. Other 2
4. Limited skills 8 8. Don't know/no answer 7
(9) Are you familiar with the Concilio Hispano?
1. Yes 20
2. No 1
(a) If yes, what do you feel have been the major successes of
the agency:
1. Provision of services 3
2. Advocacy and community leadership 14
3. Community organization 5
4. Other 2
5. Don't know/no answer 3
(b) What do you feel have been its major darwbacks:
1. Inability to coordinate internally 4
2. Inability to provide services 1
3. Lack of direction in leadership 4
4. Lack of political involvement 2
5. Lack of funding 6
6. Isolation 2
7. Overexpansion 1
8. Other 2
9. Don't know/no answer 4
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Appendix C. (cont.)
OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section IV, cont.
(10) In your opinion, what are the major needs of:
(a) the Puerto Rican population of Cambridge:
1. Employment and training 13
2. Housing 6
3. Political Involvement 2
4. Coordination of leadership 2
5. Assimilation 3
6. Educational opportunities 4
7. Other 1
8. Don't know/no answer 6
(b) the general Hispano population of Cambridge:
1. Employment and training 11
2. Housing 5
3. Development of Leadership 5
4. Assimilation 1
5. Educational Opportunities 4
6. Other 2
7. Don't know/no answer 7
SECTION V
(1) What type of additional information or data would you like to
see made available to the Anglo public:
1. Origins of the Puerto Ricans and Hispanos 7
2. Regional Differences between Puerto Ricans 3
3. Needs of Puerto Ricans and other Hispanos 7
4. Services and Events of Concilio 3
5. Other services available to Hispanos in the community 1
6. Other 5
7. Don't know/no answer 6
(2) What recommendations would you give to the Concilio in order
to improve its services:
1. Increase funding pattern 3
2. Greater political involvement by members 2
3. Delineate Goals and Objectives 4
4. More community involvement 2
5. Advocate citywide application of Affirmative Action 1
6. Improve publicity 3
7. Specialize services 4
8. Define distribution of power 2
9. Consider Hispanic and regional differences in planning process 1
10. Other -0-
11. Don't know/no answer 8
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OFFICIAL RESPONSE DATA, Section V, cont.
(3) What recommendations do you have for improving services to and
the involvement of the Hispanic and Puerto Rican community by
the Anglo public.
1. Encourage Hispanos to join Community Planning meetings 5
2. Utilize Concilio personnel and data in Planning process 1
3. Conduct bilingual community meetings in areas of Hispano
concentration 1
4. Better effort of communication 3
5. Greater utilization of data available on Puerto Ricans and
Hispanos. 3
6. Other 4
7. Don't know/no answer 10
(4) What recommendations do you have for:
(a) the Puerto Rican community:
1. Assimilate 2
2. Become involved in City issues 3
3. Establish a political base 3
4. Strengthen Concilio 3
5. Greater utilization of resources available in private sector 2
6. Other 1
7. Don't know/no answer 14
(b) the general Hispano community:
1. Assimilate -0-
2. Become involved in City issues 2
3. Establish a political base 3
4. Strengthen Concilio -0-
5. Greater utilization of resources available in the private sector-O-
6. Other 3
7. Dondt know/no answer 14
(5) How would you envision the City and city agencies incorporating
these recommendations into their planning process:
1. Conduct bilingual planning meetings in areas of Hispano concen-
tration 2
2. Utilize more comprehensive data on Hispanos in planning process 4
3. Develop awareness of regional and national differences and incor-
porate these into the Planning process 3
4. Hire more Puerto Ricans and Hispanos in City Depts. and Agencies 2
5. Utilize relevant Concilio personnel in planning process 2
6. Other 2
7. Don't know/no answer 15
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APPENDIX D.
MIEORANDUM OF AGREDIENT BY AND BETWEEN TEE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE AND
CONCILIO HISPANO DE CAMBRIDGE
1. The City of Cambridge hereby announces and binds itself to
a formal commitment by it to recruit and hire qualified Puerto Rican
and other Hispanic personnel to fill positions at all levels of em-
ployment by the City of Cambridge, in accordance with both the letter
and spirit of any and all state and/or federal Affirmative Action
guidelines.
1A. This agreement is subject to all applicable Civil Service
and other State and Federal requirements of law.
2. The City of Cambridge further agrees to appoint Puerto Rican
and other Hispanic representative to any and all boards and commit-
tees whose decisions affect the Puerto Rican and other Hispanic Com-
munity of Cambridge, with special emphasis to be placed in appointing
said representatives to the Cambridge Housing Authority and the Cam-
bridge Redevelopment Authority.
3. As consideration for this agreement, Concilio Hispano de
Cambridge, as a representative for the Puerto Rican and other His-
panic Community, acknowledges the good faith of the City of Cambridge
in executing and complying with the terms and spirit of this and any
other agreements on behalf of the said Community.
EXECUTED UNDER SEAL this sixteenth (16th) day of January, 1976.
THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE CONCILIO HISPANO DE CAMBRIDGE
BY: BY:
[Signed] [Signed)
James L. Sullivan, Tulio Espada,
City Manager President
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MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE AND
THE CAMBRIDGE HOSPITAL AND CONCILIO HISPANO DE CAMBRIDGE
This agreement is the result of a series of discussions invol-
ving representatives of the City of Cambridge, the Cambridge Hospi-
tal and Concilio Hispano de Cambridge; and relates to staffing pat-
terns at the Cambridge Hospital as well as at any and all other fa-
cilities which are presently or may in the future be operated by or
through the City of Cambridge and/or the Cambridge Hospital, with
specific regard to anticipated neighborhood health facilities loca-
ted at 105 Windsor Street and at North Cambridge.
1. The City of Cambridge hereby announces and binds itself
to a formal commitment by it to recruit qualified Puerto Rican and
other Hispanic personnel according to both the letter and spirit of
any and all state and/or federal Affirmative Action guidelines
towards the ultimate end of effective delivery of health and related
social services to the Hispanic community of the City of Cambridge.
2. This agreement includes, but is not limited to, a formal
commitment on the part of the City of Cambridge to recruit qualified
Puerto Rican and other Hispanic personnel to: fill positions at the
105 windsor Street and at the North Cambridge neighborhood health
service facilities, for receptionists, adult nurse practitioners,
adult health aides, pediatrics nurse practitioners and pediatrics
health aides, within thirty (30) days from the date that the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts issues the appropriate certificate of need
for the said facilities.
3. The City of Cambridge and the Cambridge Hospital further
agree to recruit, in compliance with paragraph one (1) of this agree-
ment, qualified Puerto Rican and other Hispanic staff personnel to
fill anticipated future positions for mental health workers, social
service workers and nutritionists, and as rapidly as possible to .
fill present and future positions for physicians, according to the
same Affirmative Action guidelines.
4. The City of Cambridge and the Cambridge Hospital further
agree to recruit and hire qualified Puerto Rican and other Hispanic
personnel to serve as interpreters at the Cambridge Hospital and all
of its said facilities, so that competent interpreting services will
at all times be available to the Hispanic Community of Cambridge;
such hiring to be accomplished and services to be provided immediate-
ly at the Cambridge Hospital and at any other said facility presently
in operation, and within seven (7) days of the date upon which the
Commonwealth of Maasachusetts issues the appropriate certificate of
need as to any future facility.
5. The Concilio Hispano de Cambridge agrees, as does the City
of Cambridge and the Cambridge Hospital, to actively and vigorously
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participate in the recruitment of the said Puerto Rican and other
Hispanic personnel alluded to throughout this agreement; and the City
of CAmbridge further agrees to hire as quickly as openings become
available, any and all qualified Puerto Rican and other Hispanic
personnel, as determined by both the Cambridge Hospital and the Con-
cilio Hispano de Cambridge.
6. The City of Cambridge further agrees, in the interests
of facilitating identification and resolution of future issues af-
fecting the Hispanic Community of Cambridge, to appoint to the Board
of Health and Hospitals, a member of the Puerto Rican/Hispanic Com-
munity who is recognized for his or her leadership and interest in
the Hispanic Community of Cambridge.
7. As part of the consideration for this agreement, the
Concilio Hispano de Cambridge agrees to withdraw its opposition to
the application by the City of Cambridge and the Cambridge Hospital
for the granting of a certificate of need by the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts for a neighborhood health services facility located
at 105 Windsor Street, as the Concilio is satisfied that the interests
of the Hispanic Community will be well served, and the reasons for
its continued opposition to the said application will be obviated,
so long as all parties hereto comply with the letter and spirit of
this agreement.
EXECUTED UNDER SEAL this sixteenth (16th) day of January, 1976.
THE CITY OF CAMBRIDGE
BY:
[Signed]
James L. Sullivan,
City Manager
THE CAMBRIDGE HOSPITAL
BY:
[Signed]
Leslie N. H. MacLeod,
Director
CONCILIO HISPANO DE CAMBRIDGE
BY:
[Signed]
Tulio Espada,
President
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EDITORIAL
CARTA A TODOS LOS HISPANOS Y AMIGOS DE CAMBRIDGE
Queridos Amigos:
Quiero informarle que aqui en Cambridge existe una agencia y
los propositos de esta agencia es mejorar el area que compone una
seccion de Cambridge. Esta agencia es el Cambridge Spanish Coun-
cil. Queremos informarle que en esta area vive la mayoria de la
communidad Hispana de esta ciudad.
Oimos decir en una reunion las otras noches cue hay dinero en-
vuelto para programas en dicha area, a la que nos referimos; en mi
peticion, yo quiero pedirle a todos Ustedes que se unan a mi persona
y a un grupo de lideres de la ciudad para las personas hispanas que
viven en esta area.
Como numero uno le voy a pedir que se construya un centra para
cuidar los ninos de todas aquellas madres que viven en dicha area y
al mismo tiempo que se ensene Ingles a nuestros hijos en este sector.
Tambien para que se le brinde alimentacion atencion medica; si es
necesario. Esto brindara la oportunidad para que todas las madres
puedan trabajar si es que asi lo desean y le brindara tranquilidad,
pues saben que en este lugar sus hijos, nuestros hijos, tendran ayuda
profesional GRATUITAMENTE.
Tambien queremos que se ofrezca un local donde ofrecer clases
de Ingles a los adultos, para asi mejorar en economia en nuestros
hogares, trabajos y toda la comunidad lispana de Cambridge.
Los invito a todos y cada uno de ustedes a que asistan este
proxima Domingo 19 de Octubre 1969 a una gran reunion de toda la
comunidad Hispana.
Tambien quiero que no se quede ninguno de los Hispanos de otras
areas en Cambridge, sin respaldar a todas las personas ed esta comu-
nidad, que tienen derecho a que se le ofrezca esta clase de programa.
El area que me refiero es la de Columbia St., Broadway, toda el area
de Mass Ave, Hampshire St. e East Cambridge. Esta area es mejor cono-
cido como MODEL CITIES.
Asi espero la cooperacion de todos Ustedes, el proximo Domingo.
La reunion se llevara acabo en el 595 de Mass Ave mejor conocido por
Latin American Sports Club a la 1:00PM Dios Mediante.
Habra refrigerios y golosinas.
Cordialmente.
[Signed] Jorge Cordova
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Interviews:
1. Gordon Brigham--First Executive Director, Cambridge Model Cities.
2. Robert A. Boyer-Director, City of Cambridge, Planning Department.
3. Carmen Colon--Chairwoman CAST I & II (1973-1974), Vice-President
Concilio Board, 1975. Coamena.
4. Daniel Driscoll--Director of Housing, Cambridge Redevelopment
Authority.
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Jayuyano history.
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Coameno.
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12. Father Daniel Sheehan-St. Mary's of the Annunciation Church,
Cambridge, Mass,
13. Joseph Tulmieri--Assistant Director of the Cambridge Redevelop-
ment Authority; Member, CEOC Board of Directors; Member, Model
Cities Board of Directors.
14. Councillor Albert Vellucci-Former Mayor of the City of Cambridge,
presently Councilman.
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15. Robert Williams--Second Executive Director, Cambridge Model Ci-
ties.
Interviews were conducted by the author as explained in the Preface
with:
50 Coamenos
50 Jayuyanos
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